a 


UC-NRLF 


SEXTUS  EMPIBICUS 

AND 

GREEK  SCEPTICISM 


A  Dissertation  for  the  Degree  of  Doctor  of 
Philosophy  in  the  University  of  Bern 


MARY  MILLS   PATRICK 


CAMBRIDGE 

DEIGHTON  BELL  &  CO. 
1899 


fr~ 


PREFACE 

THE  following  treatise  on  Sextus  Empiricus  and 
Greek  Scepticism  has  been  prepared  to  supply 
a  need  much  felt  in  the  English  language  by 
students  of  Greek  philosophy.  For,  while  other 
schools  of  Greek  philosophy  have  been  exhaust- 
ively and  critically  discussed  by  English  scholars, 
there  are  few  sources  of  information  available  to 
the  student  who  wishes  to  make  himself  familiar 
with  the  teachings  of  Pyrrhonism.  The  aim  has 
been,  accordingly,  to  give  a  concise  presentation 
of  Pyrrhonism  in  relation  to  its  historical  develop- 
ment and  the  scepticism  of  the  Academy,  with 
critical  references  to  the  French  and  German 
works  existing  on  the  subject.  The  time  and 
manner  of  the  connection  of  Sextus  Empiricus 
with  the  Pyrrhonean  School  has  also  been  dis- 
cussed. 

In  the  study  of  the  works  of  Sextus,  the  Greek 
text  of  Immanuel  Bekker,  Berlin,  1842,  has  been 
used,  with  frequent  consultation  of  the  text  of 
J.  A.  Fabricius,  1718,  which  was  taken  directly 
from  the  existing  manuscripts  of  the  works  of 


vi  PREFACE. 

Sextus.      Eeferences  to  Diogenes  Laertius  and 
other  ancient  works  have  been  carefully  verified. 
The  principal  modern  authors  consulted  are 
the  following: 

Ritter,  Oeschichte  der  Philosophic,  11  Auf.,  Hamburg, 

1836—38. 
Zeller,  Philosophic  der  Gi^iechen,  111   Auf.,  Leipzig, 

1879—89. 

Lewes,  History  of  Philosophy,  Vol.  I.,  London,  1866. 
Ueberweg,  History  of  Philosophy,  IV.  ed.,  tran.sl 

by  Morris,  1871. 

Brochard,  Les  Sceptiques  Grecs,  Paris,  1877. 
Brochard,  PyrrJion  et  le  Scepticism  Primitive,  No.  5, 

Ribot's  Revue  Phil.,  Pai  i 
Saisset,  Le  Scepticism  Aentsidfait-Pascal-Kant,  Paris, 

1867. 
Chaignet,  Histoire  de  la  Psychologic  des  Grecs,  Paris, 

1887—90. 

Haas,  Leben  des  Sextus  Empiricus,  Burghausen,  1882. 
Natorp,  Forschungen  zur  d'^llckte  des  Erkenntnis- 

problems  bei  den  Alien,  Berlin,  1884. 
Hirzel,    Untersuchungen  zu  Cicero's  philos<  / 

Schriften,  Leipzig,  1887—93. 
Pappenheim,   Erlduterung  zu  des  Scxtu*  Empiricus 

Pyrrhoneischen  Grundzugen,  11  i»l<  MX  i-.  1882. 
Pappenheim,  Die  Tropen  der  Qreichiach*  filter, 

Berlin,  IcSS.V 
Pappenheim,  LebensverhdU'n  i*se  des  Sextus  Empw*icus, 

Berlin,  1887. 
Pappenheim,  Der  angcblichc  Heraclitismus  des  Skep- 

tikers  Ainesidemos,  Berlin,  1887. 


PREFACE.  vii 

Pappenheim,  Der  Sitz  der  Schule  der  Griechischen 
Skeptiker,  Archiv  fur  Geschichte  der  Philosophic, 
1, 1.  S.  47,  1887. 

Maccoll,  The  Greek  Sceptics  from  Pyrrho  to  Sextus, 
London,  1869. 

My  grateful  acknowledgments  are  due  to 
Professor  Dr.  Ludwig  Stein,  Professor  of  Philo- 
sophy in  the  University  of  Bern,  for  valuable 
assistance  in  relation  to  the  plan  of  the  work, 
advice  in  respect  to  the  best  authorities  to  be 
consulted,  and  for  its  final  revision. 

BERN,  November  5,  1897. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I. 

PAOB 

THE  HISTORICAL  RELATIONS  OF  SEXTUS  EMPIRICUS.    .    .      1 
His  profession. — The  time   when   he   lived. — The   place 
where  he  taught. — The  character  of  his  writings. 

CHAPTER  II. 

THE  POSITION  AND  AIM  OF  PYERHONIC  SCEPTICISM    .    .    88 
Its   origin.  —  Its  nomenclature. — The   criterion   of   Pyr- 
rhonism.—  ^•rrox'n  and  arupa^la. 

CHAPTER  III. 

THE  TROPES  OF  PYRRHONIC  SCEPTICISM 31 

The  ten  Tropes  of  ^rox^.—  The  five  Tropes  of  Agrippa.— 
The  two  Tropes.— The  eight  Tropes  against  aetiology. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

AENESIDEMUS  AND  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  HERACLITUS  .    .    63 

The  statement  of  the  problem. — The  principal  theories  on 
the  subject.— Critical  examination  of  the  subject. 

CHAPTER  V. 

AN  ANALYSIS  OF  PYRRHONIC  SCEPTICISM 81 

Pyrrhonism  and  Pyrrho. — Pyrrhonism  and  the  Academy. 
— The  strength  and  weakness  of  Pyrrhonism. 


CHAPTER  I. 

The  Historical  Relations  of  Sextus  Empiricus. 

Interest  has  revived  in  the  works  of  Sextus  Empiri- 
cus in  recent  times,  especially,  one  may  say,  since  the 
date  of  Herbart.  There  is  much  in  the  writings  of 
Sextus  that  finds  a  parallel  in  the  methods  of  modern 
philosophy.  There  is  a  common  starting-point  in  the 
study  of  the  power  and  limitations  of  human  thought. 
There  is  a  common  desire  to  investigate  the  phenomena 
of  sense-perception,  and  the  genetic  relations  of  man  to 
the  lower  animals,  and  a  common  interest  in  the  theory 
of  human  knowledge. 

While,  however,  some  of  the  pages  of  Sextus'  works 
would  form  a  possible  introduction  to  certain  lines  of 
modern  philosophical  thought,  we  cannot  carry  the 
analogy  farther,  for  Pyrrhonism  as  a  whole  lacked  the 
essential  element  of  all  philosophical  progress,  which  is 
a  belief  in  the  possibility  of  finding  and  establishing 
the  truth  in  the  subjects  investigated. 

Before  beginning  a  critical  study  of  the  writings  of 
Sextus  Empiricus,  and  the  light  which  they  throw  on 
the  development  of  Greek  Scepticism,  it  is  necessary  to 
make  ourselves  somewhat  familiar  with  the  environ- 
ment in  which  he  lived  and  wrote.  We  shall  thus  be 
able  to  comprehend  more  fully  the  standpoint  from 
which  he  regarded  philosophical  questions. 

Let  us  accordingly  attempt  to  give  some  details  of 
his  life,  including  his  profession,  the  time  when  he  lived, 

1 


'2        Sextua  Empiricus  and  Oreek  Scepticism. 

tin-  place  of  liis  birth,  tin-  country  in  which  he  taught, 
;in<l  '  ral  aim  and  character  of  1.  .s.     Here, 

however,  we  encount*  difficulties,  for  although 

we  possess  most  of  tin-  writings  of  Sextus  well  pre- 
.  idonce  whicli  tiny  provide  on  the  points 
mentioned  is  very  slight.  He  does  not  give  us  bio- 
graphical d  tails  in  regard  to  himself,  nor  does  he  refer 
to  liis  contemporaries  in  a  way  to  afford  any  exact 
knowledge  of  them.  His  name  even  furnishes  us  with 
a  problem  impossible  of  solution.  If  tiled  Je^ro?  6 

by  Diogenes  Lacrtius1 :  'HpoSoTov  Se  Sujrcovce 

CfjiTreiplKOS,     OV     K(U     Tt\      SefCd    TO)V 

KOI  a\\a  tcd\\icTTa'    S*!~TOV  Sc  &nJKOv<T 
KvBfjvas,  epTreipiKos  KOI  auro?.    Although  in  this  passage 

ifl the  second  huut  the 

surname,  w«-  c.-innot  uii<lcrstaiul  t1  .ing  other 

than  tliat  Di«  >--. -!i« •>  c.  msidered  Sextus  a  physician  of  the 
Empirical   Sclioul.      ()tli.-r  evidence  also  is  not  war 

that  Sextos  bore  this  surname    I-'.  •    '-ius,  in  his  edition 

of  the  works  of  Sextus,  quotes  from  the  Tabetta  de 

•  >rum  of  Lambecius  the  statement  that 

US    was   called    Kmpl,  16   of  his   pO>'. 

in    nu.'dicine.2 

Pseudo-Galen  also  refers  to  him  as  one  of  the 
directors  of  the  Empirical  School,  and  calls  him  Se^ro^ 
6  e/jLTreipifcos.3  His  name  is  often  found  in  the  manu- 
scripts written  with  the  surname,  as  for  example  at  the 
end  of  Loyic  II.4  In  other  places  it  is  found  written 

1  Diog.  Laert.  ix.  12,  116. 

2  Fabricius  Testimonia,  p.  2. 

3  Pseudo-Galen  Isag.  4 ;  Fabriciua  Testimonia,  p.  2. 

4  Bekker  J/aM.  vin.  481. 


Historical  Relations  of  Sextus  Empiricus.       3 

without  the  surname,  as  Fabricius  testifies,  where 
Sextus  is  mentioned  as  a  Sceptic  in  connection  with 
Pyrrho. 

The  Sceptical  School  was  long  closely  connected 
with  the  Empirical  School  of  medicine,  and  the  later 
Pyrrhoneans,  when  they  were  physicians,  as  was  often 
the  case,  belonged  for  the  most  part  to  this  school. 
Menedotus  of  Nicomedia  is  the  first  Sceptic,  however, 
who  is  formally  spoken  of  as  an  Empirical  physician,1 
and  his  contemporary  Theodas  of  Laodicea  was  also 
an  Empirical  physician.  The  date  of  Menedotus  and 
Theodas  is  difficult  to  fix,  but  Brochard  and  Hass 
agree  that  it  was  about  150  A.D.2  After  the  time  of 
these  two  physicians,  who  were  also  each  in  turn  at 
the  head  of  the  Sceptical  School,3  there  seems  to 
have  been  a  definite  alliance  between  Pyrrhonism  and 
Empiricism  in  medicine,  and  we  have  every  reason  to 
believe  that  this  alliance  existed  until  the  time  of 
Sextus. 

The  difficulty  in  regard  to  the  name  arises  from 
Sextus'  own  testimony.  In  the  first  book  of  the  Hy- 
potyposes  he  takes  strong  ground  against  the  identity 
of  Pyrrhonism  and  Empiricism  in  medicine.  Although 
he  introduces  his  objections  with  the  admission  that 
"  some  say  that  they  are  the  same,"  in  recognition  of 
the  close  union  that  had  existed  between  them,  he  goes 
on  to  say  that  "  Empiricism  is  neither  Scepticism  itself, 
nor  would  it  suit  the  Sceptic  to  take  that  sect  upon 
himself,4  for  the  reason  that  Empiricism  maintains  dog- 
M  matically  the  impossibility  of  knowledge,  but  he  would 

1  Diog.  ix.  12,  115.  3  Diog.  ix.  12,  116. 

2  Brochard  Op.  cit.  Livre  iv.  p.  311.          4  Hyp.  I.  236. 


4        Sextus  Empiricu8  and  Greek  >m 


prefer  io  IM-I..II-  t.»  tin-  M<-tho.i'. 

only  medical  scliool  worthy  of  the  Sceptic.     "For  this 

alone  of  all  tin    medical  sects,  does  not  proceed  ra>hly 

it  seems  to  me,  in  regard  to  unknown  things,  and 

not  presume  to  say  whether  they  are  comprehensible 

or  not,  but  it  is  guided  by  phenomena.1     It  will  thus 

•hat  (In-  Methodical  School  of  medicine  has  a 

in  relationship  to  Scepticism  which  is  closer  than 

that  of  tin-  oilier  inediral  91  ' 

W.  know  from  th  uony  of  Sextus  himself 

that  li«-  wa.-  a  physician.  In  one  case  he  uses  the  first 
person  for  himself  as  a  physician,3  and  in  another  he 
sp.-aks  of  Asclepius  as  "the  founder  of  our  science/'4 
and  all  his  illustrations  >how  a  bn-adth  and  variety  of 
medical  kno\.  iiat  only  a  physician  could  possess. 

He  published  a  im-dical  work  which  he  refers  to  once 
as  la-Tpiica  v7ro/jLvyjfj,aTaf  and  again  as  efnreipiKa  vTro/jLvq- 
yLtara.0  Thrs.-  paaBBgei  probably  refer  to  the  same 
work,7  which,  unfortunately  for  the  solution  of  the  diffi- 
cult question  that  we  have  in  hand,  is  lost,  and  nothing 
is  known  of  its  contents. 

In  apparent  contradiction  to  his  statement  in  II  j- 
potyposes  I.,  that  Scepticism  and  Empiricism  are 
opposed  to  each  other,  in  that  Empiricism  denies  the 
possibility  of  knowledge,  and  Scepticism  makes  no 
dogmatic  statements  of  any  kind,  Sextus  classes  the 
Sceptics  and  Empiricists  together  in  another  instance, 
as  regarding  knowledge  as  impossible8  a\\'  ol  pev  <f)ao-iv 

1  Hyp.  i.  237.  5  Adv.  Math.  vn.  202. 

2  Hyp.  i.  241.  6  Adv.  Math.  A.  61. 

3  Hyp.  ii.  238.  :  Zcller  Up.  cit.  in.  43. 

4  Adv.  Math.  A.  260.  8  ^rfr.  ^aM.  vin.  191. 


Historical  Relations  of  Sextus  Empiricus.       5 


CLVTO,  fjirj  Kara\a/jL/3dv€o-0ai,,  &cr7rep  ol  CLTTO  rfjs 
larpol  /cal  ol  CLTTO  7779  o-/cei|rea)5  (j)i\6do^)OL.  In  another 
case,  on  the  contrary,  he  contrasts  the  Sceptics  sharply 
with  the  Empiricists  in  regard  to  the  aTroSe^?.1  ol  Se 
ep,7reipiKol  avaipovo~iv,  ol  Se  or/ceTrriKol  eV  eVo%^  Tavrrjv 


Pappenheim  thinks  that  Sextus  belonged  to  the 
Methodical  School,  both  from  his  strong  expression  in 
favor  of  that  school  in  Hyp.  I.  236,  as  above,  and  also 
because  many  of  his  medical  opinions,  as  found  in 
his  works,  agree  with  the  teachings  of  the  Methodical 
School,  more  nearly  than  with  those  of  the  Empiricists. 
Pappenheim  also  claims  that  we  find  no  inconsistency 
with  this  view  in  the  passage  given  where  Sextus 
classes  the  Sceptics  with  the  Empiricists,  but  considers 
that  statement  an  instance  of  carelessness  in  expressing 
himself,  on  the  part  of  Sextus.2 

The  position  of  Pappenheim  is  assailable  for  the 
reason  that  in  dealing  with  any  problem  regarding  an 
author  on  the  basis  of  internal  evidence,  we  have  no 
right  to  consider  one  of  his  statements  worthy  of 
weight,  and  another  one  unworthy,  on  the  supposition 
that  he  expressed  himself  carelessly  in  the  second 
instance.  Rather  must  we  attempt  to  find  his  true 
standpoint  by  fairly  meeting  all  the  difficulties  offered 
in  apparently  conflicting  passages.  This  has  been 
attempted  by  Zeller,  Brochard,  Natorp  and  others,  with 
the  general  result  that  all  things  considered  they  think 
without  doubt  that  Sextus  belonged  to  the  Empirical 

1  Adv.  Math.  vm.  328. 

2  Lebensverhdltnisse  des  Sex.  Em.  36. 


6        Sextus  Empiricus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

School.1  His  other  references  are  too  strong  to  allow 
his  fidelity  to  it  to  be  doubted.  He  is  called  one  of 
the  leaders  of  Empiricism  by  Pseudo-Galen,  and  his 
only  medical  work  bore  the  title  ejjLireipiKa  vTro^vri^a-ra. 
The  o]»inion  of  the  writers  above  referred  to  is  ih.v 

ge   which   we   hav<-  quoted   from   the   HypOtypQUQ 
does   not   necessarily  mean   that  Sextus  was  no* 
Kmpirieist,  hut   as   he  was  more  of  a  Sceptic  than  a 
physician,  he  gave  preference  to  those  doctrines  that 
were  most  c<»;  with  Scepticism,  and  accordingly 

claimed    that    it    was  not  absolutely  necessary  th 
Sceptic  phy-ician  .should  bean  Empiricist.    Natorp  con- 
siders that  the  different  standpoint  from  which  Sextus 
judges   the   Empirical   and   M  il   Schools   in   his 

dif'teient  wo) !  Bunted  f,,r  on  the  supposition  that 

he  was  an  Empiricist,  but  disagreed  with  that  school 
on  the  one  point  only."  Natorp  points  out  that  Sextus 
does  not  speak  more  favourably  of  the  medical  sUii 
the  Methodical  School,  but  only  compares  the  way  in 
which  both  schools  regarded  the  question  of  the  possi- 
bility of  knowledge,  and  thinks  that  S.-xtus  could  have 
been  an  Empiricist  as  a  physician  notwithstanding  his 
condemnation  of  the  attitude  of  the  Empirical  School 
in  relation  to  the  theory  of  knowledge.  This  difference 
between  the  two  schools  was  a  small  one,  and  on  a 
subtle  and  unimportant  point;  in  fact,  a  difference  in 
philosophical  theory,  and  not  in  medical  pra<" 

While    we    would    agree    with    the    authors   above 
referred  to,  that  Sextus  very  probably  recognized  the 

1  Brochard  Op.  cit.  Litre  iv.  317  ;  Zeller  Op.  cit.  in.  15 ;  Natorp  Op. 
cit.  p.  155. 

2  Natorp  Op.  cit.  157. 


Historical  Relations  of  Sextus  Empiricus.       7 

bond  between  the  Empirical  School  of  medicine  and 
Pyrrhonism,  yet  to  make  his  possible  connection  with 
that  school  the  explanation  of  his  name,  gives  him 
more  prominence  as  a  physician  than  is  consistent  with 
what  we  know  of  his  career.  The  long  continued  union 
of  Empiricism  and  Scepticism  would  naturally  support 
the  view  that  Sextus  was,  at  least  during  the  earlier 
part  of  his  life,  a  physician  of  that  school,  and  yet  it 
may  be  that  he  was  not  named  Empiricus  for  that 
reason.  There  is  one  instance  in  ancient  writiugs  where 
Empiricus  is  known  as  a  simple  proper  name.1  It  may 
have  been  a  proper  name  in  Sextus'  case,  or  there  are 
many  other  ways  in  which  it  could  have  originated,  as 
those  who  have  studied  the  origin  of  names  will  readily 
grant,  perhaps  indeed,  from  the  title  of  the  above-named 
work,  €/j,7reipifca  vivo JJLVT) para.  The  chief  argument  for 
this  view  of  the  case  is  that  there  were  other  leaders  of 
the  Sceptical  School,  for  whom  we  can  claim  far  greater 
influence  as  Empiricists  than  for  Sextus,  and  for  whom 
the  surname  Empiricus  would  have  been  more  appro- 
priate, if  it  was  given  in  consequence  of  prominence  in 
the  Empirical  School.  Sextus  is  known  to  the  world 
as  a  Sceptic,  and  not  as  a  physician.  He  was  classed  in 
later  times  with  Pyrrho,  and  his  philosophical  works 
survived,  while  his  medical  writings  did  not,  but  are 
chiefly  known  from  his  own  mention  of  them.  More- 
over, the  passage  which  we  have  quoted  from  the 
Hypotyposes  is  too  strong  to  allow  us  easily  to  believe 
that  Sextus  remained  all  his  life  a  member  of  the 
Empirical  School.  He  could  hardly  have  said,  "Nor 

1  Pappenbeim  Leb.  Ver.  Sex.  Em.  6. 


8        Sextus  Eri>i  >m. 

\\MiiId   it   Miit   tin-  Sc.-ptic  !•,  it  sect  upon  liitn- 

ine  belonged  to  it.     His  other 

s  to  the  Empirical  School,  of  a  more  favorable 

r,  can  be  easily  ex  on  the  ground  of  the 

long  coiitinm --I  connection  which  had  existed  between 

tin-  two  schools.     It  i    .{ii it.-  possible  to  suppose  that 

us  was  an  Empiricist  a  part  of  his  life,  and 
wards  found  the  Methodical  School  more  to  his  liking, 
.in  1  such  a  change  would  not  in  any  way  have  affected 
his  stand  as  a  physician. 

In  regard  to  the  exact  time  when  Sextus  Empiri 
I'm .•»!,  we  gain  very  little  knowledge  from  internal 
dence,  and  outside  sources  of  information  are  eq 
UIK •< Ttain.     Diogenes  Laertius  must  have  been  a  gene- 
ration younger  than  Sextus,  as  he  mention  -ciple 
ot'S.                 ' 'iriiinus,  as  an  Empii                       ^i.1     Tlic 
tini.'  of  Diog                usually  i                                first  half 
of  the  third  century  A.D.,2  therefore  Sextus  cannot  be 
brought  forward  later  than  the  beginning  of  the  century. 

is,  liowever,  directs  his  writings  entirely  against  the 
Dogmatics,  by  whom  he  distinctly  states  that  he  means 

the  Stoics,'  and  the  influence  of  the  Stoics  began  to 
decline  in  the  beginning  of  the  third  century  A.D.     A 
fact  often  used  as  a  help  in  fixing  the  date  of  Sext 
his  mention  of  Basilidcs  the  Stoic,4  d\\a  /cal  oi  OTGH*OI, 
ax?  oi  Trepl  7ov  Bd(ri\€iS7]v.    This  Basil  supposed 

to  be  identical  with  one  of  the  teachers  of  Marcus 
Aurelius.5  This  is  accepted  by  Zeller  in  the  second 
edition  of  his  Histwy  of  Philosophy,  but  not  in  the 

1  Diog.  ix.  12,  116.  4  Adv.  Math.  vin.  258. 

•  Ueberweg  Hist,  of  Phil.  p.  21.  5  Fabriciua  Vita  Sexti. 

s  Hyp.  i.  65. 


Historical  Relations  of  Sextus  Empiricus.       9 

third,  for  the  reason  that  Sextus,  in  all  the  work  from 
which  this  reference  is  taken,  i.e.  Math.  vn. — XL,  men- 
tions no  one  besides  Aenesidemus,  who  lived  later  than 
the  middle  of  the  last  century  B.C.1  The  Basilides- 
referred  to  by  Sextus  may  be  one  mentioned  in  a  list 
of  twenty  Stoics,  in  a  fragment  of  Diogenes  Laertius, 
recently  published  in  Berlin  by  Val  Rose.2  Too  much 
importance  has,  however,  been  given  to  the  relation  of 
the  mention  of  Basilides  the  Stoic  to  the  question  of 
the  date  of  Sextus.  Even  if  the  Basilides  referred  to 
by  Sextus  is  granted  to  have  been  the  teacher  of  Marcus 
Aurelius,  it  only  serves  to  show  that  Sextus  lived  either 
at  the  same  time  with  Marcus  Aurelius  or  after  him, 
which  is  a  conclusion  that  we  must  in  any  case  reach 
for  other  reasons. 

The  fact  that  has  caused  the  greatest  uncertainty  in 
regard  to  the  date  of  Sextus  is  that  Claudius  Galen  in 
his  works  mentions  several  Sceptics  who  were  also 
physicians  of  the  Empirical  School,3  and  often  speaks 
of  Herodotus,  supposed  to  be  identical  with  the  teacher 
of  Sextus  given  by  Diogenes  Laertius,4  but  makes  no 
reference  whatever  to  Sextus.  As  Galen's  time  passes 
the  limit  of  the  second  century  A.D.,  we  must  either 
infer  that  Sextus  was  not  the  well-known  physician 
that  he  was  stated  to  be  by  Pseudo-Galen,  and  con- 
sequently not  known  to  Galen,  or  that  Galen  wrote 
before  Sextus  became  prominent  as  a  Sceptic.  This 
silence  on  the  part  of  Galen  in  regard  to  Sextus 
increases  the  doubt,  caused  by  Sextus7  own  criticism 
of  the  Empirical  School  of  medicine,  as  to  his  having 

1  Zeller  Op.  cit.  in.  8.  3  Zeller,  in.  7. 

2  Brochard  Op.  cit.  iv.  315.  4  Diog.  xi.  12,  116. 


Jo      SeXttu  Kinjf'trlcua  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

an  KmpiriciM.     The  <iji'  made  more  com- 

plicated, as  it  is  diflienlt  to  fix  the  identity  of  the 
Herodotus  so  often  referred  to  by  Galen.1  As  Galen 
died  ;il)niit  -joo  A.I),  at  the  age  of  seventy,2  we  should 
fix  tin-  date  <>i'  Bextaa  early  iii  tip;  third  century,  and 
that  of  Diogenes  perhaps  a  little  Inter  than  the  middle, 
were  it  not  that  early  in  tin-  third  century  the  Stoics 

M   to  decline  in   influence,  and  could  hardly  have 
vxcitr.l  tin-  w.-umth  of  ai  displayed  by  Se 

We  must  then  suppose  that  Sextus  wrote  at  the  very 
i  o{  tin-  second  a  and  either  that  Galen 

did  not  know  him,  or  that  Galen's  books  were  pub- 
li>hed    before  Sextus  became  prominent   either  as  a 
physician  or  as  a  Sceptic.     The  fact  that  he  may 
heen  better  known  as  the  latter  than  as  the  former  does 
iifliciently    account     for   (Jal.-n's    >il«-nce,  as  other 

tiofl  are  i  1  hy  him  of  less  importance  than 

. nd  the  latter,  even  if  not  as  great  a  phy> 
den  asserts,  was  certainly  both  a  Sc 
and  a  phy>irian,  and  must  have  belonged  to  one  of  the 
schools  so  thorou  _  y  Galen — 

either  the  Knipiriral  «»i   the  Methudic-al.     Therefore,  if 
Sextua  were  a  contemporary  of  Galen,  he  was  so  far 
removed  i'roin  the  eircle  of  Galen's  acquaintances 
hare  made  DO  impression  upon  him,  rith-  i  Coptic 

01  a  physician,  a  supposition  that  is  very  improbable 
We  must  then  fix  the  date  of  Sextus  late  in  the  second 
century,  and  conclude  that  the  climax  of  his  public 
Career  was  ivaehed  after  Galen  had  finished  those  of  his 
writings  which  are  still  extant. 

1  Pappenheim  Lebetis.  Ver.  Sex.  Em.  30. 
•  Zfllcr  Urundriss  der  Get.  der  Phil.  p.  260. 


Historical  Relations  of  Sextus  Empiricus.     11 

Sextus  has  a  Latin  name,  but  he  was  a  Greek ;  we 
know  this  from  his  own  statement.1  We  also  know  that 
lie  must  have  been  a  Greek  from  the  beauty  and  facility 
•of  his  style,  and  from  his  acquaintance  with  Greek 
dialects.  The  place  of  his  birth  can  only,  however,  be 
conjectured,  from  arguments  indirectly  derived  from  his 
writings.  His  constant  references  throughout  his  works 
to  the  minute  customs  of  different  nations  ought  to 
.give  us  a  clue  to  the  solution  of  this  question,  but 
strange  to  say  they  do  not  give  us  a  decided  one.  Of 
these  references  a  large  number,  however,  relate  to  the 
customs  of  Libya,  showing  a  minute  knowledge  in 
regard  to  the  political  and  religious  customs  of  this 
land  that  he  displays  in  regard  to  no  other  country 
•except  Egypt.2  Fabricius  thinks  Libya  was  not  his 
birth  place  because  of  a  reference  which  he  makes  to  it 
in  the  Hypotyposes — 0patc£)v  Se  KOI  TairovXwv  (Aifivnv 
£e  edvos  roOro).3  This  conclusion  is,  however,  entirely 
unfounded,  as  the  explanation  of  Sextus  simply  shows 
that  the  people  whom  he  was  then  addressing  were  not 
familiar  with  the  nations  of  Libya.  Suidas  speaks  of 
two  men  called  Sextus,  one  from  Chseronea  and  one 
from  Libya,  both  of  whom  he  calls  Sceptics,  and  to  one 
of  whom  he  attributes  Sextus'  books.  All  authorities 
-agree  in  asserting  that  great  confusion  exists  in  the 
works  of  Suidas ;  and  Fabricius,  Zeller,  and  Pappenheim 
place  no  weight  upon  this  testimony  of  Suidas.4  Haas, 

1  Adv.  Math.  A.  246;  Hyp.  i.  152;  Hyp.  in.  211,  214. 

2  Haas  Op.  cit.  p.  10. 

3  Hyp.  in.  213. 

4  Pappenheim  Lebens.   Ver.  Sex.  Em.  5,  22 ;  Zeller  Op.  cit.  in.  39  ; 
JFabricius  Vita  de  Sextus. 


12       Sextus  Empiricus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

however,  contends1  that  it  is  unreasonable  to  suppose 
tli;it  tliis  confusion  could  go  as  far  as  to  attribute  the 
writings  of  Sextus  Kmpiricus  to  Sextus  of  Chaeronea, 
and  also  ni.iki  the  latt'-r  a  Sceptic,  and  he  considers  it 
f,n  more  reasonable  to  accept  the  testimony  of  Suidas, 
coincides  so  well  with  the  internal  evidence  of 
Se\tu.>'  writings  in  regard  to  his  native  land.  ! 
in  v< -rtheless  evident,  from  his  familiarity  with  the 
customs,  language,  and  laws  of  Athens,  Alexandria  and 
Rome,  that  he  must  have  resided  at  some  time  in  each 
of  these  cities. 

Of  all  the  problems  connected  with  the  historical 
Is  of  the  life  of  Sextus,  the  one  that  is  the  most 
difficult  <>l'  solution,  and  also  the  most  important  for  our 
iit  purpose  of  making  a  critical  study  of  his  teach- 
ing, is  to  fix  of  tin-  Sceptical  School  during  the 
time  that  he  was  in  charge  of  it.  The  Hypotyposes  are 
lectures  delivered  in  public  in  that  period  of  his  life. 
Where  then  were  they  delivered  ?  "NV  that  the 
Sceptical  School  must  have  had  a  long  continued  exis- 
tence as  a  definite  philosophical  movement,  although 
some  have  contended  otherwise.  The  fact  of  its  exis- 
tence as  an  organized  direction  of  thought,  is  demon- 
strated by  its  formulated  teachings,  and  the  list  L 
by  Diogenes  Laertius  of  its  principal  leaders,2  and 
by  references  from  the  writings  of  Sextus.  In  the 
first  book  of  Hypotyposes  he  refers  to  Scepticism  as 
a  distinct  system  of  philosophy,  /cat  Trjv  Sidtcpio-iv  r^ 
(T/eev/rea)?  CLTTO  TMV  irapaKei^evayv  avrfj  <f)i\o(ro(f)ia)v.3  He 
speaks  also  of  the  older  Sceptics,4  and  the  later  Sceptics.5 

i  Haas  Op.  cit.  p.  6.          •  Diog.  XT.  12,  115,  116.          s  Hyp.  i.  5. 
4  Hyp.  I.  36.          5  Hyp.  i.  164. 


Historical  Relations  of  Sextus  Empiricus.     13 

Pyrrho,  the  founder  of  the  school,  taught  in  Elis,  his 
native  village ;  but  even  as  early  as  the  time  of  Timon, 
his  immediate  follower,  his  teachings  were  somewhat 
known  in  Alexandria,  where  Timon  for  a  while  resided.1 
The  immediate  disciples  of  Timon,  as  given  by  Diogenes, 
were  not  men  known  in  Greece  or  mentioned  in  Greek 
writings.  Then  we  have  the  well-known  testimony  of 
Aristocles  the  Peripatetic  in  regard  to  Aenesidemus,  that 
he  taught  Pyrrhonism  in  Alexandria2 — e^#e?  teal  irp^v 
ev  'A\e£avSp€la  TTJ  tear'  Alyvirrov  Aivr)o-iSr]/j,6s  TLS  ava- 
£p)7rvpelv  fip^aro  TOV  vd\ov  TOVTOV. 

This  was  after  the  dogmatic  tendency  of  the  Academy 
under  Antiochus  and  his  followers  had  driven  Pyrrhon- 
ism from  the  partial  union  with  the  Academy,  which  it 
had  experienced  after  the  breaking  up  of  the  school  under 
the  immediate  successors  of  Timon.  Aenesidemus  taught 
about  the  time  of  our  era  in  Alexandria,  and  established 
the  school  there  anew ;  and  his  followers  are  spoken  of 
in  a  way  that  presupposes  their  continuing  in  the  same 
place.  There  is  every  reason  to  think  that  the  connec- 
tion of  Sextus  with  Alexandria  was  an  intimate  one, 
not  only  because  Alexandria  had  been  for  so  long  a 
time  the  seat  of  Pyrrhonism,  but  also  from  internal 
evidence  from  his  writings  and  their  subsequent  his- 
torical influence;  and  yet  the  Hypotyposes  could  not 
have  been  delivered  in  Alexandria,  as  he  often  refers  to 
that  place  in  comparison  with  the  place  where  he  was 
then  speaking.  He  says,  furthermore,  that  he  teaches 
in  the  same  place  where  his  master  taught.3 

1  Chaignet  Op.  cit.  45. 

2  Aristocles  of  Euseb.  Praep.  Ev.  xiv.  E.  446. 

3  Hyp.  m.  120. 


14       Seoctus  Empiricua  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

re  on  evOa  6  v(f>rjyrjrij<;  6  6/10?  SieXeyero,  evravda  eye*  vvv 
SiaXeyofjiai.  Therefore  the  school  nn  been  re- 

moved from  Alexandria,  in   or  before  tin-  time  of  the 
xtus,  to  some  otl  re     The  Hypoty- 

poses  are  from  beginning  to  end  a  direct  attack  on  the 
Dogmatics;  therefore  must  have  taught  ei 

in  some  city  where  th«  itic  philosophy  was  strong, 

or  in  some  rival  philosophical  cent!  Ihipotyposes 

show  also  that  the  writer  had  access  to  some  large 
library.  Al« •>; an dri a.  Rome  and  Athens  are  the  three 
plaoefl  the  most  probable  for  selection  for  such  a 
purpose.  For  whatever  reason  the  seat  of  the  school 
was  removed  from  Alexandria  by  the  master  of  Sextus, 
or  by  himselt,  IK. in  the  place  \  had  so  long  been 

united  with  the  Knipirical  School  of  medicine,  Athens 
AvoiiM  B6(  OMMri  suitable  city  ••mntinu 

in  the  land  where  Pyrrhonism  first  had  its  birth. 
Sextus,  however,  in  one  instance,  in  referring  to  things 
invisible  because  of  their  outward  relations,  says  in 
illustration,  "as  the  city  of  Athens  is  invisible  to  us  at 
present."1  In  other  p  lao  he  contrasts  the  Athen- 

ians with  the  people  whom  he  is  addressing,  equally 
with  the  Alexaiulrians,  thus  puttm-  At  liens  as  well  as 
Alexandria  out  of  the  question. 

Of  the  ditiVivnt  writers  on  Sextus  Empiricus,  those 
who  have  treated  this  part  of  the  subject  most  critically 
are  Haas  and  Pappenheim.  We  will  therefore  consider, 
somewhat  at  length,  the  results  presented  by  the.s 
authors.  Haas  thinks  that  the  Hypotyposes  were 
delivered  in  Rome  for  the  following  reasons.  Sextus" 

1  Hyp.  ii.  98. 


Historical  Relations  of  Sextus  Empiricus.     15 

lectures  must  have  been  given  in  some  centre  of  philo- 
sophical schools  and  of  learning.  He  never  opposes- 
Roman  relations  to  those  of  the  place  where  he  is 
speaking,  as  he  does  in  regard  to  Athens  and  Alexan- 
dria. He  uses  the  name  "Romans"  only  three  times,1 
once  comparing  them  to  the  Rhodians,  once  to  the 
Persians,  and  once  in  general  to  other  nations.2  In  the 
first  two  of  these  references,  the  expression  "  among  the 
Romans"  in  the  first  part  of  the  antithesis  is  followed 
by  the  expression,  "among  us,"  in  the. second  part, 
which  Haas  understands  to  be  synonymous.  The  third 
reference  is  in  regard  to  a  Roman  law,  and  the  use  of 
the  word  '  Roman '  does  not  at  all  show  that  Sextus  was 
not  then  in  Rome.  The  character  of  the  laws  referred 
to  by  Sextus  as  Trap'  t]^lv  shows  that  they  were  always 
Roman  laws,  and  his  definition  of  law3  is  especially  a 
definition  of  Roman  law.  This  argument  might,  it 
would  seem,  apply  to  any  part  of  the  Roman  Empire,, 
but  Haas  claims  that  the  whole  relation  of  law  to 
custom  as  treated  of  by  Sextus,  and  all  his  statements 
of  customs  forbidden  at  that  time  by  law,  point  to 
Rome  as  the  place  of  his  residence.  Further,  Haas 
considers  the  Herodotus  mentioned  by  Galen4  as  a  pro- 
minent physician  in  Rome,  to  have  been  the  predecessor 
and  master  of  Sextus,  in  whose  place  Sextus  says  that 
he  is  teaching.5  Haas  also  thinks  that  Sextus'  refuta- 
tion  of  the  identity  of  Pyrrhonism  with  Empiricism 
evidently  refers  to  a  paragraph  in  Galen's  Subfiguraiio 

1  Haas  Op.  cit.  p.  15. 

2  Hyp.  i.  149,  152;  m.  211. 

3  Hyp.  i.  146. 

4  Galen  depuls.  iv.  11 ;  Bd.  ym.  751.  5  Hyp.  in.  120. 


16      Sextus  Empiricus  a/nd  <>  ism. 


Empirl<:<i,1  which  would  be  natural  ii'  th»- 

shortly  after  Galenas  Sub.  Em.,  and  in  the 

place.     Further,  Hippolytus,  \\li»  wrote  in  or  near 

Rome  very  soon  after  the  time  of  S  upan-ntly 

the  J/t'/]»>ft'jp08e8,  which  would  be  more  natural  if 

rote  in  the  same  place.     According  to  Haas,  every 

thing    in    internal    e  and    outward    testimony, 

points  to  Rome  as  having  been  the  city  where  S 

occupied  his  p«.Mi  ion  as  the  head  of  the  Sceptical  School. 

Com  in.  4  nuw  to  the  position  of  Pappenheim  on  this 

subject,  we   find   that  he  takes  very  decided  ground 

at  of  the  Sceptical  School  h,  jn  in 

Rome,  even  for  a  short  time,  in  his  latest  publication 

••ling  it.2  This  opinion  is  the  xesult  of  late  Bi 
on  the  part  of  Pappenhe-im,  for  in  his  work  on  the 
Lcbensvcrhaltnisse  des  Sextus  Empiiwus  Berlin  1875, 
he  says,  "Dass  Herodotus  in  Rom  lebte  sagt  Galen. 
Vermuthlich  auch  Sextus."  His  reasons  given  in  the 
later  article  for  not  connecting  the  Sceptical  School  at 
all  with  Rome  are  as  follows.  He  finds  no  proof  of  the 
influence  of  Scepticism  in  Rome,  as  Cicero  remarks  that 
Pyrrhonism  is  extinct,3  and  he  also  gives  weight  to  the 
well-known  sarcastic  saying  of  Seneca,  Qc'ts  est  qui 
Iradat  praecepta  l\/rrhoni#  !4  While  Haas  claims 
that  Sextus  would  naturally  seek  one  of  the  centres  of 
dogmatism,  in  order  most  effectively  to  combat  it, 
Pappenheim,  on  the  contrary,  contends  that  it  would 
have  been  foolishness  on  the  part  of  Sextus  to  think  of 

1  Galen  Sub.  Em.  123  B—  126  D.  (Basileae,  1542). 

2  Pappenheim  Sitz  der  Skeptischen  Schule.    Archiv  fiir  Getchichte  der 
Phil.  1888. 

3  Cicero  De  Oral.  in.  17,  62.  4  Seneca  nat.  qu.  vn.  32. 


Historical  Relations  of  Sextus  Empiricus.     17 

starting  the  Sceptical  School  in  Rome,  where  Stoicism 
was  the  favored  philosophy  of  the  Roman  Emperors; 
and  when  either  for  the  possible  reason  of  strife  between 
the  Empirical  and  Methodical  Schools,  or  for  some  other 
cause,  the  Pyrrhonean  School  was  removed  from  Alex- 
andria, Pappenheim  claims  that  all  testimony  points  to 
the  conclusion  that  it  was  founded  in  some  city  of  the 
East.  The  name  of  Sextus  is  never  known  in  Roman 
literature,  but  in  the  East,  on  the  contrary,  literature 
speaks  for  centuries  of  Sextus  and  Pyrrho.  The  Hy- 
poty poses,  especially,  were  well-known  in  the  East,  and 
references  to  Sextus  are  found  there  in  philosophical 
and  religious  dogmatic  writings.  The  Emperor  Julian 
makes  use  of  the  works  of  Sextus,  and  he  is  frequently 
quoted  by  the  Church  Fathers  of  the  Eastern  Church.1 
Pappenheim  accordingly  concludes  that  the  seat  of 
Pyrrhonism  after  the  school  was  removed  from  Alex- 
andria, was  in  some  unknown  city  of  the  East. 

In  estimating  the  weight  of  these  arguments,  we 
must  accept  with  Pappenheim  the  close  connection  of 
Pyrrhonism  with  Alexandria,  and  the  subsequent  influ- 
ence which  it  exerted  upon  the  literature  of  the  East. 
All  historical  relations  tend  to  fix  the  permanent  seat 
of  Pyrrhonism,  after  its  separation  from  the  Academy,  in 
Alexandria.  There  is  nothing  to  point  to  its  removal 
from  Alexandria  before  the  time  of  Menodotus,  who  is 
the  teacher  of  Herodotus,2  and  for  many  reasons  to  be 
•considered  the  real  teacher  of  Sextus.  It  was  Menodo- 
tus who  perfected  the  Empirical  doctrines,  and  who 
brought  about  an  official  union  between  Scepticism  and 

1  Fabricius  de  Sexto  Empirico  Testimonia. 

2  Diog.  ix.  12,  116. 


1^       Sextus  Empiincux  and  (Ireck  Scepticism. 

Kmpiricism,  arid  who  gave  Pyrrhonism  in  -^reat  measure, 
tlie  f'dii.t  that  it  enjoyed  in  Alexandria,  and  who 
appears  to  have  been  the  most  powerful  influen- 
the  school,  from  the  time  of  Aenesidemus  to  that  of 
Sextus.  Furthermore,  Sextus'  familiaiity  with  Al- 
drian  customs  bears  the  imprint  of  original  knowledge, 
and  he  cannot,  as  Zcller  implies,  be  accepted  as  simply 
quoting.  One  could  hardly  agree  with  Zoller,1 
the  familiarity  sliown  by  Sextus  with  the  customs  of 
both  Alexandria  and  Rome  in  the  Hypotyposes  does 
not  necessarily  show  that  he  ever  lived  in  either  of 
those  places,  because  a  lar^v  part  of  his  works  are  com- 
pilations from  other  books;  but  on  the  contrary,  the 
careful  reader  of  Sextus'  works  must  find  in  all  of  them 
much  evidence  <>f  per-onal  knowledge  of  Alexandria, 
Athens  and  Rom,-. 

A  part  of  Sextus'  books  also  may  have  been  \vri 
in  Alexandria.  Tlpbs  <f>v(riKovs  could  have  been  written 
in  Alexandria-  If  the<e  w.  re  also  lectures.  th< 
taught  in  Alexandria  as  well  as  elsewhere.  The  history  of 
1 1 ure  for  the  centuries  immediately  folio  w- 
iiiLT  the  time  of  Sextus,  showing  as  it  does  in  so  many 
instances  the  influence  of  Pyrrhonism,  and  a  knowledge 
of  the  HypotypOB68,  furnishes  us  with  an  incontestable 
proof  that  the  school  could  not  have  been  for  a  long 
time  removed  from  the  East,  and  the  absence  of  such 
knowledge  in  Roman  literature  is  also  a  strong  argu- 
ment against  its  long  continuance  in  that  city.  It 
would  seem,  however,  from  all  the  data  at  command. 

1  Zcller  Op.  cit.  in.  p.  39. 

2  Pappenheim  Sitz  dcr  Skeptischen  Schule ;  Archiv  fiir  Geschichte  der 
Mil.,  1888;  Adv.  Math.  x.  15,  95. 


Historical  Relations  of  Sextus  Empiricus.     19 

that  during  the  years  that  the  Sceptical  School  was 
removed  from  Alexandria,  its  head-  quarters  were 
in  Rome,  and  that  the  Pyrrhonean  Hypotyposes  were 
delivered  in  Rome.  Let  us  briefly  consider  the  argu- 
ments in  favour  of  such  a  hypothesis.  Scepticism  was 
not  unknown  in  Rome.  Pappenheim  quotes  the  remark 
of  Cicero  that  Pyrrhonism  was  long  since  dead,  and  the 
sarcasm  of  Seneca,  Quis  est  qui  tradat  praecepta 
Pyrrhonis?  as  an  argument  against  the  knowledge 
of  Pyrrhonism  in  Rome.  We  must  remember,  however, 
that  in  Cicero's  time  Aenesidemus  had  not  yet  separated 
himself  from  the  Academy;  or  if  we  consider  the 
Lucius  Tubero  to  whom  Aenesidemus  dedicated  his 
works,  as  the  same  Lucius  Tubero  who  was  the  friend 
of  Cicero  in  his  youth,  and  accordingly  fix  the  date  of 
Aenesidemus  about  50  B.C.,1  even  then  Aenesidemus' 
work  in  Alexandria  was  too  late  to  have  necessarily  been 
known  to  Cicero,  whose  remark  must  have  been  referred 
to  the  old  school  of  Scepticism.  Should  we  grant,  how- 
ever, that  the  statements  of  Cicero  and  Seneca  prove 
that  in  their  time  Pyrrhonism  was  extinct  in  Rome, 
they  certainly  do  not  show  that  after  their  death  it 
could  not  have  again  revived,  for  the  Hypotyposes 
were  delivered  more  than  a  century  after  the  death  of 
Seneca.  There  are  very  few  writers  in  Aenesidemus' 
own  time  who  showed  any  influence  of  his  teachings.2 
This  influence  was  felt  later,  as  Pyrrhonism  became 
better  known.  That  Pyrrhonism  received  some  atten- 
tion in  Rome  before  the  time  of  Sextus  is  nevertheless 
demonstrated  by  the  teachings  of  Favorinus  there. 

1  Zeller  Op.  cit.  in.  10.  2  Zeller  Op.  cit.  p.  63. 


ShnpfoicuB  and  Gh  <$m. 

Altliui.  »iinus  was  known   as  an  Academic 

the  title  oi  his  principal  work  was  ruv^  (f>i\oao<})oufjLevov<; 
avT(Z  TOW  \6ya)v,  &v  apicfroi  ol  IIvpp(t)veioi.}  Suidas 
calls  Favorinus  a  great  author  and  learned  in  all  science 
and  philosophy,1  aud  Favorinus  made  Rome  the  centre 
of  his  teaching  and  writin-.  j  1 '.  -d  by  Zeller 

at  MO- !.")<)  A.D.,  therefore  Pyrrhonism  was  known  in 
Rome  shortly  before  the  time  of  Sextus. 

The  whole  tone  of  the  Hypotyposes,  with  the 
constant  references  to  the  Stoics  as  living  present 
opponents,  shows  thai  tin  ><  ir.-tures  must  have  been 
delivered  in  one  of  the  centres  of  Stoic  !ex- 

andria  and  Athens  are  out  of  the  question,  all  testimony 
points  to  Rome  as  having  been  the  seat  of  the  Pyrrho- 
IH  an  School,  for  at  least  a  part  of  the  time  that  Sextus 
was  at  its  head.  We  would  then  accept  the  teacher  of 
Sextus,  in  v  ace  he  says  he  taught,  as  the  Hero- 

dotus so  often  referred  to  by  Galen3  who  lived  in  Rome. 
<[uent  references  to  Asdepiades,  whom  he 
mentions  ten  different  times  by  name  in  his  \\-orl. 
speak  in  favour  of  Rome  in  the  matter  under  discussion, 
as  Asdepiades  made  that  city  one  of  the  centres  of 
medical  culture.  On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that 
there  is  no  trace  of  the  Hypotyposes  in  later  Roman 
literature,  with  the  one  exception  of  the  works  of  Hip- 
polytus,  as  opposed  to  the  wide-spread  knowledge  of 
them  shown  in  the  East  for  centuries,  is  incontestable 
historical  proof  that  the  Sceptical  School  could  not  long 
have  had  its  seat  at  Rome.  From  the  two  passages 
given  above  from  Sextus'  work  against  physics,  he  must 

1  Zellor  Op.  cit.  p.  67.  3  Galen  vm.  751. 

2  Brochard  Op.  cit.  329.  4  Bekker  Index. 


Historical  Relations  of  Sextus  Empiricus.     21 

either  have  written  that  book  in  Alexandria,  it  would 
seem,  or  have  quoted  those  passages  from  some  other 
work.  May  we  not  then  conclude,  that  Sextus  was  at 
the  head  of  the  school  in  Home  for  a  short  time,  where 
it  may  have  been  removed  temporarily,  on  account  of 
the  difficulty  with  the  Empiricists,  implied  in  Hyp.  I. 
236-241,  or  in  order  to  be  better  able  to  attack  the 
Stoics,  but  that  he  also  taught  in  Alexandria,  where  the 
real  home  of  the  school  was  certainly  found  ?  There  it 
probably  came  to  an  end  about  fifty  years  after  the  time 
of  Sextus,  and  from  that  centre  the  Sceptical  works  of 
Sextus  had  their  wide-spread  influence  in  the  East. 

The  books  of  Sextus  Empiricus  furnish  us  with  the 
best  and  fullest  presentation  of  ancient  Scepticism 
which  has  been  preserved  to  modern  times,  and  give 
Sextus  the  position  of  one  of  the  greatest  men  of  the 
Sceptical  School.  His  works  which  are  still  extant  are 
the  Pyrrhonean  Hypotyposes  in  three  volumes,  and  the 
two  works  comprising  eleven  books  which  have  been 
united  in  later  times  under  the  title  of  ?rpo9  ^aOri^an- 
KOVS,  one  of  which  is  directed  against  the  sciences  in 
general,  and  the  other  against  the  dogmatic  philoso- 
phers. The  six  books  composing  the  first  of  these  are 
written  respectively  against  grammarians,  rhetoricians, 
geometricians,  arithmeticians,  astronomers  and  music- 
ians. The  five  books  of  the  latter  consist  of  two 
against  the  logicians,  two  against  physics,  and  one 
against  systems  of  morals.  If  the  last  short  work  of 
the  first  book  directed  against  the  arithmeticians  is  com- 
bined with  the  one  preceding  against  the  geometricians, 
as  it  well  could  be,  the  two  works  together  would  be 
divided  into  ten  different  parts;  there  is  evidence  to 


--       Sextua  Empiincua  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

show  that  in  ancient  times  such  a  division  was  in 
There  were  two  other  works  of  Sextus  which  are  now 
lost,  tin-  medical  work  before  referred  to,  and  a  book 
entitled  Trepl  yfrvxns.  The  character  of  the  extant 
works  of  Sextus  is  similar,  as  they  are  all  directed 
either  against  science  or  against  the  dogmatics,  and 
they  all  present  the  negative  side  of  Pyrrhonism.  The 

nay  of  arguments  comprising  the  subject-matter, 
often  repeated  in  the  same  and  different  forms,  are 
•  •vidcntly  taken  largely  from  the  Sceptical  works  which 
Sextus  had  resource  to,  and  are,  in  fact,  a  summing  up 
of  all  the  wisdom  of  the  S  School.  The  style  of 

books  is  fluent,  and  the  Greek  reminds  one  of 
Plutarch  and  Thucyd'uh's,  and  although  Scxtus  does 
not  claim  originality,  l,ut  j,n •-•< -nts  in  all  cases  the  ; 
inents  of  the  Sceptic,  yet  the  illustrations  and  the 
form  in  which  the  argument*  are  presented,  often  bear 
the  marks  of  his  own  thought,  and  are  char 

and  there  by  a  wealth  of  humor  that  has  not  been 
sufficiently  noticed  in  the  critical  works  on  Sextus.  Of 
all  the  anthers  who  have  reviewed  Sextus,  Brochard  is 
the  only  one  who  seems  to  have  understood  and  appre- 
ciated his  humorous  side. 

We  shall  now  proceed  to  the  consideration  of  the 
general  position  and  aim  of  Pyrrhonism. 

1  Diog.  ix.  12,  lie. 


CHAPTER  II. 

The  Position  and  Aim  of  Pyrrhonism. 

The  first  volume  of  the  Pyrrhonean  Hypotyposes 
gives  the  most  complete  statement  found  in  any  of  the 
works  of  Sextus  Empiricus  of  the  teachings  of  Pyrrho- 
nism and  its  relation  to  other  schools  of  philosophy. 
The  chief  source  of  the  subject-matter  presented  is  a 
work  of  the  same  name  by  Aenesidemus,1  either  directly 
used  by  Sextus,  or  ^through  the  writings  of  those  who 
followed  Aenesidemus.  The  comprehensive  title  Hvppdt- 
veioi  vTTOTVTrdcKjeis  was  very  probably  used  in  general  to 
designate  courses  of  lectures  given  by  the  leaders  of  the 
Sceptical  School. 

In  the  opening  chapters  of  the  Hypotyposes  Sextus 
undertakes  to  define  the  position  and  aim  of  Pyrrho- 
nism.2 In  introducing  his  subject  he  treats  briefly  of 
the  differences  between  philosophical  schools,  dividing 
them  into  three  classes ;  those  which  claim  that  they 
have  found  the  truth,  like  the  schools  of  Aristotle  and 
Epicurus  and  the  Stoics;  those  which  deny  the  possibility 
of  finding  it,  like  that  of  the  Academicians ;  and  those 
that  still  seek  it,  like  the  Sceptical  School.  The  accu- 
sation against  the  Academicians,  that  they  denied  the 
possibility  of  finding  the  truth,  was  one  that  the  Sceptics 
were  very  fond  of  making.  We  shall  discuss  the  justice 
of  it  later,  simply  remarking  here,  that  to  affirm  the 

1  Diog.  ix.  11,  78.  2  Hyp.  i.  3,  4. 


h'iit,iricw*  tmd  Gh 


••  incomprehensibility  <>{  the  uukn  ..as  a  form  of 

expression    that,    tin-  Pyrrhonists  them- 

tiinc.^    1"  into,    notwithstanding    their    ca. 

avoidance   of  dogmatic   itatementfc1 

After  defining  tin-  three  kind*  ul'  philosophy  as 
KiatiCj  ill*-  Academic  ami  the  Sceptic,  Sextu 
minds  his  hearers  tliat  he  does  not  speak  dogmatically 
in  anything  that  he  says,  but  that  he  intends  simply  to 
Sceptical  arguments  historically,  and  as 
th«  -y  appear  to  him.     He  characterizes  his  treatment  of 
'ihject  as  general  rather  than  critical,  including  a 
statt  niriit  of  the  character  of  Scepticism,  its  idea,  its 
principles,   its   manner  of  iva  its  criterion  and 

aim,  and  a  piv.M-ntation  of  thu  Tropes,  or  aspects  of 
doubt,  and  the  Sceptical  formulae  and  the  distinction 
bet\\.  schools  of  philo- 

sophy.2 

The  result  of  all  the  gradual  changes  which  I 
development  of  thought  had  brought  about  in  the  out- 
ward relations  of  the  Sceptical  School,  was  to  increase 
the  earnestness  of  the  claim  of  the  Sceptics  to  be  simply 
followers  of  Pyrrho,  the  great  founder  of  the  movement. 
in  discussing  the  names  given  to  the  Sceptics,  Sex  t  us 
precedence  very  decidedly  to  the  title  "  Pyrrho- 
nean,"  because  Pyrrho  appears  the  best  representative 
of  Scepticism,  aud  more  prominent  than  all  who  before 
him  occupied  themselves  with  it.3 

It  was  a  question  much  discussed  among  philoso- 
phers in  ancient  times,  whether  Pyrrhonism  should  be 
considered  a  philosophical  sect  or  not.  Thus  we  find 

1  Adv.  Math.  viii.  191.  3  Hyp.  i.  5,  6.  3  Eyp.  i.  7. 


The  Position  and  Aim  of  Pyrrhonism.       25 

that  Hippobotus  in  his  work  entitled  Trepl  aipevewv, 
written  shortly  before  our  era,  does  not  include  Pyrrho- 
nism among  the  other  sects.1  Diogenes  himself,  after 
some  hesitation  remarking  that  many  do  not  consider 
it  a  sect,  finally  decides  to  call  it  so.2 

Sextus  in  discussing  this  subject  calls  Scepticism  an 
aycoyrj,  or  a  movement,  rather  than  a  a2p€<rt?,  saying 
that  Scepticism  is  not  a  sect,  if  that  word  implies  a 
systematic  arrangement  of  dogmas,  for  the  Sceptic  has 
no  dogmas.  If,  however,  a  sect  may  mean  simply  the 
following  of  a  certain  system  of  reasoning  according  to 
what  appears  to  be  true,  then  Scepticism  is  a  sect.3 
From  a  quotation  given  later  on  by  Sextus  from 
Aenesidemus,  we  know  that  the  latter  used  the  term 
dya)<yij*  Sextus  gives  also  the  other  titles,  so  well  known 
as  having  been  applied  to  Scepticism,  namely,  fyrrjTLfcij, 
€<f)€KTiici]j  and  aTroprjriKr]?  The  Svvajjus6  of  Scepticism 
is  to  oppose  the  things  of  sense  and  intellect  in  every 
possible  way  to  each  other,  and  through  the  equal 
weight  of  things  opposed,  or  laoaOiveiaj  to  reach  first 
the  state  of  suspension  of  judgement,  and  afterwards 
ataraxia,  or  "  repose  and  tranquillity  of  soul."7  The  pur- 
pose of  Scepticism  is  then  the  hope  of  ataraxia,  and  its 
origin  was  in  the  troubled  state  of  mind  induced  by  the 
inequality  of  things,  and  uncertainty  in  regard  to  the 
truth.  Therefore,  says  Sextus,  men  of  the  greatest 
talent  began  the  Sceptical  system  by  placing  in  opposi- 
tion to  every  argument  an  equal  one,  thus  leading  to  a 

1  Diog.  Pro.  19.  5  Hyp.  i.  7;  Diog.  ix.  11,  70. 

2  Diog.  Pro.  20.  6  Hyp.  i.  8. 

3  Hyp.  i.  16,  17.  7  Hyp.  i.  10. 

4  Hyp.  i.  210. 


iW       Sextus  Kn>i>'ricu8  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

philosophical  system  without  a  do^ma,  for  •  tic 

Haims  that  h«-  has  no  dogma.1  The  Scept 
supposed  to  state  a  decided  opinion,  but  only  to  say 
what  appears  to  him.  Even  the  Sceptical  formulae, 
such  as  "Nothing  more/'2  or  "I  decide  nothing/'3  or 
""All  is  false,"  include  themselves  with  other  things. 
The  only  statements  that  the  Sceptic  can  make,  are  in 
regard  to  his  own  sensations.  He  cannot  deny  that  he 
is  warm  or  cold  or  hungry. 

;tas  n -plies  to  the  charge  that  the  Sceptics  deny 
phenomena  by  refuting  it.4     Tli  ic  does  not  deny 

phenomena.  beo*CI86  they  are  the  only  criteria  by  which 
he  <  an  regulate  his  actions.  "We  call  the  criterion  of 
the  Sceptical  Seh<>ol  tli«  ]»henomenon,  meaning  by  this 
name  tlie  idea  of  it."5  Phenoir,  the  only  things 

which  the  Sceptic  does  not  deny,  and  he  guides  his  ] 
by  them.  They  are,  however,  subjective.  Sextus  di>- 
tinctly  affirms  that  sensations  are  the  phenomena,*  and 
that  they  lie  in  susceptibility  and  voluntary  feeling, 
and  that  they  constitute  the  appearances  of  obje< 
We  see  from  this  that  Sextus  makes  the  only  reality  to 
consist  in  subjective  experience,  but  he  does  not  follow 
this  to  its  logical  conclusion,  and  doubt  the  existence  of 
anything  outside  of  mind.  He  rather  takes  for  granted 
that  there  is  a  something  unknown  outside,  about  which 
the  Sceptic  can  make  no  assertions.  Phenomena  are 
the  criteria  according  to  which  the  Sceptic  orders  his 
daily  life,  as  he  cannot  be  entirely  inactive,  and  they 

1  Hyp.  i.  12.  5  Hyp.  i.  19. 

2  Hyp.  i.  14.  6  Hyp.  i.  22;  Diog.  ix.  11,  105. 

*  Hyp.  i.  14.  '  Hyp.  i.  22. 

*  Hyp.  i.  19. 


The  Position  and  Aim  of  Pyrrhonism.       27 

affect  life  in  four  different  ways.  They  constitute  the 
guidance  of  nature,  the  impulse  of  feeling;  they  give 
rise  to  the  traditions  of  customs  and  laws,  and  make 
the  teaching  of  the  arts  important.1  According  to  the 
tradition  of  laws  and  customs,  piety  is  a  good  in  daily 
life,  but  it  is  not  in  itself  an  abstract  good.  The  Sceptic 
•of  Sextus'  time  also  inculcated  the  teaching  of  the  arts, 
as  indeed  must  be  the  case  with  professing  physicians, 
as  most  of  the  leading  Sceptics  were.  Sextus  says, 
""  We  are  not  without  energy  in  the  arts  which  we 
undertake."2  This  was  a  positive  tendency  which  no 
philosophy,  however  negative,  could  escape,  and  the 
Sceptic  tried  to  avoid  inconsistency  in  this  respect,  by 
separating  his  philosophy  from  his  theory  of  life.  His 
philosophy  controlled  his  opinions,  and  his  life  was 
governed  by  phenomena. 

The  aim  of  Pyrrhonism  was  ataraxia  in  those  things 
which  pertain  to  opinion,  and  moderation  in  the  things 
which  life  imposes.3  In  other  words,  we  find  here  the 
same  natural  desire  of  the  human  being  to  rise  above 
and  beyond  the  limitations  which  pain  and  passion 
impose,  which  is  expressed  in  other  forms,  and  under 
other  names,  in  other  schools  of  philosophy.  The 
method,  however,  by  which  ataraxia  or  peace  of  mind 
could  be  reached,  was  peculiar  to  the  Sceptic.  It  is  a 
state  of  psychological  equilibrium,  which  results  from 
the  equality  of  the  weight  of  different  arguments  that 
are  opposed  to  each  other,  and  the  consequent  impossi- 
bility of  affirming  in  regard  to  either  one,  that  it  is 
correct.4  The  discovery  of  ataraxia  was,  in  the  first 

1  Hyp.  i.  23.         2  Hyp.  i.  24.         3  Hyp.  i.  25.         4  Hyp.  i.  26. 


28       Sextus  Empiricua  and  Greek  &•» ],f'irlfim. 

instance,  apparently  accidental,  for  while  the  So 
withhold  his  opinion,  unable  to  decide  what  things  were 
true,  and  what  things  were  false,  ataraxia  fortunately 
followed.1  After  he  had  begun  to  philosophize,  with  a 
<•  to  discriminate  in  regard  to  ideas,  and  to  separate 
the  true  from  the  false2  during  the  time  of  eVo;^;,  or 
suspension  of  judgement,  ataraxia  followed  as  if  by 
chance,  as  the  shadow  follows  the  body.3 

The  Sceptic  in  seeking  ataraxia  in  the  things  of 
opinion,  does  not  entirely  escape  from  suffering  from 
n-ations.  He  is  not  wholly  undisturbed,  for  h«  is 
sometimes  cold  and  hungry,  and  so  on.4  He  claims, 
nevertheless:,  that  he  suffers  less  than  the  dogmatist,, 
who  is  beset  with  two  kinds  of  suffering,  one  from  the 
feelings  themselves,  and  also  from  the  conviction  that 
they  are  by  nature  an  evil."  To  the  Sceptic  nothing  is 
in  itself  either  an  evil  or  a  good,  and  so  he  thinks  that 
"he  escapes  from  difficult  r."6  For  instance,  he 

who  considers  riches  a  good  in  themselves,  is  unhappy 
in  the  loss  of  them,  and  in  possession  of  thom  is  in  fear 
of  losing  them,  while  the  Sceptic,  remembering  the 
Sceptical  saying  "  No  more,"  is  untroubled  in  whatever 
condition  he  may  be  found,  as  the  loss  of  riches  is  no 
more  an  evil  than  the  possession  of  them  is  a  good.7 
For  he  who  considers  anything  good  or  bad  by  nature 
is  always  troubled,  and  when  that  which  seemed  good  is 
not  present  with  him,  he  thinks  that  he  is  tortured  by 
that  which  is  by  nature  bad,  and  follows  after  what  he 

1  Hyp.  i.  26.  «  Hyp.  i.  30. 

2  Diog.  ix.  11,  107.  5  Hyp.  i.  30. 

3  Hyp.  i.  29.  •  Hpy.  i.  30 ;  Diog.  ix.  11,  61. 

7  Adv.  Math.  xi.  146—160. 


The  Position  and  Aim  of  Pyrrhonism.       29 

thinks  to  be  good.  Having  acquired  it,  however,  he  is 
not  at  rest,  for  his  reason  tells  him  that  a  sudden  change 
may  deprive  him  of  this  thing  that  he  considers  a  good.1 
The  Sceptic,  however,  endeavours  neither  to  avoid  nor 
seek  anything  eagerly.2 

Ataraxia  came  to  the  Sceptic  as  success  in  painting 
the  foam  on  a  horse's  mouth  came  to  Apelles  the  painter. 
After  many  attempts  to  do  this,  and  many  failures,  he 
gave  up  in  despair,  and  threw  the  sponge  at  the  picture 
that  he  had  used  to  wipe  the  colors  from  the  painting 
with.  As  soon  as  it  touched  'the  picture  it  produced  a 
representation  of  the  foam.3  Thus  the  Sceptics  were 
never  able  to  attain  to  ataraxia  by  examining  the 
anomaly  between  the  phenomena  and  the  things  of 
thought,  but  it  came  to  them  of  its  own  accord  just 
when  they  despaired  of  finding  it. 

The  intellectual  preparation  for  producing  ataraxia, 
consists  in  placing  arguments  in  opposition  to  each 
other,  both  in  regard  to  phenomena,  and  to  things  of  the 
intellect.  By  placing  the  phenomenal  in  opposition  to 
the  phenomenal,  the  intellectual  to  the  intellectual,  and 
the  phenomenal  to  the  intellectual,  and  vice  versa,  the 
present  to  the  present,  past,  and  future,  one  will  find 
that  no  argument  exists  that  is  incontrovertible.  It  is 
not  necessary  to  accept  any  statement  whatever  as  true, 
and  consequently  a  state  of  eVo^r;  may  always  be  main- 
tained.4 Although  ataraxia  concerns  things  of  the 
opinion,  and  must  be  preceded  by  the  intellectual  pro- 
cess described  above,  it  is  not  itself  a  function  of  the 
intellect,  or  any  subtle  kind  of  reasoning,  but  seems  to 

1  Hyp.  i.  27.        2  Hyp.  i.  28.         3  Hyp.  i.  28,  29.         *  Hyp.  i.  32—35. 


30       Sextus  Empiricus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

!)••  rather  a  unique  form  of  moral  perfection,  leading  to 
happiness,  or  is  itse If  happiness. 

It  was  the  aim  of  Scepticism  to  know  nothing,  and 
to  assert  nothing  in  regard  to  any  subject,  but  at  the 
same  time  not  to  affirm  that  knowledge  on  all  subjects 
is  impossible,  and  consequently  to  have  the  attitude  of 
still  seeking.  The  standpoint  of  Pyrrhonism  was  ma- 
n  nalistic.  We  find  from  the  teachings  of  Sextus  that 
he  affirmed  the  non-existence  of  the  soul,1  or  the  ego, 
and  denied  absolute  <  tt  altogether.2  The  intro- 

ductory statements  of  Diogenes  regarding  Pyrrhonism 
\\ould  ai^ree  with  this  standpo 

There  is  no  criterion  of  truth  in  Scepticism.  We 
cannot  prove  that  the  phenomena  represent  objects,  or 
find  out  what  the  relation  of  phenomena  to  objects  is. 
Tin  -re  is  no  criterion  to  tell  us  which  one  is  true  of  all 
the  different  representations  of  the  same  object,  and  of 
all  tL  ties  of  sensation  that  arise  through  the 

many  phases  of  relativity  of  the  conditions  which  con- 
trol the  character  uf  the  phenomena. 

iy  effort  to  find  the  truth  can  deal  only  with 
phenomena,  and  absolute  reality  can  never  be  known. 

1    .I'lr.  Math.  \  ,;>.  ii.  32.  *  Adv.  Math.  xi.  140. 

3  Diog.  ix.  11,61. 


CHAPTER   III. 

The  Sceptical  Tropes. 

The  exposition  of  the  Tropes  of  Pyrrhonism  consti- 
tutes historically  and  philosophically  the  most  important 
part  of  the  writings  of  Sextus  Empiricus.  These  Tropes 
represent  the  sum  total  of  the  wisdom  of  the  older 
Sceptical  School,  and  were  held  in  high  respect  for 
centuries,  not  only  by  the  Pyrrhoneans,  but  also  by  many 
outside  the  narrow  limits  of  that  School.  In  the  first 
book  of  the  Hypotyposes  Sextus  gives  two  classes  of 
Tropes,  those  of  eVo^  and  the  eight  Tropes  of  Aeneside- 
mus  against  Aetiology. 

The  Tropes  of  eVo^  are  arranged  in  groups  of  ten, 
five  and  two,  according  to  the  period  of  the  Sceptical 
School  to  which  they  belong ;  the  first  of  these  groups 
is  historically  the  most  important,  or  the  Ten  Tropes  of 
67ro%?;,  as  these  are  far  more  closely  connected  with  the 
general  development  of  Scepticism,  than  the  later  ones. 
By  the  name  T^OTTO?  or  Trope,  the  Sceptic  understood  a 
manner  of  thought,  or  form  of  argument,  or  standpoint 
of  judgement.  It  was  a  term  common  in  Greek  philo- 
sophy, used  in  this  sense,  from  the  time  of  Aristotle.1 
The  Stoics,  however,  used  the  word  with  a  different 
meaning  from  that  attributed  to  it  by  the  Sceptics.'2 
Stephanus  and  Fabricius  translate  it  by  the  Latin  word 
modus,3  and  rpovro?  also  is  often  used  interchangeably 

1  Pappenheim  Erlauterung  Pyrrh.  Grundzugen,  p.  35. 

2  Diog.  i.  76 ;  Adv.  Math.  vm.  227.         3  Fabricius,  Cap.  xiv.  7. 


32       Sextus  Empiricus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

with  the  word  \6yos  by  Sextus,  ])  Laertius,  ;in<l 

others;  sometimes  also  as  synonymous  with  TOTTO?/ 
and  TUTro?  is  found  in  the  oldest  edition  of  Sextus.2 
Diogenes  defines  the  word  as  the  standpoint,  or  manner 
of  argument,  by  which  the  Sceptics  arrived  at  the 
condition  of  doubt,  in  consequence  of  the  equality  of 
probabilities,  ami  lie  calls  the  Tropes,  the  ten  Tropes  of 
doubt.3  All  writers  on  Pyrrhonism  after  the  time  of 
Aenesidenius  give  the  Tropes  the  principal  place  in 
their  treatment  of  the  subject.  Sextus  occupies  two 
thirds  of  the  first  book  of  the  Hypotyposes  in  stating 
and  disciisMni;-  tin-in  ;  and  about  one  fourth  of  his  pre- 
sentation of  Scepticism  is  devoted  to  the  Tropes  by 
Diogenes.  In  addition  to  these  two  authors,  Aristocles 
the  Peripatetic  refers  to  them  in  his  attack  on  Sceptic- 
i.Mii.4  Favorinus  wrote  a  book  entitled  Pyrrhonean 
Tropes,  and  Plutarch  one  called  The  Ten  (TQTOL) 
Topes  of  P/y/'/Ao/'  Both  of  these  latter  works  are  lost. 
All  authorities  unite  in  attributing  to  Aenesidemus 
the  work  of  systematizing  and  presenting  to  the  world 
the  ten  Tropes  of  eVo^-  He  was  the  first  to  conceive 
the  project  of  opposing  an  organized  philosophical 
system  of  Pyrrhonism  to  the  dogmatism  of  his  contem- 
poraries.6 Moreover,  the  fact  that  Diogenes  introduces 
the  Tropes  into  his  life  of  Pyrrho,  does  not  necessarily 
imply  that  he  considered  Pyrrho  their  author,  for 


*  Hyp.  i.  36. 

2  Fabricius  on  Hyp.  i.  36  ;  Cap.  xiv.  G. 

3  Diog.  ix.  11,  79—108. 

*  Aristocles  Etueb.  praep.  et\  x.  14,  18. 

*  Fabricius  on  Hyp.  i.  36. 

6  Compare  Saisset  Op.  tit.  p.  78. 


The  Sceptical  Tropes.  33 

Diogenes  invariably  combines  the  teachings  of  the  follow- 
ers of  a  movement  with  those  of  the  founders  themselves  ; 
he  gives  these  Tropes  after  speaking  of  Aenesidemus' 
work  entitled  Pyrrhonean  Hypotyposes,  and  appar- 
ently quotes  from  this  book,  in  giving  at  least  a  part 
of  his  presentation  of  Pyrrhonism,  either  directly  or 
through  the  works  of  others.  Nietzsche  proposes  a 
correction  of  the  text  of  Diogenes  IX.  II.,  79,  which 
would  make  him  quote  the  Tropes  from  a  book  by 
Theodosius,1  author  of  a  commentary  on  the  works  of 
Theodas.  No  writer  of  antiquity  claims  for  the  Tropes 
an  older  source  than  the  books  of  Aenesidemus,  to 
whom  Aristocles  also  attributes  them.2  They  are  not 
mentioned  in  Diogenes'  life  of  Timon,  the  immediate 
disciple  of  Pyrrho.  Cicero  has  no  knowledge  of  them, 
and  does  not  refer  to  them  in  his  discussion  of  Scepticism. 
Aenesidemus  was  undoubtedly  the  first  to  formulate 
these  Tropes,  but  many  things  tend  to  show  that  they 
resulted,  in  reality,  from  the  gradual  classification  of 
the  results  of  the  teachings  of  Pyrrho,  in  the  subsequent 
development  of  thought  from  his  own  time  to  that  of 
Aenesidemus.  The  ideas  contained  in  the  Tropes  were 
not  original  with  Aenesidemus,  but  are  more  closely 
connected  with  the  thought  of  earlier  times.  The 
decidedly  empirical  character  of  the  Tropes  proves  this 
connection,  for  the  eight  Tropes  of  Aetiology,  which 
were  original  with  Aenesidemus,  bear  a  far  stronger 
dialectic  stamp,  thus  showing  a  more  decided  dialectic 
influence  of  the  Academy  than  is  found  in  the  Tropes 
Many  of  the  illustrations  given  of  the  Tropes 


1  Brochard  Op.  cit.  254,  Note  4. 

2  Aristocles  Eus.  praep.  ev.  xiv.  18.  8. 


'•/">•  Empi/ricus  "ud  Greek  Scepticism. 


also,  ratify  to  ;i  time  of  greater  antiquity  than  tliat  of 
A  .us.     The  name  Trope  was  well   known   in 

ancient   thins,  and  the  number  ten  reminds  us  of  the 
ten    opfH^m-j;   principles  of   Pythagoras,  and  the   ten 
IGS  of  Aristotle,  the  fourth  of  which  was  the  same 

Tii-  eighth  Trope.  The  terminology,  however,  with 
very  few  exceptions,  points  to  a  later  period  than  t 
of  Pyrrho.  Zeller  points  out  a  number  of  expressions 
in  both  Diogenes'  and  Sextus'  exposition  of  the  Tropes, 
which  could  not  date  back  farther  than  the  time  of 
Aen>  i  i  nuis.1  One  of  the  most  striking  features  of 
tin-  \\hole  presentation  of  the  Tropes,  especially  as  given 
by  Sextus,  is  their  mosaic  character,  stamping  them  not 
as  th  \\ork  of  one  person,  but  as  a  growth,  and  also  an 
agglutinous  growth,  lacking  very  decidedly  the  sym- 
iii«  -try  of  thought  that  the  work  of  one  mind  would  ha 
shown. 

At  the  time  of  the  separation  of  Pyrrhonism  from  the 
A'-adriny,  no  other  force  was  as  strong  in  giving  life  to 
the  school  as  the  systematic  treatment  by  Aenesidemus 
of  the  Ten  Tropes  of  eVo^r?.  The  reason  of  this  is 
evident.  It  was  not  that  the  ideas  of  the  Sceptical 
Trop  -  wore  original  with  Aenesidemus,  but  because  a 
>  1  .  ti  1  1  n  .  >r  atement  of  belief  is  always  a  far  more  powerful 
influence  than  principles  which  are  vaguely  understood 
and  accepted.  There  is  always,  however,  the  danger  to 
the  Sceptic,  in  making  a  statement  even  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  Scepticism,  that  the  psychological  result  would 
be  a  dogmatic  tendency  of  mind,  as  we  shall  see  later 
the  case,  even  with  Aenesidemus  himself.  That 


1  Zeller  Op.  tit.  p.  I 


The  Sceptical  Tropes.  35 

the  Sceptical  School  could  not  escape  the  accusation  of 
dogmatizing,  from  the  Dogmatics,  even  in  stating  the 
grounds  of  their  Scepticism,  we  know  from  Diogenes.1 
To  avoid  this  dogmatic  tendency  of  the  ten  Tropes, 
Sextus  makes  the  frequent  assertion  that  he  does  not 
affirm  things  to  be  absolutely  true,  but  states  them  as 
they  appear  to  him,  and  that  they  may  be  otherwise 
from  what  he  has  said.2 

Sextus  tells  us  that "  Certain  Tropes,  ten  in  number, 
for  producing  the  state  of  eVo^r;  have  been  handed 
down  from  the  older  Sceptics."3  He  refers  to  them  in 
another  work  as  the  "Tropes  of  Aenesidemus."4  There 
is  no  evidence  that  the  substance  of  these  Tropes  was 
changed  after  the  time  of  Aenesidemus,  although  many 
of  the  illustrations  given  by  Sextus  must  have  been  of 
a  later  date,  added  during  the  two  centuries  that  elapsed 
between  the  time  of  Aenesidemus  and  Sextus.  In 
giving  these  Tropes  Sextus  does  not  claim  to  offer  a 
systematic  methodical  classification,  and  closes  his  list 
of  them,  in  their  original  concise  form,  with  the  remark, 
"  We  make  this  order  ourselves."5  The  order  is  given 
differently  by  Diogenes,  and  also  by  Favorinus.6  The 
Trope  which  Sextus  gives  as  the  tenth  is  the  fifth 
given  by  Diogenes,  the  seventh  by  Sextus  is  the  eighth 
given  by  Diogenes,  the  fifth  by  Sextus,  the  seventh 
by  Diogenes,  the  tenth  by  Diogenes,  the  eighth  by 
Sextus.  Diogenes  says  that  the  one  he  gives  as  the 
ninth  Favorinus  calls  the  eighth,  and  Sextus  and 
Aenesidemus  the  tenth.  This  statement  does  not 

1  Diog.  ix.  11,  102.  4  Adv.  Math.  vn.  345. 

2  Hyp.  i.  4,  24.  5  Hyp.  i.  38. 

3  Hyp.  1.36.  *  Diog.  ix.  11.  87. 


36       Sextiw  Empiricus  and  QreA  N    //' 

correspond  with  the  list  of  the  Tropes  which  Sextus 
gives,  proving  that  Diogenes  took  some  other  text 
that  of  Sextus  as  his  authority.1     The  difference  in  the 
order  of  the  Tropes  shows,  also,  that  the  order  was  not 
considered  a  matter  of  gn-at   importance.     Then 
marked  contrast  in  the  spirit  of  the  two  presentations 
of  the  Tropes  given  by  Sextus  and  Diogenes.     The 
former  gives  them  not  only  as  an  orator,  but  as  one  who 
feels  that  he  is  defending  his  own  cause,  and  the  school 
of  which  he  is  th-  against  mortal  enemies,  while 

Diogenes  relates  them  as  an  historian. 

Pappenht  im  tries  to  pro ve2 that  Aenesidem us  origin- 
ally gave  only  nine  Tropes  in  his  Pyrrhonean  Hypoty- 
poses,  as  Aristocles  mentions  only  nine  in  referring  to 
the  Tropes  of  Aenesidemus,  and  that  the  tenth  was 
added  later.  Had  this  been  the  case,  however,  the  fact 
would  surely  have  been  mentioned  either  by  Diogenes 
or  Sextus,  who  both  refer  to  the  ten  Tropes  of  Aene- 
sidcinus. 

The  Tropes  claim  to  prove  that  the  character  of 
phenomena  is  so  relative  and  changeable,  that  certain 
knowledge  cannot  be  based  upon  them,  and  as  we  have 
shown,  there  is  no  other  criterion  of  knowledge  for  the 
So-ptir  than  phenomena.3  All  of  the  Tropes,  except 
the  tenth,  are  connected  with  sense-perception,  and  re- 
late to  the  difference  of  the  results  obtained  through 
tin  senses  under  different  circumstances.  They  may 
be  divided  into  two  classes,  i.e.,  those  based  upon  differ- 
ences of  our  physical  organism,  and  those  based  upon 

1  Diog.  ix.  11,  87. 

2  Pappenhcim,  Die  Tropen  der  Griechen,  p.  23. 
s  Hyp.  i.  22. 


The  Sceptical  Tropes.  37 

external  differences.  To  the  first  class  belong  the  first, 
second,  third  and  fourth  ;  to  the  second  class,  th'e  fifth, 
sixth,  seventh  and  eighth,  and  also  the  ninth.  The 
eighth,  or  that  of  relation,  is  applied  objectively  both 
by  Sextus  and  Diogenes  in  their  treatment  of  the  Tropes, 
and  is  not  used  for  objects  of  thought  alone,  but  princi- 
pally to  show  the  relation  of  outward  objects  to  each 
other.  The  tenth  is  the  only  one  which  has  a  moral 
significance,  and  it  has  also  a  higher  subjective  value 
than  the  others ;  it  takes  its  arguments  from  an  entirely 
different  sphere  of  thought,  and  deals  with  metaphysical 
and  religious  contradictions  in  opinion,  and  with  the 
question  of  good  and  evil.  That  this  Trope  is  one  of 
the  oldest,  we  know  from  its  distinct  mention  in  connec- 
tion with  the  foundation  theories  of  Pyrrho,  by  Dio- 
genes.1 In  treating  of  the  subjective  reasons  for  doubt 
as  to  the  character  of  external  reality,  the  Sceptics  were 
very  near  the  denial  of  all  outward  reality,  a  point,  how- 
ever, which  they  never  quite  reached. 

There  is  evidently  much  of  Sextus'  own  thought  mixed 
with  the  illustrations  of  the  Tropes,  but  it  is  impossible 
to  separate  the  original  parts  from  the  material  that 
was  the  common  property  of  the  Sceptical  School. 
Many  of  these  illustrations  show,  however,  perfect  famil- 
iarity with  the  scientific  and  medical  teachings  of  the 
time.  Before  entering  upon  his  exposition  of  the  Tropes, 
Sextus  gives  them  in  the  short  concise  form  in  which 
they  must  first  have  existed2 — 

(i)  Based  upon  the  variety  of  animals, 
(ii)  Based  upon  the  differences  between  men. 

1  Diog.  ix.  11,  61.  2  Hyp.  i.  36—38. 


38      Sextua  Empiricus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

(iii)  Based  upon  differences  in  the  constitution  of 
the  sense  organs. 

(iv)  Based  upon  circumstances. 
(v)  Based  upon  position,  distance  and  place. 

(vi)  Based  upon  mixtures. 

(vii)  Based  upon  the  quantities  and  constitutions 
of  objects. 

(viii)  Relation. 

(ix)  Based  upon  frequency  or  rarity  of  occurences. 
(x)  Based     upon    systems,    customs    and     laws, 
mythical  beliefs,  and  dogmatic  opinions. 

Although  Sextus  is  careful  not  to  dogmatise  regard- 
ing the  arrangement  of  the  Tropes,  yet  there  is  in  his 
clu-silication  of  them  a  regular  gradation,  from  the  argu- 
ments based  upon  differences  in  animals  to  those  in 
man,  first  considering  the  latter  in  relation  to  the  phy>i- 
cal  constitution,  and  then  to  circumstances  outside  of 
us,  and  finally  the  treatment  of  metaphysical  and  moral 
differences. 

The  First  Trope.1  That  the  same  mental  repre- 
sentations are  not  found  in  different  animals,  may  be 
inferred  from  their  differences  in  constitution  resulting 
from  their  different  origins,  and  from  the  variety  in 
their  organs  of  sense.  Sextus  takes  up  the  five  senses 
in  order,  giving  illustrations  to  prove  the  relative  results 
of  the  mental  representations  in  all  of  them,  as  for 
example  the  subjectivity  of  color2  and  sound.3  All 
knowledge  of  objects  through  the  senses  is  relative  an.l 
not  absolute.  Sextus  does  not,  accordingly,  confine  the 
impossibility  of  certain  knowledge  to  the  qualities  that 

1  Hyp.  I.  40—61.  2  Hyp.  i.  44—46.  3  Hyp.  i.  50. 


The  Sceptical  Tropes.  39 

Locke  regards  as  secondary,  but  includes  also  the  prim- 
ary ones  in  this  statement.1  The  form  and  shape  of 
objects  as  they  appear  to  us  may  be  changed  by  pressure 
on  the  eyeball.  Furthermore,  the  character  of  reflect- 

v  ions  in  mirrors  depend  entirely  on  their  shape,  as  the 
images  in  concave  mirrors  are  very  different  from  those 
in  convex  ones;  and  so  in  the  same  way  as  the  eyes 
of  animals  are  of  different  shapes,  and  supplied  with 

y  different  fluids,  the  ideas  of  dogs,  fishes,  men  and  grass- 
hoppers must  be  very  different.2 

In  discussing  the  mental  representations  of  animals 
of  different  grades  of  intelligence,  Sextus  shows  a  very 
good  comprehension  of  the  philogenetic  development  of 
the  organs  of  sense,  and  draws  the  final  conclusion  that 
external  objects  are  regarded  differently  by  animals, 
according  to  their  difference  in  constitution.3  These 
differences  in  the  ideas  which  different  animals  have  of 
the  same  objects  are  demonstrated  by  their  different 
tastes,  as  the  things  desired  by  some  are  fatal  to  others.4 
The  practical  illustrations  given  of  this  result  show  a 
familiarity  with  natural  history,  and  cognizance  of  the 
tastes  and  habits  of  many  animals,5  but  were  probably 
few  of  them  original  with  Sextus,  unless  perhaps  in 
their  application  ;  that  this  train  of  reasoning  was  the 
common  property  of  the  Sceptic  School,  we  know  from 
the  fact  that  Diogenes  begins  his  exposition  of  the  first 
Trope  in  a  way  similar  to  that  of  Sextus.6  His  illustra- 
tions are,  however,  few  and  meagre  compared  with  those , 
of  Sextus,  and  the  scientific  facts  used  by  both  of  them 

1  Hyp.  i.  47.  4  Hyp.  T.  55. 

2  Hyp.  i.  49.  6  Hyp.  i.  55—59. 

3  Hyp.  i.  54.  6  Diog.  ix.  11,  79—80. 


40      Sextu8  Empiricus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

may  mostly  be  found  in  other  authors  of  anti^' 
milar  way.1     Tin,-  logical  result  of  tin-  r 
to  explain  the  first  Trope,  is  that  we  cannot  com- 
bhe  i<leas  of  the  animals  with  each  other,  nor  with 
our  .\vn ;  nor  can  we  prove  that  our  ideas  are  more  t 
worthy  than  those  of  the  animals.2     As  therefore  an 
examination  of  ideas  is  impossible,  any  decided  opinion 
about  their  trustworthiness  is  also  impossible,  and  this 
Trope  leads  to  the  suspension  of  judgment  regarding 
external  objects,  or  to  eVo 

After  reaching  this  conclusion,  Sextus  introduces  a 
long  chapter  to  prove  that  animals  can  reason.  There 
is  no  reference  to  this  in  Diogenes,  but  there  is  other 
uony  to  show  that  it  was  a  favourite  line  of  argu- 
ment \\itli  the  Sceptics.4  Sextus,  however,  says  that 
his  course  of  reasoning  is  different  from  that  of 
of  the  Sceptics  on  the  subject,6  as  they  usually  applied 
their  arguments  to  all  animals,  while  he  selected  only 
on.  namely  the  dog.6  This  chapter  is  full  of  sar 
attacks  on  the  Dogmatics,  and  contains  the  special 
allusion  to  the  Stoics  as  the  greatest  opponents  of  the 
Sceptics,  which  has  been  before  referred  to.7 

Sextus  claims  with  a  greater  freedom  of  diction  than 
in  some  apparently  less  original  chapters,  and  with  a 
wealth  of  special  illustrations,  that  the  dog  is  superior 
to  man  in  acuteness  of  perception,8  that  he  has  the 
power  of  choice,  and  possesses  an  art,  that  of  hunting,9 

1  Pappenheira  Erlauterung  Pyrr.  Grundz&ge  Par.  41. 

3  Hyp.  i.  69.  6  Hyp.  i.  62—63. 

3  Hyp.  i.  61.  '  Hyp.  i.  65. 

4  Hyp.  i.  238.  8  Hyp.  I.  64. 

5  Compare  Brochard  Op.  tit.  256.  9  Hyp.  i.  66. 


The  Sceptical  Tropes.  41 

and,  also,  is  not  deprived  of  virtue,1  as  the  true  nature  of 
virtue  is  to  show  justice  to  all,  which  the  dog  does  by 
guarding  loyally  those  who  are  kind  to  him,  and  keep- 
ing off  those  who  do  evil.2  The  reasoning  power  of  this 
animal  is  proved  by  the  story  taken  from  Chrysippus,  of 
the  dog  that  came  to  a  meeting  of  three  roads  in  follow- 
ing a  scent.  After  seeking  the  scent  in  vain  in  two 
of  the  roads,  he  takes  the  third  road  without  scenting 
it,  as  a  result  of  a  quick  process  of  thought,  which  proves 
that  he  shares  in  the  famous  dialectic  of  Chrysippus,3 
the  five  forms  of  avair^iKToi  \6yoi,  of  which  the  dog 
chooses  the  fifth.  Either  A  or  B  or  (7,  not  A  or  B, 
therefore  C. 

The  dog  and  other  irrational  animals  may  also 
possess  spoken  language,  as  the  only  proof  that  we  have 
to  the  contrary,  is  the  fact  that  we  cannot  understand 
the  sounds  that  they  make.4  We  have  an  example  in 
this  chapter  of  the  humor  of  Sextus,  who  after  enlarging 
on  the  perfect  character  of  the  dog,  remarks,  "For  which 
reason  it  seems  to  me  some  philosophers  have  honoured 
themselves  with  the  name  of  this  animal,"5  thus  making 
a  sarcastic  allusion  to  the  Cynics,  especially  Antisthenes.6 

The  Second  Trope.  Passing  on  to  the  second  Trope, 
Sextus  aims  to  prove  that  even  if  we  leave  the  differen- 
ces of  the  mental  images  of  animals  out  of  the  discussion, 
there  is  not  a  sufficient  unanimity  in  the  mental  images 
of  human  beings  to  allow  us  to  base  any  assertions  upon 
them  in  regard  to  the  character  of  external  objects.7 

1  Hyp.  i.  67.  5  Hyp.  i.  72. 

2  Hyp.  i.  67.  6  Diog.  vi.  1,  13. 

3  Hyp.  i.  69 ;  Hyp.  n.  156  ;  Diog.  vn.  1,  79.      ?  Hyp.  i.  79. 

4  Hyp.  i.  74. 


42       Sextua  Empiricus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

He  had  previously  announced  that  hu  intended  to 
oppose  the  phenomenal  to  the  intellectual  "  in  any  way 
whatever,"1  so  he  begins  here  by  referring  to  the  two 
parts  of  which  man  is  said  to  be  composed,  the  soul  and 
the  body,  and  proceeds  to  diacuaa  the  differences  among 
men  in  sense-perception  and  in  opinion.2  Most  of  the 
illustrations  given  of  differences  in  sense-perception  are 
medical  ones;  of  the  more  general  of  these  I  will  note 
the  only  two  which  are  also  given  by  Diogenes  in  his  ex- 
position of  this  Trope,3  viz.,  Demophon,  Alexander's  table 
waiter,  who  shivered  in  the  sun,  and  Andron  the  Argive, 
who  was  so  free  from  thirst  that  he  travelled  through 
the  desert  of  Libya  without  seeking  a  drink.  Some 
have  reasoned  from  the  presence  of  the  first  of  these 
illustrations  in  the  exposition  of  the  Tropes,  that  a  part 
of  this  material  at  least  goes  back  to  the  time  of  Pyrrbo, 
as  Pyrrho  from  his  intimacy  with  Alexander,  when  he 
accompanied  him  to  India,  had  abundant  opportunities 
to  observe  the  peculiarities  of  his  servant  Demophon.4 
The  illustration  of  Andron  the  Argive  is  taken  from 
Aristotle,  according  to  Diogenes.5 

Passing  on  to  differences  of  opinion,  we  have  another 
example  of  the  sarcastic  humor  of  Sextus,  as  he  rei< 
the  <f>v(Tt,oyva)/Jiovi,K7J  croQia?  as  the  authority  for  believing 
that  the  body  is  a  type  of  the  soul.  As  the  bodies  of 
men  differ,  so  the  souls  also  probably  differ.  The  differ- 
ences of  mind  among  men  is  not  referred  to  by  Diogenes, 
except  in  the  general  statement  that  they  choose 

1  Hyp.  i.  8.          2  Hyp.  i.  80.  3  Diog.  ix.  11,  80—81. 

4  Compare  Pyrrhon  et  le  Scepticism  primitive.  Revue  phil.,  Paris  1885, 
No.  5;  Victor  Brochard,  p.  521. 

5  Diog.  ix.  11,  81.  6  Hyp.  i.  85. 


The  Sceptical  Tropes.  43 

different  professions ;  while  Sextus  elaborates  this  point, 
speaking  of  the  great  differences  in  opposing  schools  of 
philosophy,  and  in  the  objects  of  choice  and  avoidance, 
and  sources  of  pleasure  for  different  men.1  The  poets 
well  understand  this  marked  difference  in  human 
desires,  as  Homer  says, 

"  One  man  enjoys  this,  another  enjoys  that." 
Sextus  also  quotes  the  beautiful  lines  of  Pindar,2 

"  One  delights  in  getting  honours  and  crowns  through  stormfooted 

horses, 

Others  in  passing  life  in  rooms  rich  in  gold, 

Another  safe  travelling  enjoys,  in  a  swift  ship,  on  a  wave  of  the 
sea." 

The  Third  Trope.  The  third  Trope  limits  the  argu- 
ment to  the  sense-perceptions  of  one  man,  a  Dogmatic,  if 
preferred,  or  to  one  whom  the  Dogmatics  consider  wise,3 
and  states  that  as  the  ideas  given  by  the  different  sense 
organs  differ  radically  in  a  way  that  does  not  admit  of 
their  being  compared  with  each  other,  they  furnish  no 
reliable  testimony  regarding  the  nature  of  objects.4 
"  Each  of  the  phenomena  perceived  by  us  seems  to  pre- 
sent itself  in  many  forms,  as  the  apple,  smooth,  fragrant 
brown  and  sweet."  The  apple  was  evidently  the  ordin- 
ary example  given  for  this  Trope,  for  Diogenes  uses  the 
same,  but  in  a  much  more  condensed  form,  and  not  with 
equal  understanding  of  the  results  to  be  deduced  from 
it.5  The  consequence  of  the  incompatibility  of  the  men- 
tal representations  produced  through  the  several  sense 

1  Hyp.  i.  87—89.  *  Hyp.  i.  86.  3  Hyp.  i.  90. 

4  Hyp.  i.  94.  5  Diog.  ix.  11,  81. 


44       Sextua  Empiricua  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

US  by  the  apple,  may  be  the  acceptance  of  either  of 
the  three  following  propositions:  (i)  That  only  those 
quail*  t  in  the  apple  which  we  perceive,  (ii) 

Th;it  more  than  these  exist,  (iii)  That  even  those  per- 
ceived d<>  not  exist.1  Accordingly,  any  experience  which 
can  give  rise  to  such  different  views  regarding  outward 
objects,  cannot  be  relied  upon  as  a  testimony  concerning 
them. 

The  non-homogeneous  nature  of  the  mental  images 
connected  with  the  different  sense  organs,  as  presented 
by  Si-xtus,  reminds  us  of  the  discussion  of  the  same 
subject  by  Berkeley  in  his  7heoi*y  of  Vi#< 

Sextus  says  that  a  man  born  with  less  than  the  usual 
number  of  senses,  would  form  altogether  different  ideas 
of  the  external  world  than  those  who  have  the  usual 
number,  and  as  our  ideas  of  objects  depend  on  our 
mental  images,  a  greater  number  of  sense  organs  would 
give  us  still  different  ideas  of  outward  reality.2  The 
strong  argument  of  the  Stoics  against  such  reasoning  as 
this,  was  their  doctrine  of  pre-established  harmony  be- 
twren  nature  and  the  soul,  so  that  when  a  representation 
is  produced  in  us  of  a  real  object,  a  KaraXijTmicrj 
fyavraa-ia?  by  this  representation  the  soul  grasps  a  real 
existence.  There  is  a  \6yos  in  us  which  is  of  the  same 
kind,  o-vyyevos,  or  in  relation  to  all  nature.  This  argu- 
ment of  pre-established  harmony  between  the  faculties 
of  the  soul  and  the  objects  of  nature,  is  the  one  that 
has  been  used  in  all  ages  to  combat  philosophical  teach- 
ing that  denies  that  we  apprehend  the  external  world 
as  it  is.  It  was  used  against  Kant  by  his  opponents, 

1  Hyp.  i.  99.  -  Hyp.  i.  96—97.  3  Adv.  Math.  vn.  93. 


The  Sceptical  Tropes.  45 

who  thought  in  this  way  to  refute  his  teachings.1  The 
Sceptics  could  not,  of  course,  accept  a  theory  of  nature 
that  included  the  soul  and  the  external  world  in  one 
harmonious  whole,  but  Sextus  in  his  discussion  of  the 
third  Trope  does  not  refute  this  argument  as  fully  as  he 
does  later  in  his  work  against  logic.2  He  simply  states 
here  that  philosophers  themselves  cannot  agree  as  to 
what  nature  is,  and  furthermore,  that  a  philosopher 
himself  is  a  part  of  the  discord,  and  to  be  judged,  rather 
than  being  capable  of  judging,  and  that  no  conclusion 
can  be  reached  by  those  who  are  themselves  an  element 
of  the  uncertainty.3 

The  Fourth  Trope.  This  Trope  limits  the  argu- 
ment to  each  separate  sense,  and  the  effect  is  considered 
of  the  condition  of  body  and  mind  upon  sense-perception 
in  relation  to  the  several  sense-organs.4  The  physical 
states  which  modify  sense-perception  are  health  and 
illness,  sleeping  and  waking,  youth  and  age,  hunger  and 
satiety,  drunkenness  and  sobriety.  All  of  these  condi- 
tions of  the  body  entirely  change  the  character  of  the 
mental  images,  producing  different  judgments  of  the 
color,  taste,  and  temperature  of  objects,  and  of  the  cha- 
racter of  sounds.  A  man  who  is  asleep  is  in  a  different 
world  from  one  awake,  the  existence  of  both  worlds 
being  relative  to  the  condition  of  waking  and  sleeping.5 

The  subjective  states  which  Sextus  mentions  here 
as  modifying  the  character  of  the  mental  representations 
are  hating  or  loving,  courage  or  fear,  sorrow  or  joy,  and 
sanity  or  insanity.6  No  man  is  ever  twice  in  exactly 

1  Ueberweg  Op.  cit.  195.  *  Hyp.  i.  100. 

2  Adv.  Math.  vii.  354.  5  Hyp.  i.  104. 

3  Hyp.  i.  98—99.  «  Hyp.  i.  100. 


4f>       Sextus  Empiricus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

urn-  condition  of  body  or  mind,  and  never  abl«  to 
v  tin-  diii«  ronces  of  his  ideas  as  a  sum  total,  for 
those  of  the  present  moment  only  are  subject  to  careful 
inspection.1  Furthermore,  no  one  is  free  from  tin/  in- 
fluence of  all  conditions  of  body  or  mind,  so  that  he  can 
be  unbiassed  to  judge  his  ideas,  and  no  criterion  can  be 
established  that  can  be  shown  to  be  true,  but  on  the 
(•(.ntiary,  whatever  course  is  pursued  on  the  subject, 
both  the  criterion  and  the  proof  will  be  thrown  into  the 
circulus  in  probando,  for  the  truth  of  each  rests  on 
the  other.2 

Diogenes  gives  in  part  the  same  illustrations  of  this 
Trope,  but  in  a  much  more  condensed  form.  The  marked 
characteristic  of  this  train  of  reasoning  is  the  attempt 
to  prove  that  abnormal  conditions  are  also  natural.  In 
referring  at  first  to  the  opposing  states  of  body  and 
mind,  which  so  change  the  character  of  sense-perception, 
Sextus  classifies  them  according  to  the  popular  usage 
as  Kara  <f>vcriv  and  irapa  (frvaiv.  This  distinction  was  an 
important  one,  even  with  Aristotle,  and  was  especially 
developed  by  the  Stoics3  in  a  broader  sense  than 
referring  merely  to  health  and  sickness.  The  Stoics, 
however,  considered  only  normal  conditions  as  being 
according  to  nature.  Srxtus,  on  the  contrary,  declares 
that  abnormal  states  are  also  conditions  according  to 
nature,4  and  just  as  those  who  are  in  health  are  in  a 
state  that  is  natural  to  those  who  are  in  health,  so  also 
those  not  in  health  are  in  a  state  that  is  natural  to 
those  not  in  health,  and  in  some  respects  according  to 
nature.  Existence,  then,  and  non-existence  are  not 

*  Hyp.  i.  112.       *  Hyp.  1.117.        3  Diog.  vn.  1,  86.        4  Hyp.  i.  103. 


The  Sceptical  Tropes.  47 

absolute,  but  relative,  and  the  world  of  sleep  as  really 
exists  for  those  who  are  asleep  as  the  things  that  exist 
in  waking  exist,  although  they  do  not  exist  in  sleep.1 
One  mental  representation,  therefore,  cannot  be  judged 
by  another,  which  is  also  in  a  state  of  relation  to  exist- 
ing physical  and  mental  conditions.  Diogenes  states 
this  principle  even  more  decidedly  in  his  exposition  of 
this  Trope.  "The  insane  are  not  in  a  condition  opposed 
to  nature ;  why  they  more  than  we  ?  For  we  also  see 
the  sun  as  if  it  were  stationary."2  Furthermore,  in 
different  periods  of  life  ideas  differ.  Children  are  fond 
of  balls  and  hoops,  while  those  in  their  prime  prefer 
other  things,  and  the  aged  still  others.3  The  wisdom 
contained  in  this  Trope  in  reference  to  the  relative 
value  of  the  things  most  sought  after  is  not  original 
with  Sextus,  but  is  found  in  the  more  earnest  ethical 
teachings  of  older  writers.  Sextus  does  not,  however, 
draw  any  moral  conclusions  from  this  reasoning,  but 
only  uses  it  as  an  argument  for  ITTO^TJ. 

The  Fifth  Trope.  This  Trope  leaves  the  discussion 
of  the  dependence  of  the  ideas  upon  the  physical  nature, 
and  takes  up  the  influence  of  the  environment  upon 
them.  It  makes  the  difference  in  ideas  depend  upon  the 
position,  distance,  and  place  of  objects,  thus  taking 
apparently  their  real  existence  for  granted.  Things 
change  their  form  and  shape  according  to  the  distance 
from  which  they  are  observed,  and  the  position  in  which 
they  stand.4 

The  same  light  or  tone  alters  decidedly  in  different 
surroundings.  Perspective  in  paintings  depends  on  the 

1  H#p.  i.  104.        2Diog.  ix.  11,  82.        3  Hyp.  1. 106.        *  Hyp.  i.  118. 


48       Sextus  Empimcus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

angle  at  which  the  picture  is  suspended.1  With  Dio- 
genes this  Trope  is  the  seventh,2  and  his  exposition  of 
it  is  similar,  but  as  usual,  shorter.  Both  Sextus  and 
Diogenes  give  the  illustration3  of  the  neck  of  the  dove 
differing  in  color  in  different  degrees  of  inclination,  an 
illustration  used  by  Protagoras  also  to  prove  the  rela- 
tivity of  perception  by  the  senses.  "The  black  neck 
of  the  dove  in  the  shade  appears  black,  but  in  the  light 
sunny  and  purple/'4  Since,  then,  all  phenomena  are 
regarded  in  a  certain  place,  and  from  a  certain  distance, 
and  according  to  a  certain  position,  each  of  which  rela- 
tions makes  a  great  difference  with  the  mental  images, 
we  shall  be  obliged  also  by  this  Trope  to  come  to  the 
reserving  of  the  opinion.5 

The  Sixth  Trope.  This  Trope  leads  to  eVo^/;  re- 
garding the  nature  of  objects,  because  no  object  can 
ever  be  presented  to  the  organs  of  sense  directly,  but 
must  always  be  perceived  through  some  medium,  or  in 
some  mixture.6  This  mixture  may  be  an  outward  one, 
connected  with  the  temperature,  or  the  rarity  of  the 
air,  or  the  water7  surrounding  an  object,  or  it  may  be  a 
mixture  resulting  from  the  different  humors  of  the 
sense-organs.8  A  man  with  the  jaundice,  for  example, 
sees  colors  differently  from  one  who  is  in  health.  The 
illustration  of  the  jaundice  is  a  favorite  one  with  the 
Sceptics.  Diogenes  uses  it  several  times  in  his  pre- 
sentation of  Scepticism,  and  it  occurs  in  Sextus'  writings 

^  Hyp.  i.  120.  -  Diog.  ix.  11,  85. 

s  Hyp.  i.  120;  Diog.  ix.  11,  56. 

4  SchoL  zu  Arist.  60,  18,  ed.  Brandis ;   Pappen.  Er.  Pyrr.  Grundziige, 
p.  54. 

6  Hyp.  i.  121.        *  Hyp.  i.  124.        7  Hyp.  i.  125.        8  Hyp.  i.  126. 


The  Sceptical  Tropes.  49 

in  all,  as  an  illustration,  in  eight  different  places.1  The 
condition  of  the  organ  of  the  rjyejAovucov,  or  the  ruling 
faculty,  may  also  cause  mixtures.  Pappenheim  thinks 
that  we  have  here  Kant's  idea  of  a  priori,  only  on  a 
materialistic  foundation.2  A  careful  consideration  of 
the  passage,  however,  shows  us  that  Sextus'  thought 
is  more  in  harmony  with  the  discoveries  of  modern 
psychiatry  than  with  the  philosophy  of  Kant.  If  the 
sentence,  I'cro)?  Se  /cal  avrrj  (f)  Stdvoia)  eV^tu^/az;  TLVCL 
IS  lav  TTOielrai,  TT/DO?  TO,  VTTO  rwv  alcrOrjo'ecov  dva<yye\- 
\b[jL€va?  stood  alone,  without  further  explanation,  it 
might  well  refer  to  a  priori  laws  of  thought,  but  the 
explanation  which  follows  beginning  with  "  because " 
makes  that  impossible.4  "  Because  in  each  of  the  places 
where  the  Dogmatics  think  that  the  ruling  faculty  is, 
we  see  present  certain  humors,  which  are  the  cause  of 
mixtures."  Sextus  does  not  advance  any  opinion  as  to 
the  place  of  the  ruling  faculty  in  the  body,  which  is, 
according  to  the  Stoics,  the  principal  part  of  the  soul, 
where  ideas,  desires,  and  reasoning  originate,5  but 
simply  refers  to  the  two  theories  of  the  Dogmatics, 
which  claim  on  the  one  hand  that  it  is  in  the  brain, 
and  on  the  other  that  it  is  in  the  heart.6  This  subject 
he  deals  with  more  fully  in  his  woik  against  logic.7  As, 
however,  he  bases  his  argument,  in  discussing  possible 
intellectual  mixtures  in  illustration  of  the  sixth  Trope, 
entirely  on  the  condition  of  the  organ  of  the  intellect,  it 
is  evident  that  his  theory  of  the  soul  was  a  materialistic 
one. 

1  See  Index  to  Bekker's  edition  of  Sextus. 

2  Papp.  Er.  Pyr.  Gr.  p.  55.  5  Diog.  vn.  1,  159. 

3  Hyp.  i.  128.  6  Hyp.  i.  128. 

4  Hyp.  i.  128.  7  Adv.  Math.  vn.  313. 

4 


r>o      Sextua  Empiricua  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

The  Seventh  Trope.  This  Trope,  based  upon  tin- 
quantities  and  compositions  of  objects,  is  illustrated  by 
examples  of  different  kinds  of  food,  drink,  and  medicine, 
showing  the  different  effects  according  to  the  quantity 
taken,  as  the  harmfulness  and  the  usefulness  of  i 
things  depend  on  their  quantity.  Things  act  differently 
upon  the  senses  if  applied  in  small  or  large  quant 
as  filings  of  metal  or  horn,  and  separate  grains  of  sand, 
have  a  different  color  and  touch  from  the  same  taken 
in  the  form  of  a  solid.1  The  result  is  that  ideas  vary 
according  to  the  composition  of  the  object,  and  this 
Trope  also  brings  to  confusion  the  existence  of  outward 
objects,  and  leads  us  to  reserve  our  opinion  in  regard 
to  them.2  This  Trope  is  illustrated  by  Diogenes  with 
iig  brevity.3 

The  Elyhth  Trope.  The  Trope  based  upon  relation 
contain-  afl  Sextus  rightly  remarks,  the  substance  of 
the  other  nine,4  for  the  general  statement  of  the  rela- 
tivity of  knowledge  includes  the  other  statements  made. 
Thr  prominence  which  Sextus  gave  this  Trope  in  his 
introduction  to  the  ten  Tropes  leads  one  to  expect  here 
new  illustrations  and  added5  arguments  for  eVo^.  We 
find,  however,  neither  of  these,  but  simply  a  statement 
that  all  things  are  in  relation  in  one  of  two  ways,  either 
directly,  or  as  being  a  part  of  a  difference.  These  two 
kinds  of  relation  are  given  by  Protagoras,  and  might 
have  been  used  to  good  purpose  in  the  introduction  to 
the  Tropes,  or  at  the  end,  to  prove  that  all  the  others 
were  really  subordinate  to  the  eighth.  The  reasoning 

1  Hyp.  i.  129—131.  *  Hyp.  i.  39. 

2  Hyp.  i.  134.  5  Hyp.  i.  135—140. 

3  Diog.  ix.  11,  86. 


The  Sceptical  Tropes.  51 

is,  however,  simply  applied  to  the  relation  of  objects  to 
each  other,  and  nothing  is  added  that  is  not  found  else- 
where as  an  argument  for  eVo^.1  This  Trope  is  the 
tenth  by  Diogenes,  and  he  strengthens  his  reasoning 
in  regard  to  it,  by  a  statement  that  Sextus  does  not 
directly  make,  i.e.,  that  everything  is  in  relation  to  the 
understanding.2 

The  Ninth  Trope.  This  is  based  upon  the  frequency 
and  rarity  of  events,  and  refers  to  some  of  the  phenomena 
of  nature,  such  as  the  rising  of  the  sun,  and  the  sea,  as 
no  longer  a  source  of  astonishment,  while  a  comet  or  an 
earthquake  are  wonders  to  those  not  accustomed  to 
them.3  The  value  of  objects  also  depends  on  their 
rarity,  as  for  example  the  value  of  gold.4  Furthermore, 
things  may  be  valuable  at  one  time,  and  at  another  not 
so,  according  to  the  frequency  and  rarity  of  the  occur- 
rence.5 Therefore  this  Trope  also  leads  to  eVo%^.  Dio- 
genes gives  only  two  illustrations  to  this  Trope,  that  of 
the  sun  and  the  earthquake.6 

The  Tenth  Trope.  We  have  already  remarked  on 
the  difference  in  the  character  of  the  tenth  Trope,  deal- 
ing as  it  does,  not  with  the  ideas  of  objects,  like  the 
other  nine  Tropes,  but  with  philosophical  and  religious 
opinions,  and  questions  of  right  and  wrong.  It  was  the 
well-known  aim  of  the  Sceptics  to  submit  to  the  laws 
and  customs  of  the  land  where  they  were  found,  and 
to  conform  to  certain  moral  teachings  and  religious 
ceremonies;  this  they  .did  without  either  affirming  or 

1  Hyp.  i.  135—140.  4  Hyp.  i.  143. 

3  Diog.  ix.  11,  88.  s  Hypt  T.  144. 

p.  i.  141—142.  «  Diog.  ix.  11,  87. 


."•I'       Sextus  Empiricu8  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

denying  the  truth  of  the  principles  upon  which  these 
teu<  -1  lin^s  were  based,1  and  also  without  any  passion  or 
strong  feeling  in  regard  to  them,-  as  nothing  in  it 
can  be  proved  to  be  good  or  evil.     The  tenth  Trope, 
accordingly,  brings  forward  contradictions  in  customs, 
laws,  and  the  beliefs  of  different  lands,  to  show  that  ih.-y 
are  also  changeable  and  relative,  and  not  of  absolute 
worth.     The  foundation-thought  of  this  Trope  is  gi 
twice  by  Diogenes,  once  as  we  have  before  stated  in  his 
introduction    to  the  life  of  Pyrrlio,  and  also  as  on< 
the  Trope.-  it  is  apparently  one  of  the  oldest  of 

the  Tropes,  it  would  naturally  be  much  used  in 
in-  with  the  Stoics,  whose  philosophy  had  such  a  \v 
ethical  significance,  and  must  also  have  held  an  imj> 
ant  place  in  the  &c<  -)iii«  -il  School  in  all  metaphysical 
and   philosophical    discussions.     The  definition5  in   the 
beumnini;  of  Sextus'  exposition  of  this  Trope  Fabri< 
thinks  waa  taken  from  Aristotle,  of  schools,  In  ins, 

mythical  lx  li>  t>  and  dogmatic  opinions,6  and  the  defini- 
tion which  Diogenes  gives  of  law  in  his  life  of  Plat< 
similar.     Pappenheim,  however,  thinks  they  were  taken 
from  i:  ),  perhape  irom  Chrysippus.8     The  argu- 

(  ment  is  based  upon  the  ditterences  in  development  of 
J  thought,  as  affecting  the  nit  of  judgment  in 

I  philosophy,  in  morals,  and  religion,  the  results  of  which 
\  we  find  in  the  widely  opposing  schools  of  philosophy,  in 
I  the  variety  in  religious  belief,  and  in  the  laws  and  cus- 
toms of  different  countries.     Therefore  the  decisions 


•'.;?.  1.24.  5  llyp.i.  113-147. 

•  Hyp.  in.  235.  6  Fabricius,  Cap.  iv.  H. 

3  Diog.  ix.  11,  61.  '  Diog.  in.  86. 

4  Diog.  ix.  11,  83.  &  Pappenheim  Gr.  Pyrr.  Grundzilge,  p.  50. 


The  Sceptical  Tropes.  53 

reached  in  the  world  of  thought  leave  us  equally  -m\ 
doubt  regarding  the  absolute  value  of  any  standards,/ 
with  those  obtained  through  sense-perception,  and  the\ 
universal  conflict  of  opinion  regarding  all  questions  of  '' 
philosophy  and  ethics  leads  us  also  according  to  this 
Trope  to  the  reserving  of  the  opinion.1     This  Trope  is  ; 
the  fifth  as  given  by  Diogenes,  who  placed  it  directly 
after  the  first  four  which  relate  more  especially  to  human 
development,2  while  Sextus  uses  it  as  the  final  one, 
perhaps  thinking  that  an  argument  based   upon   the 
higher  powers  of  man  deserves  the  last  place,  or  is  the 
summation  of  the  other  arguments. 

Following  the  exposition  of  the  ten  Tropes  of  the 
older  Sceptics,  Sextus  gives  the  five  Tropes  which  he 
attributes  to  the  "  later  Sceptics."3  Sextus  nowhere 
mentions  the  author  of  these  Tropes.  Diogenes,  how- 
ever, attributes  them  to  Agrippa,  a  man  of  whom  we 
know  nothing  except  his  mention  of  him.  He  was 
evidently  one  of  the  followers  of  Aenesidemus,  and  a 
scholar  of  influence  in  the  Sceptical  School,  who  must 
have  himself  had  disciples,  as  Diogenes  says,  ol  rrrepl 
'AypiTTTrav*  add  to  these  tropes  other  five  tropes,  using 
the  plural  verb.  Another  Sceptic,  also  mentioned  by 
Diogenes,  and  a  man  unknown  from  other  sources, 
named  some  of  his  books  after  Agrippa.5  Agrippa  is  not 
given  by  Diogenes  in  the  list  of  the  leaders  of  the 
Sceptical  School,  but6  his  influence  in  the  development 
of  the  thought  of  the  School  must  have  been  great,  as 
the  transition  from  the  ten  Tropes  of  the  "older 

1  Hij2).  I.  163.  4  Diog.  ix.  11,  88. 

2  Diog.  ix.  11.  83.  5  Diog.  ix.  11,  106. 

3  Hyp.  i.  164.  6  Diog.  ix.  12,  115—116. 


54       Sextus  Empiricus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

Sceptics  "  to  the  five  attributed  to  Agrippa  is  a  marked 
one,  and  shows  the  entrance  into  the  school  of  a  logical 
power  before  unknown  in  it.  The  latter  are  not  a  re- 
duction of  the  Tropes  of  Aenesidemus,  but  are  written 
from  an  entirely  different  standpoint.  The  ten  Tropes 
are  empirical,  and  aim  to  furnish  objective  proofs  of  the 
foundation  theories  of  Pyrrhonism,  while  the  five  are 

/I     "~  -  ~  •  _!•-- 

I    rather  rules  of  thought  leading  to  logical  proof,  and  are 

dialectic  in  their  character.  \Y<-  find  this  distinction 
illustrated  by  the  different  way  in  which  the  Trope  of 
relativity  is  treated  in  the  two  groups.  In  the  first  it 
points  to  an  objective  relativity,  but  with  Agrippa  to  a 
general  subjective  logical  principle.  The  originality  of 
the  Tropes  of  Agrippa  does  not  lie  in  their  substance 
matter,  but  in  their  formulation  and  use  in  the  Sceptical 
School.  These  methods  of  proof  were,  of  course,  not  new, 
but  were  well  known  to  Aristotle,  and  were  used  by 
the  Sceptical  Academy,  and  probably  also  by  Timon,1 
while  the  TT/HK  TI  goes  back  at  least  to  Protagoras. 
The  five  Tropes  are  as  follows. 

(i)  The  one  based  upon  discord. 

(ii)  The  regressus  in  infinit 

(iii)  Relation. 

(iv)  The  hypothetical, 
(v)  The  circulus  in  probando. 

Two  of  these  are  taken  from  the  old  list,  the  first 
and  the  third,  and  Sextus  says  that  the  five  Tropes  are 
intended  to  supplement  the  ten  Tropes,  and  to  show 
the  audacity  of  the  Dogmatics  in  a  variety  of  ways.2 
The  order  of  these  Tropes  is  the  same  with  Diogenes  as 


Compare  Natorp.  Op.  cit.  p.  302. 
*  Hyp.  i.  177. 


I 


The  Sceptical  Tropes.  55 

with  Sextus,  but  the  definitions  of  them  differ  sufficiently 
to  show  that  the  two  authors  took  their  material  from 
different  sources.  According  to  the  first  one  everything 
in  question  is  either  sensible  or  intellectual,  and  in  at- 
tempting to  judge  it  either  in  life,  practically,  or  "  among 
philosophers,"  a  position  is  developed  from  which  it  is 
impossible  to  reach  a  conclusion.1  According  to  the 
second,  every  proof  requires  another  proof,  and  so  on  to 
*  infinity,  and  there  is  no  standpoint  from  which  to  begin 
the  reasoning.2  According  to  the  third,  all  perceptions 
are  relative,  as  the  object  is  colored  by  the  condition  of 
the  judge,  and  the  influence  of  other  things  around  it.3 
According  to  the  fourth,  it  is  impossible  to  escape  from 
the  regressus  in  infinitum  by  making  a  hypothesis  the 
starting  point,  as  the  Dogmatics  attempt  to  do.4  And 
the  fifth,  or  the  circulus  in  probando,  arises  when  that 
which  should  be  the  proof  needs  to  be  sustained  by  the 
thing  to  be  proved. 

Sextus  claims  that  all  things  can  be  included  in 
these  Tropes,  whether  sensible  or  intellectual.5  For 
whether,  as  some  say,  only  the  things  of  sense  are  true, 
or  as  others  claim,  only  those  of  the  understanding,  or 
as  still  others  contend,  some  things  both  of  sense  and 
understanding  are  true,  a  discord  must  arise  that  is 
impossible  to  be  judged,  for  it  cannot  be  judged  by  the 
sensible,  nor  by  the  intellectual,  for  the  things  of  the 
intellect  themselves  require  a  proof;  accordingly,  the 
result  of  all  reasoning  must  be  either  hypothetical,  or 
fall  into  the  regressus  in  infinitum  or  the  circulus  in 

1  Hyp.  i.  165.  4  Hyp.  i.  168. 

2  Hyp.  i.  166.  5  Hyp.  i.  169. 

3  Hyp.  i.  167. 


Sextus  l^i"  i>>  I'icus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 


The  reference  above  to  some  who  B 
only  tip    tilings  of  sense  are  true,  is  to  E]  and 

Pr<  ;  to  some  that  only  the  things  of  thoi; 

true,  toDemocritusainl  Plato;  and  to  those  that  clain 
some  of  both  to  be  true,to  the  Stoics  arid  thePeripateti 
The  tin-  <  IK  \\  Tropes  added  by  Agrippa  have  notlr 
to  do  with  sense-perception,  but  bear  entirely  upon 

;  possibility  of  reasoning,  as  demanded  by  the  science  of 
lo.i^ic,  in  contrast  to  the  earlier  ones  which  related  almost 

/  entin-ly,  with  the  exception  of  the  tenth,  to  mat- 
objects.  Sextus  claims  that  these  five  Tropes  also  1 
to  the  on  of  judgment,3  but  their  logical  result 

iie  dogmatic  denial  of  all  possibility  of  know- 
ledge. showing  as  Hirzel   has  well  demonstrated, 
more  the  influence  of  the  New  Academy  than  the  spirit 

.  of  the  Sceptical  School.4  It  was  the  standpoint  of  the 
older  Sceptics,  that  although  the  search  for  the  truth 
had  not  yet  succeeded,  yet  they  were  still  seekers,  and 

to  be  faithful  to  this  old  aim  of 
Pynhoni-ts.  He  calls  himself  a  seeker,5  and  in  re- 
proaching the  New  Academy  for  affirming  that  know- 
ledge is  impossible,  Sextus  says,  "  Moreover,  we  say  that 
our  ideas  are  equal  as  regards  trustworthiness  and  un- 
trust\vorthiness."G  The  ten  Tropes  claim  to  establish 
doubt  only  in  regard  to  a  knowledge  of  the  truth,  but 
the  five  J]rjapej_oX_Agrippa  aim  to  logically  prove  the 
impossibility  of  knowledge.  It  is  very  strange  that 
Sextus  does  not  see  this  decided  contrast  in  the  attitude 

1  Hyp.  i.  170—171. 

2  Adv.  Math.  vin.  185—186;  vm.  56;  vn.  369. 
*lfyp.i.  177.  5  Eyp.  i.  3,  7. 
4  Hirzel  Op.  cit.  p.  131.  «  Hyp.  i.  - 


The  Sceptical  Tropes.  57 

of  the  two  s'ets  of  Tropes,  and  expresses  his  approval  of 
those  of  Agrippa,  and  makes  more  frequent  use  of  the 
fifth  of  these,  6  &<zXX7?Xo9,  in  his  subsequent  reasoning 
than  of  any  other  argument.1 

We  find  here  in  the  Sceptical  School,  shortly  after 
the  time  of  Aenesidemus,  the  same  tendency  to  dogmatic 
teaching,  that — so  far  as  the  dim  and  shadowy  history  of 
the  last  years  of  the  New  Academy  can  be  unravelled, 
and  the  separation  of  Pyrrhonism  can  be  understood,  at 
the  time  that  the  Academy  passed  over  into  eclecticism — 
was  one  of  the  causes  of  that  separation. 

It  is  true  that  the  Tropes  of  Agrippa  show  great 
progress  in  the  development  of  thought.  They  furnish 
an  organisation  of  the  School  far  superior  to  what  went 
before,  placing  the  reasoning  on  the  firm  basis  of  the 
laws  of  logic,  and  simplifying  the  amount  of  material  to 
be  used.  In  a  certain  sense  Saisset  is  correct  in  saying 
that  Agrippa  contributed  more  than  any  other  in  com- 
pleting the  organisation  of  Scepticism,2  but  it  is  not 
correct  when  we  consider  the  true  spirit  of  Scepticism 
with  which  the  Tropes  of  Agrippa  were  not  in  harmony. 
It  was  through  the  very  progress  shown  in  the  pro- 
duction of  these  Tropes  that  the  school  finally  lost  the 
strength  of  its  position. 

Not  content  with  having  reduced  the  number  of  the 
Tropes  from  ten  to  five,  others  tried  to  limit  the  number 
still  further  to  two.3  Sextus  gives  us  no  hint  of  the 
authorship  of  the  two  Tropes.  Hitter  attributes  them 
to  Menodotus  and  his  followers,  and  Zeller  agrees  with 


1  See  Index  of  Bekker's  edition  of  Sextus'  works. 

2  Saisset  Op.  cit.  p.  237.  3  Hyp.  i.  178. 


58       Sextus  Empiricus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

that  opinion,1  while  Saisset  thinks  that  Agrippa  was 
•  the  author  of  these,2  which  ifl  a  strange  theory  to 
propound,  as  some  of  the  material  of  the  five  is  repeated 
in  the  two,  and  the  same  man  could  certainly  not  appear 
as  an  advocate  of  five,  and  at  the  same  time  of  T 
Tropes. 

The  two  Tropes  are  founded  on  the  principle  that 
anything   must   be    known   through    itself  or  through 
something  else.     It  cannot  be   known   througl 
because  of  the  discord  existing  between  all  things  of 
senses  and  intellect,  nor  can  it  be  known  through  soi 
thing  else,  as  then  cither  the  regressus  in  infinitum  or 
the  cl realm  in  probando  follow.8     Diogenes  Laertius 
j  does  not  refer  to  these  two  Tropes. 

In  regard  to  all  these  Tropes  of  the  suspension  of 
judgment, SexttUi  has  well  remarked  in  his  introduction 
to  them,  that  they  are  included  in  the  eighth,  or  that 
of  relation.4 

The  Tropes  of  Aetiology.  The  eight  Tropes  against 
causality  belong  chronologically  before  the  live  Tropes 
of  Agrippa,  in  the  history  of  the  development  of  scepti- 
cal thought.  They  have  a  much  closer  connection  with 
the  spirit  of  Scepticism  than  the  Tropes  of  Agrippa, 
including,  as  they  do,  the  fundamental  thought  of 
Pyrrhonism,  i.e.,  that  the  phenomena  do  not  reveal  the 
unknown. 

The  Sceptics  did  not  deny  the  phenomena,  but  they 

'  denied  that  the  phenomena  are  signs  capable  of  being 

/  interpreted,  or  of  revealing  the  reality  of  causes.     It  is 

1  Zeller  m.  38  ;  Hitter  iv.  277.         3  Uyp.  I.  178  -179. 

2  Saisset  Op.  eit.  p.  231.  *  Hyp.  i.  39. 


The  Sceptical  Tropes.  59 

impossible  by  a  research  of  the  signs  to  find  out  the 
unknown,  or  the  explanation  of  things,  as  the  Stoics 
and  Epicureans  claim.  The  theory  of  Aenesidemus 
which  lies  at  the  foundation  of  his  eight  Tropes  against 
aetiology,  is  given  to  us  by  Photius  as  follows  i1  "  There 
are  no  visible  signs  of  the  unknown,  and  those  who  be- 
lieve in  its  existence  are  the  victims  of  a  vain  illusion." 
This  statement  of  Aenesidemus  is  confirmed  by  a  fuller 
explanation  of  it  given  later  on  by  Sextus.2  If  pheno- 
mena are  not  signs  of  the  unknown  there  is  no  causality, 
and  a  refutation  of  causality  is  a  proof  of  the  impossi- 
bility of  science,  as  all  science  is  the  science  of  causes, 
the  power  of  studying  causes  from  effects,  or  as  Sextus 
calls  them,  phenomena. 

It  is  very  noticeable  to  any  one  who  reads  the  refu- 
tation of  causality  by  Aenesidemus,  as  given  by  Sextus,3 
that  there  is  no  reference  to  the  strongest  argument  of 
modern  Scepticism,  since  the  time  of  Hume,  against 
causality,  namely  that  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  causality 
cannot  be  so  accounted  for  as  to  justify  our  relying  upon 
it  as  a  form  of  cognition.4 

The  eight  Tropes  are  directed  against  the  possibility 
of  knowledge  of  nature,  which  Aenesidemus  contested 
against  in  all  his  Tropes,  the  ten  as  well  as  the  eight.5 
They  are  written  from  a  materialistic  standpoint. 
These  Tropes  are  given  with  illustrations  by  Fabricius 
as  follows : 

I.  Since  aetiology  in  general  refers  to  things  that  are 
unseen,  it  does  not  give  testimony  that  is  incontestable 

1  Myriob.  170  B.  12.  4  Ueberweg  Op.  cit.  p.  217. 

2  Adv.  Math.  vin.  207.  5  Hyp.  I.  98. 
a  Hyp.  i.  180—186. 


<50       Sextus  Empiricus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

:anl  to  phenomena.  For  example,  tin;  Pythagor- 
eans explain  tin-  distance  of  the  planets  by  a  musical 
proportion. 

II.  From  many  equally  plausible  reasons   which 
might  be  given  for  tin-  same  thing,  one  only  is  arbitrarily 
chosen,  afl  some  explain  the  inundation  of  the  Nile  by 
a  fall  of  snow  at  its  source,  while  there  could  be  other 

•s.  afl  rain,  or  wind,  or  the  action  of  the  sun. 

III.  Things  take  place  in  an  orderly  manner,  but 
the  causes  presented  do  not  show  any  order,  as  for  ex- 
ample, the  motion  of  the  stars  is  explained   by 
mutual  pressure,  which  does  not  take  into  account  the 
order  th  is  among  them. 

IV.  The  unseen  things  are  supposed  to  take  place 
in  the  same  way  as  phenomena,  as  vision  is  exp! 

in  the  same  way  as  the  appearance  of  images  in  a  dark 
room. 

V.  Most  philosophers  present  theories  of  aetiology 
which  agree  with  their  own  individual  hypotheses  about 
the  elements,  but  not  with  common  and  accepted  ideas, 
as  to  explain  the  world  by  atoms  like   Epicurus,  by 
homoeomeriae  like  Anaxagoras,  or  by  matter  and  form 
like  Aristotle. 

VI.  Theories  are  accepted  which  agree  with  indi- 
vidual   hypotheses,   and   others   equally   probable   are 
passed  by,  as  Aristotle's  explanation  of  comets,  that 
they  are  a  collection  of  vapors  near  the  earth,  because 
that  coincided  with  his  theory  of  the  universe. 

VII.  Theories   of  aetiology  are   presented  which 
conflict  not  only  with  individual  hypotheses,  but  also 


The  Sceptical  Tropes.  61 

with  phenomena,  as  to  admit  like  Epicurus  an  inclina- 
tion or  desire  of  the  soul,  which  was  incompatible  with 
the  necessity  which  he  advocated. 

VIII.  The  inscrutable  is  explained  by  things 
equally  inscrutable,  as  the  rising  of  sap  in  plants  is  ex- 
plained by  the  attraction  of  a  sponge  for  water,  a  fact 
contested  by  some.1 

Diogenes  does  not  mention  these  Tropes  in  this 
form,  but  he  gives  a  resumtf  of  the  general  arguments 
of  the  Sceptics  against  aetiology,2  which  has  less  in 
common  with  the  eight  Tropes  of  Aenesidemus,  than 
with  the  presentation  of  the  subject  by  Sextus  later,3 
when  he  multiplies  his  proofs  exceedingly  to  show 
jjLTjSev  elvai  CLITIOV.  Although  the  Tropes  of  Aeneside- 
mus have  a  dialectic  rather  than  an  objective  character, 
it  would  not  seem  that  he  made  the  distinction,  which  is 
so  prominent  with  Sextus,between  the  signs  vTro/jLvrjo-Ti/cd 
arid  evSeiKTiicd*  especially  as  Diogenes  sums  up  his  argu- 
ment on  the  subject  with  the  general  assertion,  ^r^fjuelov 
OVK  elvai?  and  proceeds  to  introduce  the  logical  con- 
sequence of  the  denial  of  aetiology.  The  summing  up 
of  the  Tropes  of  Aenesidemus  is  given  as  follows,  in  the 
Hypoty poses,  by  Sextus : — "  A  cause  in  harmony  with  all 
the  sects  of  philosophy,  and  with  Scepticism,  and  with 
phenomena,  is  perhaps  not  possible,  for  the  phenomena 
and  the  unknown  altogether  disagree."6 

It  is  interesting  to  remark  in  connection  with  the 
seventh  of  these  Tropes,  that  Aenesidemus  asserts  that 

1  Hyp.  i.  180—186;   Fabricius,  Cap.  xvn.  180  z. 

2  Diog.  ix.  11,  96—98.  «  Adv.  Math.  vm.  151. 

3  Hyp.  in.  24—28.  5  Diog.  ix.  11,  96. 

6  Hyp.  i.  185. 


62      Sextua  Empiricus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

causality  has  only  a  subjective  value,  which  from  his 

/    materialistic  standpoint  was  an  argument  against  its 

)  real  existence,  and  the  same  argument  is  used  by  Kant 

to   prove   that   causality   is   a   necessary  condition   of 

thought.1 

Chaignet  characterises  the  Tropes  of  Aenesidemus  as 
false  and  sophistical,2  but  as  Maccoll  has  well  said,  they 
are  remarkable  for  their  judicious  and  strong  criticism, 
and  are  directed  against  the  false  method  of  observing 
facts  through  the  light  of  preconceived  opinion.3  They 
have,  however,  a  stronger  critical  side  than  sceptical, 
and  show  the  positive  tendency  of  the  thought  of 
Aenesidemus. 

1  Compare  Maccoll  Op.  cit.  p.  77.  2  Chaignet  Op.  cit.  507. 

3  Maccoll  Op.  cit.  p.  88. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Aenesidemus  and  the  Philosophy  of  Heraditus. 

A  paragraph  in  the  First  Book  of  the  Hypotyposes 
which  has  given  rise  to  much  speculation  and  many 
different  theories,  is  the  comparison  which  Sextus  makes 
of  Scepticism  with  the  philosophy  of  Heraclitus.1  In 
this  paragraph  the  statement  is  made  that  Aenesidemus 
and  his  followers,  ol  irepl  TOV  Aiinjo-tSrjfiov,  said  that 
Scepticism  is  the  path  to  the  philosophy  of  Heraclitus, 
because  the  doctrine  that  contradictory  predicates 
appear  to  be  applicable  to  the  same  thing,  leads  the 
way  to  the  one  that  contradictory  predicates  are  in 
reality  applicable  to  the  same  thing.2  ol  irepl  rbv 
AlvrjaiSrjfjLOV  €\eyov  6$bv  elvai,  rrjv  (7K67m/crjv  dycojrjp 
€7rl  TTJV  ^HpaKKeireiov  faXoo-ocfrlaVj  &<m  TrpoyyetTai  rov 
rdvavrla  irepl  TO  avTo  VTrdp^eiv  TO  rdvavria  Trepl  TO 
avrb  tyalveadai,.  As  the  Sceptics  say  that  contradictory 
predicates  appear  to  be  applicable  to  the  same  thing, 
the  Heraclitans  come  from  this  to  the  more  positive 
doctrine  that  they  are  in  reality  so.3 

This  connection  which  Aenesidemus  is  said  to  have 
affirmed  between  Scepticism  and  the  philosophy  of 
Heraclitus  is  earnestly  combated  by  Sextus,  who  de- 
clares that  the  fact  that  contradictory  predicates  appear 
to  be  applicable  to  the  same  thing  is  not  a  dogma  of 
the  Sceptics,  but  a  fact  which  presents  itself  to  all  men, 
and  not  to  the  Sceptics  only.  No  one  for  instance, 

1  Hyp.  i.  210.         2  Hyp.  i.  210.         3  gyp.  i.  210. 


64      Sextus  Empiricus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

whether  be  be  a  Sceptic  or  not,  would  dare  to  suy  th 
honey  does  nut  et  to  those  in  health,  and  bir 

to   those   who    liave  the  jaundice,  so  that   Hei 
begins  from  a  preconception  common  to  all  men,  as  to 
us  also,  and   perhaps  to  the  other  schools  of  philosophy 
as  well.1     As  the  st  concerning  the  appearance 

of  contradictory  predicates  in  regard  to  the  same  th: 
ifl  not  an  exclusively  >c«-ptical   one,  then  Sc.  i  is 

n<»  more  a  path  to  tip-  philosophy  of  Heraclitus  th 
to  other  schools  of  philosophy,  or  to  life,  as  all  use 
common  subject  matter.  "  But  we  are  afraid  that  the 
Sceptical  School  not  only  does  not  help  towards  the 
knowledge  of  the  philosophy  of  Heraclitus,  but  even 
hinders  that  result.  Since  the  Sceptic  accuses  Heraclitus 
of  having  ra>ldy  dogmatised,  presenting  on  the  one 
hand  the  doe-trine  of  ' conflagration '  and  on  the  other 
that  'contradictory  predicates  are  in  reality  applicable 
to  the  same  thing.' " 2  "  It  is  absurd,  then,  to  say  that 
this  conflicting  school  is  a  path  to  the  sect  with  which  it 
conflicts.  It  is  therefore  absurd  to  say  that  the  Scepti 
School  is  a  path  to  the  philosophy  of  Heraclitus."3 

This  is  not  the  only  place  in  the  writings  of  Sextus 
which  states  that  Aenesidemus  at  some  time  of  his  life 
was  an  advocate  of  the  doctrines  of  Heraclitus.  In  no 
instance,  however,  where  Sextus  refers  to  this  remark- 
able fact,  does  he  offer  any  explanation  of  it,  or  express 
any  bitterness  against  Aenesidemus,  whom  he  always 
speaks  of  with  respect  as  a  leader  of  the  Sceptical 
School.  We  are  thus  furnished  with  one  of  the  most 
difficult  problems  of  ancient  Scepticism,  the  problem 

1  Hyp.  i.  211.  a  Hyp.  i.  212.  3  Hyp.  i.  212. 


\Aenesidemus  and  the  Philosophy  of  Heraclitus.     65 

of  reconciling  the  apparent  advocacy  of  Aenesidemus 
of  the  teachings  of  Heraclitus  with  his  position  in  the 
Sceptical  School. 

A  comparison  with  eadh  other  of  the  references 
made  by  Sextus  and  other  writers  to  the  teachings  of 
Aenesidemus,  and  a  consideration  of  the  result,  gives  us 
two  pictures  of  Aenesidemus  which  conflict  most  de- 
cidedly with  each  other.  We  have  on  the  one  hand, 
the  man  who  was  the  first  to  give  Pyrrhonism  a  position 
as  an  influential  school,  and  the  first  to  collect  and  pre- 
sent to  the  world  the  results  of  preceding  Sceptical 
thought.  He  was  the  compiler  of  the  ten  Tropes  of 
eVo^,  and  perhaps  in  part  their  author,  and  the  author 
of  the  eight  Tropes  against  aetiology.1  He  develops  his 
Scepticism  from  the  standpoint  that  neither  the  senses 
nor  the  intellect  can  give  us  any  certain  knowledge  of 
reality.2  He  denied  the  possibility  of  studying  pheno- 
mena as  signs  of  the  unknown.3  He  denied  all  possi- 
bility of  truth,  and  the  reality  of  motion,  origin  and 
decay.  There  was  according  to  his  teaching  no  plea- 
sure or  happiness,  and  no  wisdom  or  supreme  good. 
He  denied  the  possibility  of  finding  out  the  nature  of 
things,  or  of  proving  the  existence  of  the  gods,  and 
finally  he  declared  that  no  ethical  aim  is  possible. 

The  picture  on  the  other  hand,  presented  to  us  by 
Sextus  and  Tertullian,  is  that  of  a  man  with  a  system  of 
beliefs  and  dogmas,  which  lead,  he  says,  to  the  philosophy 
of  Heraclitus.  In  strange  contradiction  to  his  assertion  of 
the  impossibility  of  all  knowledge,  he  advocates  a  theory 


1  Hyp.  i.  180.  2  Photius  170,  B.  12. 

*  Adv.  Math.  via.  40. 


(ii;       Sextns  Empiricus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

that,  the  original  substance  is  air,1  which  is  most 
tainly  a  dogma,  although   indeed  a  deviation  from  the 
teachings  of  Heraclitus,  of  which  Sex t us  seemed  uncon- 
scious, as  he  says,  TO  re  ov  Kara  -rov  'HpdicKeiTov  arjp 
ecrriV)  co?  (fryvlv  6  Aivfjfft&fjfAOV,     Aenesidemu 

i    also  regarding  number  and   time  and   unity   of 
the  ori<_rinal  world-^tuff.2    He  fteemfl  to  have  d<> 
further  about  motion,3  and  about  the  soul.4 

It  S«  xtus'  language  is  taken  according  to  it>  a 
meal  find  ourselves  here  in   tl  -nee  of  a 

which  would  be  naturally  held  by  a 
follower  of  the  Stoic-Heraclitan  physics,6 and  absol 
inexplicable  from  the  nan  who  advocated 

!  a  Scepticism  as  Aenesidemus.     Sextus  in  thf 

irition 

against  the  Idea  that  Scepticism  could  form  th«-  path  to 
the  j)hilo>o|)hy  of  ir«-r;»clitus,  but  he  does  not  ex} 
surprise  or  indignation  against  Aenesidemus  persoi 
or  orVer  any  explanation  of  the  apparent  contradic1 
and  while  his  wrr  -und  in  references  to  him  as  a 

•ted  leader  of  tlte  Sceptical  School,  he  sometimes 
srenis  to  include  him  with   the  Dogmatic-,  n, 
him  with  the  Soypart/cwv  (piXocrofav.7     In  fact,  the  task 
of  presenting  any  consistent  hi>t«»ry  of  the  develop] 
of  thought   through  which   Aenesidemus  }> 
a   puzzling  one,  that  Brochard  brilliantly  remarks  that 

•»ly  the  best  attitud.  towards  it  would  be 

to  follow  the  advice  of  Aenesidemus  himself  -pend 

1  Adv.  Math.  x.  233.  6  Compare  Zellor  Op.  cit.  in.  p.  33. 

Vath.  ix.  337;  x.  216.  6  Hyp.  I.  210— J 
3  Adv.  Mitti.  x.  38.  V.  Math.  vm.  8;   x.  215. 

*  Atlr.  Math.  vn.  349. 


Aenesidemus  and  the  Philosophy  of  Heraclitus.     67 

one's  judgment  altogether  regarding  it.  Is  it  possible 
to  suppose  that  so  sharp  and  subtle  a  thinker  as  Aene- 
sidemus held  at  the  same  time  such  opposing  opinions  ? 

The  conjecture  that  he  was  first  a  Heraclitan  Stoic, 
and  later  a  Sceptic,  which  might  be  possible,  does  not 
offer  any  explanation  of  Sextus'  statement,  that  he 
regarded  Scepticism  as  a  path  to  the  philosophy  of 
Heraclitus.  Nor  would  it  be  logical  to  think  that  after 
establishing  the  Sceptical  School  in  renewed  influence 
arid  power,  he  reverted  to  the  Heraclitan  theories  as 
they  were  modified  by  the  Stoics.  These  same  theories 
were  the  cause  of  his  separation  from  the  Academy,  for 
his  chief  accusation  against  the  Academy  was  that  it 
was  adopting  the  dogmatism  of  the  Stoics.1  The  matter 
is  complicated  by  the  fact  that  Tertullian  also  attributes 
to  Aenesidemus  anthropological  and  physical  teachings 
that  agree  with  the  Stoical  Heraclitan  doctrines.  It  is 
not  strange  that  in  view  of  these  contradictory  assertions 
in  regard  to  the  same  man,  some  have  suggested  the 
possibility  that  they  referred  to  two  different  men  of 
the  same  name,  a  supposition,  however,  that  no  one  has 
been  able  to  authoritatively  vindicate. 

Let  us  consider  briefly  some  of  the  explanations 
which  have  been  attempted  of  the  apparent  heresy  of 
Aenesidemus  towards  the  Sceptical  School.  We  will 
begin  with  the  most  ingenious,  that  of  Pappenheim.2 

Pappenheim  claims  that  Sextus  was  not  referring 
to  Aenesidemus  himself  in  these  statements  which  he 
joins  with  his  name.  In  the  most  important  of  these, 


1  Compare  Zeller  Op.  cit.  in.  p.  16. 

2  Die  angebliche  Heraclitismus  des  Skeptikers  Ainesidemos,  Berlin  1889. 


68       Sextus  Empiricus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

the  one  quoted  from  the  Hypotyposes,1  which  repr« 
AeneademtUI  as  daimin^  that  Scepticism  is  the  path  to 
the  philosophy  of  Hcraclitus,  the  expression  used  is 
ol  Trepl  -rov  Alvrjo'io'rj/jLov,  and  in  many  of  the  other  places 
where  Sextus  refers  to  the  dogmatic  statements  of 
Aenesidemus,  the  expression  is  either  ol  Trepl  rov  Alirq- 
aiSrjfjLov,  or  Alvrja-iSrjfjLo^  tca0'  *H pdfc\en ov,  while  when 

us  quotes  Aenesidemus  to  sustain  Scepticism,  he 
his  nairn-  alone. 

Pappenhrim    thinks   that    S  -onflict  was  not 

with  the  dead  Aenesi<h>nm<,  who  had  lived  two  cen- 
turies before  him,  but  with  his  own  contempor 
He  also  seeks  to  prove  that  Sextus  could  not  have  gained 
his  knowledge  of  these  sayings  of  Aenesidemus  from  any 
of  AeiHsidi  mus'  own  writings,  as  neither  by  the  ancients, 
nor  by  later  writers,  was  any  book  spoken  of  which  could 
well  have  contained  them.  Neither  Aristocles  nor  Dio- 
genes mentions  any  such  book. 

Papponheim  also  makes  much  of  the  arinmu-nt  that 
Sextus  in  no  instance  seems  conscious  of  inconsistency 
on  the  part  of  Aenesidemus,  even  when  most  earnestly 
combating  his  alleged  teachings,  but  in  referring  to 
him  personally  he  always  speaks  of  him  with  great 
respect. 

Pappenheim  suggests,  accordingly,  that  the  polemic 
of  Sext  us  was  against  contemporaries,  those  who  accepted 
the  philosophy  of  Heraclitus  in  consequence  of,  or  in 
some  connection  with,  the  teachings  of  Aenesidemus. 
He  entirely  ignores  the  fact  that  there  is  no  trace  of 
any  such  school  or  sect  in  history,  calling  themselves 

»  Hyp.  i.  210—212. 


Aenesidemus  and  the  Philosophy  of  Heraclitus.     69 

followers  of  "  Aenesidemus  according  to  Heraclitus,"  but 
still  thinks  it  possible  that  such  a  movement  existed  in 
Alexandria  at  the  time  of  Sextus,  where  so  many  dif- 
ferent sects  were  found.  Sextus  uses  Aenesidemus' 
name  in  four  different  ways:— alone,  ol  irepl  TOP  Aive<riSrj- 
fAoV)  Aiwrjo-iSq/jLos  Kaff  'HpdfcXeirov,  and  in  one  instance 
ol  7T€pl  TOV  Alvrj(riSi]fjLov  fcad'  (Hpdic\eiTOV.1 

Pappenheim  advances  the  theory  that  some  of  these 
contemporaries  against  whom  Sextus  directed  his  argu- 
ments had  written  a  book  entitled  Awfi<ri&THMK  Kaff 
'Hpd/cXeirov,  to  prove  the  harmony  between  Aenesi- 
demus and  Heraclitus,  and  that  it  was  from  this  book 
that  Sextus  quoted  the  dogmatic  statements  which  he 
introduced  with  that  formula.  He  claims,  further,  that 
the  passage  quoted  from  Hypotyposes  I.  even,  is  directed 
against  contemporaries,  who  founded  their  system  of 
proofs  of  the  harmony  between  Aenesidemus  and  Herac- 
litus on  the  connection  of  the  celebrated  formula  which 
was  such  a  favourite  with  the  Sceptics:  "Contrary 
predicates  appear  to  apply  to  the  same  thing,"  with  the 
apparent  deduction  from  this,  that  "  Contrary  predicates 
in  reality  apply  to  the  same  thing."  Sextus  wishes,  ac- 
cording to  Pappenheim,  to  prove  to  these  contemporaries 
that  they  had  misunderstood  Aenesidemus,  and  Sextus 
does  not  report  Aenesidemus  to  be  a  Dogmatic,  nor  to 
have  taught  the  doctrines  of  Heraclitus;  neither  has 
he  misunderstood  Aenesidemus,  nor  consequently  mis- 
represented him ;  but  on  the  contrary,  these  dogmatic 
quotations  have  nothing  to  do  with  Aenesidemus,  but 
refer  altogether  to  contemporaries  who  pretended  to  be 

1  Adv.  Math.  vm.  8. 


70  xra. 

Sceptics    while    tl:  pted     the    tenrhinirs    t>i      H 

BeztUl  naturally  warmly  combats  this  tendency, 
as  he  \vishe<  to  preserve  Pyrrhonism  pure. 

Brochard  advocates  a  change  of  opinion  on  f 
of  Aenesidemus  as  an  explanation  of  tlie  difficulty  in 
'ion.1  He  starts  from  the  Disposition,  the  reason- 
ableness of  which  we  shall  consider  later,  that  Aene- 
sidemus had  pa.-srd  through  one  change  of  opinion 
already  when  he  severed  his  connection  with  the  New 
Academy;  and  to  the  two  phases  of  hit  life,  which  such 
a  (  hange  has  already  made  us  familiar  with,  he  adds  a 
third.  Aenesidemus  would  not  be  the  first  who  has 
accepted  different  !>•  -li< -f>  at  different  periods  of  his  life, 
and  Hrnrhard  claims  that  such  a  development  in  the 
opinions  of  Aenesidemus  is  logical.  He  does  not  accuse 
Aenesidemus  of  having,  as  might  seem  from  the  pern>al 
of  Sextus,  suddenly  changed  his  basis,  but  rather  of 
having  gradually  come  to  accept  much  in  the  teachings 
of  Heraclitns.  Aenesidemus  modifies  his  Scepticism 
only  to  the  extent  of  pretending  to  know  something 
of  absolute  reality.  The  Sceptic  says,  "Contradi 
predicates  are  apparently  applicable  to  the  same  ti 
and  Aenesidemus  accepts  the  Heraclitan  result — "  Con- 
tradictory predicates  are  in  reality  applicable  to  the 
same  thing."  From  Sextus'  report,  Aenesidemus  would 
seem  to  have  renounced  his  position  as  a  Sceptic  in 
saying  that  Scepticism  is  the  path  to  the  philosophy  of 
Heraclitus.  He  does  not,  however,  renounce  Sceptici>m, 
but  he  finds  it  incomplete.  In  deliberating  concerning 
the  appearance  of  contradictory  predicate!  in  regard  to 

1    Hrochard  Op.  cit.  272. 


Aenesidemus  and  the  Philosophy  of  Heraclitus.     71 

the  same  object,  he  would  naturally  ask,  "  Whence  come 
these  contradictory  appearances  ? "  After  having  doubted 
all  things,  he  wished  to  know  wherefore  he  doubts.  The 
system  of  Heraclitus  offers  a  solution,  and  he  accepts  it. 
Contradictory  predicates  produce  equilibrium  in  the 
soul  because  they  are  an  expression  of  reality. 

As  a  Sceptic  he  claims  that  knowledge  is  impossible, 
and  he  does  not  find  that  the  statement  of  Heraclitus 
disproves  this,  but  rather  that  it  supports  his  theory. 
He  had  denied  the  existence  of  science.  He  still  does 
so,  but  now  he  knows  why  he  denies  it.  Brochard  asks 
why  it  is  any  more  impossible  that  Aenesidemus  should 
have  been  a  follower  of  Heraclitus  than  that  Protagoras 
was  so,  as  Protagoras  was  after  all  a  Sceptic.  In  con- 
clusion, Brochard  claims  that  the  dogmatic  theories 
attributed  to  Aenesidemus  relate  to  the  doctrine  of  the 
truth  of  contradictory  predicates,  which  seemed  to  him 
a  logical  explanation  of  the  foundation  theories  of 
Scepticism.  It  is  right  to  call  him  a  Sceptic,  for  he 
was  so,  and  that  sincerely ;  and  he  deserves  his  rank 
as  one  of  the  chiefs  of  the  Sceptical  School. 

Coming  now  to  the  opinion  of  Zeller,1  we  find  that 
he  advocates  a  misconception  of  Aenesidemus  on  the 
part  of  Sextus.  The  whole  difficulty  is  removed,  Zeller 
thinks,  by  the  simple  fact  that  Sextus  had  not  under- 
stood Aenesidemus ;  and  as  Tertullian  and  Sextus  agree 
in  this  misconception  of  the  views  of  Aenesidemus,  they 
must  have  been  misled  by  consulting  a  common  author 
in  regard  to  Aenesidemus,  who  confused  what  Aene- 
sidemus said  of  Heraclitus  with  his  own  opinion.  Zeller 

1  Zeller  Op.  cit.  Ill,  pp.  31 — 35;  Grundriss  der  Geschichteder  Griechis- 
chen  Phil.  p.  263. 


7 '2       tieztux  Empiricus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

maintains  that  the  expression  so  often  repeated  by 
Suxtus — Aivr)(rib7)iJLOS  naff  'HpatcKeirov  —  shows  that 
some  one  of  Aenesidemus'  books  contained  a  report  of 
Heraclitus1  doctrines,  as  Aenesidemus  was  in  the  habit 
of  quoting  as  many  authorities  as  possible  to  sustain 
his  Scepticism.  To  justify  his  quotations  from  Herac- 
litus,  he  had  possibly  given  a  short  abstract  of  Heraclitus' 
teachings ;  and  the  misconception  advocated  by  Zeller, 
and  found  both  in  Tertullian  and  Sextus,  refers  rather 
to  the  spirit  than  to  the  words  quoted  from  Aeneside- 
ii) ns.  and  is  a  misconception  due  to  some  earlier  author, 
who  had  given  a  false  impression  of  the  meaning  of 
Aenesidemus  in  quoting  what  Aenesidemus  wrote  about 
Heraclitus.  That  is  to  say,  Heraclitus  was  classed  by 
Aenesidemua  only  among  those  who  prepared  th»- 
for  Scepticism,  just  as  Diogenes1  mentions  many  philo- 
sophers in  that  way ;  and  that  Soranus2  and  Sextus  both 
ha.l  the  same  misunderstanding  can  only  be  explained 
by  a  mistake  on  the  part  of  the  authority  whom  they 
consulted. 

This  explanation,  however,  makes  Sextus  a  very 
stupid  man.  Aenesidemus'  books  were  well  known, 
and  Sextus  would  most  certainly  take  the  trouble  to 
read  them.  His  reputation  as  an  historian  would  not 
sustain  such  an  accusation,  as  Diogenes  calls  his  books 
TO,  Setca  TWV  cnceTTTiicwv  KOI  a\\a  tcd\\i<TTa*  Further- 
more, that  Sextus  used  Aenesidemus'  own  books  we 
know  from  the  direct  quotation  from  them  in  regard  to 
Plato,4  which  he  combines  with  the  ideas  of  Menodotus5 
and  his  own. 

1  Diog.  Laert.  ix.  11,  71—74.         -  Tertullian.         3  Diog.  ix.  12,  116. 
»  Hyp.  i.  222.  5  Following  the  Greek  of  Bekker. 


Aenesidemus  and  the  Philosophy  of  Heraclitus.     73 

Sextus'  references  to  Aenesidemus  in  connection 
with  Heraclitus  are  very  numerous,  and  it  is  absurd 
to  suppose  that  he  would  have  trusted  entirely  to  some 
one  who  reported  him  for  authority  on  such  a  subject. 
Even  were  it  possible  that  Sextus  did  not  refer  directly 
to  the  works  of  Aenesidemus,  which  we  do  not  admit, 
even  then,  there  had  been  many  writers  in  the  Sceptical 
School  since  the  time  of  Aenesidemus,  and  they  certainly 
could  not  all  have  misrepresented  him.  We  must  re- 
member that  Sextus  was  at  the  head  of  the  School,  and 
had  access  to  all  of  its  literature.  His  honor  would  not 
allow  of  such  a  mistake,  and  if  he  had  indeed  made  it, 
his  contemporaries  must  surely  have  discovered  it  before 
Diogenes  characterised  his  books  as  K<i\\icrTa.  Whatever 
may  be  said  against  the  accuracy  of  Sextus  as  a  general 
historian  of  philosophy,  especially  in  regard  to  the  older 
schools,  he  cannot  certainly  be  accused  of  ignorance 
respecting  the  school  of  which  he  was  at  that  time 
the  head. 

The  opinion  of  Hitter  on  this  subject  is  that  Aene- 
sidemus must  have  been  a  Dogmatic.1  Saisset  contends2 
that  Aenesidemus  really  passed  from  the  philosophy  of 
Heraclitus  to  that  of  Pyrrho,  and  made  the  statement 
that  Scepticism  is  the  path  to  the  philosophy  of  Heracli- 
tus to  defend  his  change  of  view,  although  in  his  case 
the  change  had  been  just  the  opposite  to  the  one  he 
defends.  Saisset  propounds  as  a  law  in  the  history  of 
philosophy  a  fact  which  he  claims  to  be  true,  that 
Scepticism  always  follows  sensationalism,  for  which  he 
gives  two  examples,  Pyrrho,  who  was  first  a  disciple  of 

1  Hitter,  Op,  cit.  p.  280.  Book  IV.  2  Saisset,  Op.  cit.  p.  206. 


74 


Democritns,  an.  I    1  1  nine,  who  <»f  Locke. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  discuss  the  absurdity  of  such  a 
law,  which  someon*-  has  well  remarked  would  invoi  i 
a  priori  construction  of  history.     There  is  no  apparent 

;i  for  Saiss.-t's  conjecture  in  regard  to  Aene.>id«  -mus, 
for  it  is  exactly  the  opposite  of  what  Sextus  has  reported. 
Strange  to  say,  Saisset  him.-elf  remarks  in  another  place 
that  we  owe  religious  respect  to  any  text,  and  tl 
should  he  tin-  first  Irnv  of  criticism  to  render  this.1    Such 

'•t  to  the  text  of  Sextus,  as  he  him<«-lt'  fcdvo 
puts    Saisset's  explanation  of  the   subject  under   dis- 
cussion out  of  the  question. 

Hirzel  and  Natorp  do  not  find  such  a  marked 
contradiction  in  the  two  views  presented  of  the  theories 
of  Aenesidemus,  nor  do  they  think  that  Sextus  has 
misrepresented  them*  They  rather  maintain,  that  in 
declaring  the  coexistence  of  contradictory  predicates 
regarding  the  same  object,  Aenesidemus  does  not  cease 
to  be  a  Sceptic,  for  he  did  not  believe  that  the  predicates 
are  applicable  in  a  dogmatic  sense  of  the  word,  but  are 
only  applicable  in  appearance,  that  is,  applicable  to 
phenomena.  The  Heraclitism  of  Aenesidemus  would 
be  then  only  in  appearance,  as  he  understood  the 
statement,  that  "  Contradictory  predicates  are  in  reality 
applicable  to  the  same  thing,"  only  in  the  phenomenal 
sense.2  Hirzel  says  in  addition,  that  contradictory 
predicates  are  in  reality  applicable  to  those  phenomena 
which  are  the  same  for  all,  and  consequently  true,  for 
Aenesidemus  considered  those  phenomena  true  that 
are  the  same  for  all:'1  As  Protagoras,  the  disciple  of 

1  Saisset  Op.  cit.  p.  206.  *  Natorp  Op.  cit.  115.  122. 

3  Adv.  Math.  vin.  8  ;  Hirzel  Op.  cit.  p.  96. 


Aenesidemus  and  the  Philosophy  of  Heraclitus.     75 

Heraclitus,  declared  the  relative  character  of  sensations, 
that  things  exist  only  for  us,  and  that  their  nature 
depends  on  our  perception  of  them  ;  so,  in  the  pheno- 
menal sense,  Aenesidemus  accepts  the  apparent  fact 
that  contradictory  predicates  in  reality  apply  to  the 
same  thing. 

This  explanation  entirely  overlooks  the  fact  that  we 
have  to  do  with  the  word  vTrdpxew,  in  the  statement 
that  contradictory  predicates  in  reality  apply  to  the  same 
thing  ;  while  in  the  passage  quoted  where  Aenesidemus 
declares  common  phenomena  to  be  true  ones,  we  have 
the  word  aXrjdrj,  so  that  this  explanation  of  the  diffi- 
culty would  advocate  a  very  strange  use  of  the  word 


All  of  these  different  views  of  the  possible  solution 
of  this  perplexing  problem  are  worthy  of  respect,  as  the 
opinion  of  men  who  have  given  much  thought  to  this 
and  other  closely  related  subjects.  While  we  may  not 
altogether  agree  with  any  one  of  them,  they  neverthe- 
less furnish  many  suggestions,  which  are  very  valuable 
in  helping  to  construct  a  theory  on  the  subject  that 
shall  satisfactorily  explain  the  difficulties,  and  present  a 
consistent  view  of  the  attitude  of  Aenesidemus. 

First,  in  regard  to  the  Greek  expression  ol  irepl  in 
connection  with  proper  names,  upon  which  Pappenheim 
bases  so  much  of  his  argument.  All  Greek  scholars 
would  agree  that  the  expression  does  not  apply  usually 
only  to  the  disciples  of  any  teacher,  but  ol  irepl  rbv 
AlvrjatSTj/juov,  for  instance,  includes  Aenesidemus  with  his 
followers,  and  is  literally  translated,  "Aenesidemus  and 
his  followers."  It  is  noticeable,  however,  in  the  writings 
of  Sextus  that  he  uses  the  expression  ol  irepl  often  for 


7(>       Sextm  Empiricus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 


the  name  of  the  founder  of  a  school  alone,  as  Pappen- 
heim  himself  admits.1  We  find  examples  of  this  in  th«- 
mention  of  Plato  and  Democritus  and  Arcesilaus,  as 
01  Trepl  TOV  TIXaTtova  Kai  A^jjuoKpiTov2  and  ol  Trepl  TOP 
'Apx€<ri\aw*  and  accordingly  we  have  no  right  to  infer 
that  his  use  of  the  name  Aenesidemus  in  this  way  has 
an  exceptional  Muniiicance.  It  may  mean  Aenesidemus 
alone,  or  it  mav  Minify  Aenesidemus  in  connection  with 
his  followers. 

In  reply  to  Zeller's  position,  that  Sextus  and  Ter- 
tullian  have  misunderstood  Aenesidemus,  and  quote 
from  some  common  author  who  misrepi  him, 

we  would  admit  that  such  a  misunderstanding  miuht 
be  possible  where  Sextus  gives  long  explanations  of 
Hnaclitus'  teachings,  beginning  witli  quoting  Aene- 
sidemus,  and  eontinuing  in  such  a  way  that  it  is  not 
always  possible  to  distinguish  just  the  part  that  is 
attributed  to  Aenesidemus;  but  such  a  misunderstand- 
ing certainly  cannot  be  asserted  in  regard  to  the  direct 
statement  that  Aenesidemus  regarded  Scepticism  as  the 
path  to  the  philosophy  of  Heraclitus,  for  tho  reasons 
previously  given.  Neither  would  we  agree  with 
Brochard,  whose  solution  of  the  difficulty  is  on  the 
whole  the  most  logical,  i.e.,  that  Aenesidemus  had  neces- 
sarily already  passed  through  two  phases  of  philosophical 
belief.  It  is  possible  to  admit  a  gradual  evolution  of 
thought  in  Aenesidemus  without  supposing  in  either 
case  a  change  of  basis.  His  withdrawal  from  the 
Academy  is  an  argument  against,  rather  than  in  favor 


1   Pappenheirn  Op.  cit.  p.  21.  -  Adv.  Math.  vm.  6. 

3  Adv.  Math.  vn.  150. 


Aenesidemus  and  the  Philosophy  of  Heraclitus.     77 

of,  a  change  on  his  part,  and  was  caused  by  the  well- 
known  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  Academy. 

Many  of  the  teachings  of  the  Sceptical  School  were 
taken  directly  from  the  Academy,  belonging  to  those 
doctrines  advocated  in  the  Academy  before  the  eclectic 
dogmatic  tendency  introduced  by  Antiochus.  In  fact, 
Sextus  himself  claims  a  close  relation  between  the 
Middle  Academy  and  Pyrrhonism.1  Aenesidemus, 
although  he  was  a  Sceptic,  belonged  to  the  Academy, 
and  on  leaving  it  became,  as  it  were,  a  pioneer  in 
Pyrrhonism,  and  cannot  be  judged  in  the  same  way 
as  we  should  judge  a  Sceptic  of  Sextus'  time. 

It  seems  a  self-evident  fact  that  during  the  two 
centuries  which  elapsed  between  the  time  of  Aeneside- 
mus and  Sextus,  the  standpoint  of  judgment  in  the 
Sceptical  School  had  greatly  changed.  An  example 
illustrating  this  change  we  find  in  a  comparison  of  the 
presentation  of  Scepticism  by  Diogenes  with  that  of 
Sextus.  The  author  whom  Diogenes  follows,  probably 
one  of  the  Sceptical  writers,  considers  Xenophanes,  Zeno, 
and  Democritus,  Sceptics,  and  also  Plato,2  while  Sextus, 
in  regard  to  all  of  these  men,  opposes  the  idea  t"hat  they 
were  Sceptics.3  Diogenes  also  calls  Heraclitus  a  Sceptic, 
and  even  Homer,4  and  quotes  sceptical  sayings  from 
the  Seven  Wise  Men ; 5  he  includes  in  the  list  of  Scep- 
tics, Archilochus,  Euripides,  Empedocles,  and  Hippoc- 
rates/ and,  furthermore,  says  that  Theodosius,  probably 
one  of  the  younger  Sceptics,  objected  to  the  name 


1  Hyp.  i.  232.  *  Diog.  ix.  11,  71. 

»  Diog.  ix.  11,  17—72.  *  Diog.  ix.  11,  71. 

3  Hyp.  i.  213—214;  i.  223—225.  6  Diog.  ix.  11,  71—73. 


78       Sextua  Empii'icua  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

'  Pyrrhonean '  on  the  ground  that  Pyrrho  was  not  the 
first  Sceptic.1 

We  have  given  the  testimony  from  ninny  sources, 
to  the  effect  that  before  the  time  of  Sextus  the  Empiri- 
cal School  of  Medicine  was  considered  identical  with 
Scepticism,  although  not  so  by  Sextus  himself.  From 
all  of  these  things  we  may  infer  a  narrowing  of  the  limits 
of  Pyrrhonism  in  the  time  of  Sextus. 

Let  us  accept  with  Brochard  tin  development  of 
thought  seen  in  Aenesidemus  from  the  beginning  to 
tin-  (nd  of  his  career,  without  agreeing  with  him  that 
Aeneaidemus  ever  consciously  changed  his  basis.  He 
in  the  Academy.  He  left  the  Academy 
on  that  account,  and  he  n  mained  a  Sceptic  to  the  end, 
in  so  far  U  a  man  ran  be  a  Sceptic,  and  take  the 
positive  .-land  that  Aenrsidrnius  did. 

Two  things  might  account  for  his  apparent  dog- 
matism— 

(i)  The  eclectic  spirit  of  his  time. 

(ii)  The  psychological  effect  upon  himself  of  this 
careful  systemisation  of  the  Sceptical  teachings. 

Let  us  consider  the  first  of  these  causes.  Aeneside- 
mus, although  not  the  first  of  the  later  Sceptics,  was. 
apparently  the  first  to  separate  himself  from  the 
A  on  demy.  He  was  the  founder  of  a  new  movement, 
the  attempt  to  revive  the  older  Scepticism  as  taught  by 
Pyrrho  and  Timon,  and  separate  it  from  the  dogmatic 
teachings  of  the  Stoics  which  were  so  greatly  affecting 
the  Scepticism  of  the  New  Academy.  It  wa>  the  spirit 
of  his  time  to  seek  to  sustain  all  philosophical  teaching 

1  Diog.  ix.  n.  TO. 


Aenesidemus  and  the  Philosophy  of  Heraclitus.     79 

by  the  authority  of  as  many  as  possible  of  the  older 
philosophers,  and  he  could  hardly  escape  the  tendency 
which  his  training  in  the  Academy  had  unconsciously 
given  him.  Therefore  we  find  him  trying  to  prove  that 
the  philosophy  of  Heraclitus  follows  from  Scepticism.  It 
is  not  necessary  either  to  explain  the  matter,  as  both 
Hirzel  and  Natorp  so  ingeniously  attempt  to  do,  by 
claiming  that  the  truth  of  contradictory  predicates  which 
Aenesidemus  accepted  from  Heraclitus  referred  only  to 
phenomena.  The  history  of  philosophy  gives  us  abun- 
dant proof  of  the  impossibility  of  absolute  Scepticism, 
and  Aenesidemus  furnishes  us  with  one  example  of  many 
of  this  impossibility,  and  of  the  dogmatism  that  must 
exist  in  connection  with  all  thought.  In  the  case  of 
Aenesidemus,  who  evidently  gave  the  best  efforts  of  his 
life  to  establish  the  Sceptical  School,  the  dogmatism  was 
probably  unconscious.  That  he  remained  to  the  end 
a  Sceptic  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  he  was  known  as 
such  to  posterity.  Nowhere  do  we  find  a  change  of 
basis  referred  to  in  regard  to  him,  and  Sextus,  in 
refuting  the  mistakes  which  he  attributes  to  Aene- 
sidemus, does  it,  as  it  were,  to  point  out  something  of 
which  Aenesidemus  had  been  unconscious. 

Let  us  consider  here  the  second  cause  of  Aeneside- 
mus' Dogmatism,  the  psychological  effect  upon  himself 
of  formulating  Sceptical  beliefs.  The  work  that  he  did 
for  the  Sceptical  School  was  a  positive  one.  It  occupied 
years  of  his  life,  and  stamped  itself  upon  his  mental 
development.  In  formulating  Scepticism,  and  in  ad- 
vocating it  against  the  many  enemies  of  the  School, 
and  amidst  all  the  excitement  of  the  disruption  from 
the  Academy,  and  of  establishing  a  new  School,  it  was 


so      Seotfus  Empiricus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

inevitable  that,   liis  mind  .should   take  a  dogmatic 
denry.     He  remained  a  Sceptic  as  IK.'  had  always  been, 
but  must   liave  grown  dogmatic  in  his  attitude  tov. 
the  Sceptical  formulae,  and  was  thus  able  to  adopt  some 
<>!'    the    teachings    of    Ileraclitus,   unconscious   of    their 
inconsistency. 

Where  should  we  find  a  modern  writer  who  is  c 

it  in  all  his  statements?  Could  we  read  the  works 
of  Aenesidemus,  we  might  better  understand  the  con- 
nection between  the  apparently  contradictory  ideas  in 
his  teaching,  but  the  incn:  Q  statement  i 

probably   remain.      It   is  necessary  to   remember    the 
position   of  Aenesidemus    in    breaking  away  from    the 
Academy  and  in  founding  a  new  school,  the  full 
ficance  of  which   he  could   not  foresee.     There  must 
iarily  be  some  crudenen  in  pioneer  \v«  some 

failure  to  see  the  bearing  of  all  its  parts,  and  a  compiler 
like  Sextus  could  point  out  the  inconsistencies  which 
the  two  centuries  since  the  time  of  Aenesidemu- 
made  plain.     Aenesidemus  was  too  positive  a  char 

dmit  of  absolute  Sceptical  consistency.  He  was 
nevertheless  the  greatest  thinker  the  Sceptical  School 
had  known  since  the  age  of  Pyrrho,  its  founder.  In 
claiming  a  union  between  Pyrrhonism  and  the  philo- 
sophy of  Heraclitus,  he  recognised  also  the  pre-Socnatic 
tendency  of  the  Sceptical  School.  The  name  of  Soc 
was  all  powerful  in  the  Academy,  but  Aenesidemus  com- 
prehended the  fact  that  the  true  spirit  of  Pyrrhonism 
was  of  earlier  origin  than  the  Academic  Scepsis. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Critical  Examination  of  Pyrrhonism. 

The  distinct  philosophical  movement  of  which  Pyrrho 
was  the  author  bore  his  name  for  five  centuries  after  his 
death.  It  had  an  acknowledged  existence  as  a  philo- 
sophical tendency,  if  indeed  not  a  sect,  for  a  great  part 
of  that  time.  Yet,  when  we  carefully  analyse  the 
relation  of  Pyrrhonism,  as  presented  to  us  by  Sextus, 
to  the  teachings  of  Pyrrho  himself,  in  so  far  as  they 
can  be  known,  we  find  many  things  in  Pyrrhonism  for 
which  Pyrrho  was  not  responsible. 

The  foundation  elements  of  the  movement,  the  spirit 
of  Empirical  doubt  that  lay  underneath  and  caused  its 
development  in  certain  directions  rather  than  others, 
are  due  to  Pyrrho.  The  methods  of  the  school,  however, 
were  very  foreign  to  anything  found  in  the  life  or  teach- 
ings of  Pyriho.  Pyrrho  was  eminently  a  moralist.  He 
was  also  to  a  great  degree  an  ascetic,  and  he  lived  his 
philosophy,  giving  it  thus  a  positive  side  wanting  in  the 
Pyrrhonism  presented  to  us  by  Sextus.  Timon  represents 
him  as  desiring  to  escape  from  the  tedious  philosophical 
discussions  of  his  time  — 


&  yepov  &  Ilvppwv,  TTW?  r)  Trb6ev  etcSvcnv  evpes 
Bo^&v  re  /cepo^poavvrj^  re  O- 


M*       Sextua  Empiricus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

,'ind  a^ain  be  of  his  modest  and  tranquil  life  — 

TOVTO  pot,,  (!)  TIvppwv,  ipelperai  rj-rop  dfcovcrac 
7TW9  TTOT'  avrjp  eV  ayets  Travra  f 
fjiovvo?  SavQptoTTOicri  deov  rpojrov  rj 


alel  a<f>povTio-Ta)<;  fcal  iutivfaw*  Kara  ravra 
i]Sv\6jov 


Pyri-li.)  wished  more  than  anything  rl>«:  to  live  in 
peace,  and   his  dislike  of  the  Sophists2  may  well  hav»/ 
made  him  try  to  avoid  dialectic;  while,  on  the  contrary, 
in  tli<-  Pyrrhonean  School  of  InU-r  timrs  discussion  was 
one  of  the  principal  ni«-thuds  of  contest,  at   I 
the  time  of  Agrippa.     Pyrrhonism  seems  to  have  been 
nriiiinally  a  theory  of  life,  like  the  philosophy  of  Socrates, 
to  whom    Pyrrho  is  often   compared;'  and  Pyrrho,  like 
ites,    lived    his    philosophy.      Our    knowledge    of 
Pyrrho    is  gained   from   Aristocles,  Sextus   Empiricus, 
and   Diogeoes,  and  from  the  Academic  traditions  L: 
1)\  (  iioera     Diogenes  gives  us  details  of  his  lite  which 
he  attributes  to  Antigonus  of  Carystius,  who  lived  about 
tin-  time  of  Pyrrho.4    Pyrrho  was  a  disciple  and  adi 
of  Democritus,5  some  of  whose  teachings  bore  a  lasting 
influence  over  the  subsequent  development  of  Pyrrho- 
nism.     He  accompanied  Alexander  the  Great  to  India, 
where  he  remained  as  a  member  of  his  suite  for 
time,  and    the   philosophical   ideas  of  India   were   not 
without  influence  on  his  teachings.    Oriental  philosophy 

1  Diog.  ix.    11,  65.     Given  from  Mullach's  edition  of  Timon  by 

m  primitive,  p.  .52"). 

•  Diog.  ix.  11,  69.  *  Diog.  ix.  11,  02. 

3  Lewes  Op.  cit.  p.  460.  »  Diog.  ix.  11. 


Critical  Examination  of  Pyrrhonism.         83 

was  not  unknown  in  Greece  long  before  the  time  of 
Pyrrho,  but  his  personal  contact  with  the  Magi  and  the 
Gymnosophists  of  the  far  East,  apparently  impressed 
upon  his  mind  teachings  for  which  he  was  not  unpre- 
pared by  his  previous  study  and  natural  disposition. 
In  his  indifference  to  worldly  goods  we  find  a  strong 
trace  of  the  Buddhistic  teaching  regarding  the  vanity 
of  human  life.  He  showed  also  a  similar  hopelessness 
in  regard  to  the  possibility  of  finding  a  satisfactory 
philosophy,  or  absolute  truth.  He  evidently  returned 
from  India  with  the  conviction  that  truth  was  not  to 
be  attained.1 

After  the  death  of  Alexander  and  Pyrrho's  return 
to  Greece,  he  lived  quietly  with  his  sister  at  Elis,  and 
Diogenes  says  that  he  was  consistent  in  his  life,  asserting 
and  denying  nothing,  but  in  everything  withholding  his 
opinion,  as  nothing  in  itself  is  good  or  shameful,  just  or 
unjust.2  He  was  not  a  victim  of  false  pride,  but  sold 
animals  in  the  market  place,  and,  if  necessary,  washed 
the  utensils  himself.3  He  lived  in  equality  of  spirit, 
and  practised  his  teachings  with  serenity.  If  one  went 
out  while  he  was  talking  he  paid  no  attention,  but  went 
calmly  on  with  his  remarks.4  He  liked  to  live  alone, 
and  to  travel  alone,  and  on  one  occasion,  being  knocked 
about  in  a  vessel  by  a  storm  at  sea,  he  did  not  lose  his 
imperturbability,  but  pointed  to  a  swine  calmly  eating 
on  board,  and  said  that  the  wise  man  should  have  as 
much  calmness  of  soul  as  that.  He  endured  difficult 
surgical  operations  with  indifference,5  and  when  his 

1  Compare  Maccoll  Op.  cit.  4  Diog.  ix.  11,  63. 

2  Diog.  ix.  11,  61,  62.  5  Diog.  ix.  11,  67. 

3  Diog.  ix.  11,  66 


84       Sextua  Empiricus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

friend  Anaxarchus  was  once  unfortunate  enough  to  fall 
into  a  morass,  he  went  calmly  by  without  stopping  to 
help  him,  for  which  consistency  of  conduct  Anaxarchus 
afterwards  praised  him.  There  are  two  instances  given 
by  Diogenes  when  he  lost  control  of  himself;  once  in 
getting  angry  with  his  sister,  and  once  in  trying  to  save 
himself  when  chased  by  a  dog.  When  accused  of  incon- 
sistency, he  said  it  was  difficult  to  entirely  give  up  one's 
Imm.'inity.1  He  was  greatly  venerated  by  the  people 
among  whom  he  lived,  who  made  him  high  priest,  and 
on  his  account  exempted  all  philosophers  from  taxation,2 
and  after  his  death  erected  a  statue  to  his  memory. 
These  facts  testify  to  his  moral  character,  and  also  to 
fulfil  the  functions  of  high  priest  a  certain  amount  of 
dogmatism  must  liav.  been  necessary. 

According  to  Diogenes, "  We  cannot  know,"  said  Pyr- 
l  rho,  "  what  things  are  in  themselves,  either  by  sensation 
1  or  by  judgment,  and,  as  we  cannot  distinguish  the  true 
/   from  the  false,  therefore  we  should  live  impassively,  and 
without  an  opinion/'    The  term  eVo^?;,  so  characteristic 
/  of  Pyrrhonism,  goes  back,  according  to  Diogenes,  to  the 
I  time  of  Pyrrho.3     Nothing  is,  in  itself,  one  thing  more 
than  another,  but  all  experience  is  related  to  pheno- 
mena, and  no  knowledge  is  possible  through  the  senses.4 
Pyrrho's  aim  was   arapagta   and   his  life  furnished  a 
marked  example  of  the  spirit  of  indifference,  for  which 
the  expression  cnrdOeia  is  better  suited  than  the  later 
one,  arapa^ia.     The  description  of  his  life  with  his  sister 
confirms  this,  where  the   term  aSiafopla  is  used   to 


1  Diog.  ix.  11,  66.  3  Diog.  ix.  11,  61. 

2  Diog.  ix.  11,  64.  «  Diog.  ix.  11,  61—62. 


Critical  Examination  of  Pyrrhonism.         85 

describe  his  conduct.1  He  founded  his  Scepticism  on 
the  equivalence  of  opposing  arguments.2 

The  picture  given  of  Pyrrho  by  Cicero  is  entirely 
different  from  that  of  Diogenes,  and  contrasts  decidedly 
with  it.3  Cicero  knows  Pyrrho  as  a  severe  moralist,  not 
as  a  Sceptic.  Both  authors  attribute  to  Pyrrho  the 
doctrine  of  indifference  and  apathy,  but,  according  to 
Cicero,  Pyrrho  taught  of  virtue,  honesty,  and  the 
summum  bonum,  while  Diogenes  plainly  tells  us  that 
he  considered  nothing  as  good  in  itself,  "and  of  all  things 
nothing  as  true."4  Cicero  does  not  once  allude  to  Pyrrho- 
nean  doubt.  We  see  on  the  one  hand,  in  Cicero's  idea 
of  Pyrrho,  the  influence  of  the  Academy,  perhaps  even 
of  Antiochus  himself,5  which  probably  colored  the 
representations  given  of  Pyrrho  ;  but,  on  the  other  hand, 
there  is  much  in  Diogenes'  account  of  Pyrrho's  life  and 
teachings,  and  in  the  writings  of  Timon,  which  shows  us 
the  positive  side  of  Pyrrho.  Pyrrho,  in  denying  the 
possibility  of  all  knowledge,  made  that  rather  a  motive 
for  indifference  in  the  relations  of  life,  than  the  founda- 
tion thought  of  a  philosophical  system.  His  teaching 
has  a  decided  ethical  side,  showing  in  that  respect  the 
strong  influence  of  Democritus  over  him,  who,  like 
Pyrrho,  made  happiness  to  consist  in  a  state  of  feeling.6 
The  one  motive  of  all  of  Pyrrho's  teaching  is  a  positive 
one,  the  desire  for  happiness. 

The  essence  of  Pyrrhonism  as  given  by  Tiruon  is  as 
follows : 7  Man  desires  to  be  happy.  To  realise  his 

1  Diog.  ix.  11.  66.  5  Compare  Natorp  Op.  cit.  p.  71. 

2  Diog.  IJL.  11.  106.  6  Zeller  Grundriss  der  Griechischen  Phil.  p.  70. 

3  De  oral.  Ill,  62.  7  Aristocles  ap.  Eusebium  Praep.  Ev.  xiv.  18. 
4  Diog.  ix.  11,  61. 


•S(i       SeoctUB  tiiHi/n'icua  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

desire  he  must  consider  three  things: 
(i)   What  is  the  nature  of  thing 
(ii)  How  should  man  conduct  himself  in  relation  to 
them? 

(iii)  What  is  the  result  to  him  of  this  relation  ? 

The  nature  of  things  is  unknown.     Our  relation  to 
them  must  be  one  of  suspension  of  judgment,  without 
activity,  desire,  or  belief, — that  is,  an  entirely  negative 
relation.     The  result  is  that  state  of  having  no  opi; 
called  tVo^//,  which  is  followed  in  turn  by  arapagia. 

lrfhe  problem  of  philosophy  is  here  proposed  very 
nearly  in  the  terms  of  Kant,  but  not  with  the  positive 
motive,  like  that  of  the  great  philosopher  of  Germany, 
of  evolving  a  system  to  present  the  truth.  Yet  the  im- 
portance of  these  questions  shows  the  originality  of 
Pyrrho.  The  earnestness  of  Pyrrho  is  further  >ho\vn  by 
an  example  given  by  Diogenes.  Once  on  being  found 
talking  to  himself  alone,  he  said,  when  asked  the  reason, 
that  he  was  meditating  how  to  become  a  good  man 
(XPT/O-TO?),2  thus  showing  an  entirely  different  spirit 
from  anything  found  in  Sextus'  books.  The  explanation 
of  his  life  and  teachings  is  to  be  found  largely  in  his 
own  disposition.  Such  an  attitude  of  indifference  must 
belong  to  a  placid  nature,  and  cannot  be  entirely  the 
result  of  a  philosophical  system,  and,  while  it  can  be 
aimed  at,  it  can  never  be  perfectly  imitated.  One  of 
his  disciples  recognised  this,  and  said  that  it  was  neces- 
sary to  have  the  disposition  of  Pyrrho  in  order  to  hold  his 
doctrines.3  Diogenes  tells  us  that  he  was  the  first  to 
advance  any  formulae  of  Scepticism,4  but  they  must 

1  Compare  Maccoll  Op.cit.  p.  21.        3  Diog.  ix.  11,  70,  64. 

2  Diog.  ix.  11,  64.  4  Dio-.  ix.  11,  69;  ix.  11,  61. 


Critical  Examination  of  Pyrrhonism.         87 

have  been  very  elementary,  as  Pyrrho  himself  wrote 
nothing.  We  find  no  trace  of  formulated  Tropes  in 
Pyrrho's  teachings,  yet  it  is  probable  that  he  indicated 
some  of  the  contradictions  in  sensation,  and  possibly  the 
Tropes  in  some  rudimentary  form.  Of  the  large  number 
of  sceptical  formulae,  or  (fxovai,  the  three  which  seem  to 
have  the  oldest  connection  with  Scepticism  are  the  avri- 
\o7/a,  the  ovBev  dp/£a>,  and  the  ov  pa\\ov.1  We  know 
from  Diogenes  that  Protagoras  is  the  authority  for  saying 
that  in  regard  to  everything  there  are  two  opposing 
arguments.2  The  saying  "  to  determine  nothing "  is 
quoted  from  Timon's  Python  by  Diogenes,3  and  the 
other  two  mentioned  are  also  attributed  to  him  by 
Aristocles.4  We  have  also  in  the  ov  paXkov  a  direct 
connection  with  Democritus,  although  the  difference  in 
the  meaning  which  he  attributed  to  it  is  shown  by 
Sextus.5  So  while  the  expression  is  the  same,  the 
explanation  of  it  given  by  Pyrrho  must  have  been 
different.  It  would  seem  probable  that  Pyrrho  used 
all  of  these  three  sayings,  from  the  account  of  Diogenes, 
and  that  even  then  they  gave  rise  to  the  accusation  of 
the  Dogmatics,  that  simply  by  possessing  such  sayings 
the  Sceptics  dogmatised,6  for  the  refutation  of  this  used 
by  Sextus  occurs  in  the  old  account  of  the  sayings, 
namely,  that  these  formulae  include  also  themselves 
in  the  meaning,  as  a  cathartic  removes  itself  together 
with  other  harmful  objects.7 

In  comparing  the  later  Pyrrhonism  with  the  teach- 
ings of  Pyrrho,  we  would   sharply  contrast  the  moral 

1  Hyp.  i.  202 ;  Diog.  ix.  8,  51 ;  Photius  Bekker's  ed.  280  H. 

2  Photius  Bekker's  ed.  280  H.         3  Hyp.  i.  197;  Diog.  ix.  11.  76. 
4  Aristocles  ap.  Eusebium,  Praep.  Ev.  xiv.18.  5  Hyp.  i.  213. 

6  Diog.  ix.  11,  68—76.  7  Diog.  ix.  11,  76;  Hyp.  i.  206. 


88       Sextua  Empii-icus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

attitude  of  the  two.  With  Pyrrho  equilibrium  of  soul 
a  means  to  be  applied  to  his  positive  theory  of  life; 
with  tin-  later  Pyrrhoneans  it  was  the  end  to  be  attained. 
We  would  attribute,  however,  the  empirical  tendency 
shown  during  the  whole  history  of  Pyrrhonism  to  Pyrrho 
M  ita  "rininator.  He  WfU)  an  empirical  philosopher,  and 
the  result  of  his  influence  in  this  respect,  as  seen  in  the 
subsequent  development  of  the  school,  stands  in  m;i 
contrast  to  tin-  dial«rti<-  spirit  of  the  Academic  Scepsis. 
The  empirieism  of  the  school  is  shown  in  its  scientific 
lore,  in  the  fact  that  so  many  of  the  Sceptics  were 
physicians,  and  in  the  character  of  the  ten  Tropes  of 
eVo^?;.  We  may  safely  affirm  that  tin-  foundation 
principles  of  Pyrrhonism  are  due  to  Pyrrho,  and  the 
originality  which  gave  the  school  its  power.  The 
elaborated  arguments,  however,  and  the  details  of  its 
formulae  belong  to  later  times. 

Con ii n_;  now  to  the  relation  of  Pyrrhonism  to  the 
Academy,  the  connection  between  the  two  is  difficult 
to  exactly  determine,  between  the  time  of  Pyrrho  and 
that  of  Aenesidemus.  Scepticism  in  the  Academy 
however,  never  absolutely  identical  with  Pyrrhonism, 
although  at  certain  periods  of  the  history  of  the  Aca- 
demy the  difference  was  slight.  We  can  trace  throughout 
the  evolution  of  doubt,  as  shown  to  us  in  Pyrrhonism., 
and  in  Academic  Scepticism,  the  different  results  which 
followed  the  difference  in  origin  of  the  two  movements, 
and  these  differences  followed  according  to  general  laws 
of  development  of  thought.  Arcesilaus,  who  introduced 
doubt  into  the  Academy,  claimed  to  return  to  the  dia- 
lectic of  Socrates,  and  suppressing  the  lectures,1  which 
1  Compare  Maccoll  Op.  tit.  p.  36. 


Critical  Examination  of  Pyrrhonism.         89 

were  the  method  of  teaching  in  the  later  schools  of 
philosophy,  introduced  discussions  instead,  as  being 
more  decidedly  a  Socratic  method.  Although,  accord- 
ing to  Sextus,  he  was  the  one  leader  of  the  Academy 
whose  Scepticism  most  nearly  approached  that  of 
-^Pyrrhonism,1  yet  underneath  his  whole  teaching  lay 
that  dialectic  principle  so  thoroughly  in  opposition  to 
the  empiricism  of  Pyrrho.  The  belief  of  Socrates  and 
Plato  in  the  existence  of  absolute  truth  never  entirely 
lost  its  influence  over  the  Academy,  but  was  like  a 
hidden  germ,  destined  to  reappear  after  Scepticism  had 
passed  away.  It  finally  led  the  Academy  back  to  Dog- 
matism, and  prepared  the  way  for  the  Eclecticism  with 
which  it  disappeared  from  history. 

The  history  of  Pyrrhonism  and  that  of  Academic 
Scepticism  were  for  a  time  contemporaneous.  The  im- 
mediate follower  of  Pyrrho,  Timon,  called  by  Sextus  the 
"  prophet  of  Pyrrho,"2  was  a  contemporary  of  Arcesilaus. 
That  he  did  not  consider  the  Scepticism  of  the  Academy 
identical  with  Pyrrhonism  is  proved  from  the  fact  that 
he  did  not  himself  join  the  Academy,  but  was,  on  the 
contrary,  far  from  doing  so.  That  he  regarded  Arcesilaus 
as  a  Dogmatic  is  evident  from  his  writings.3  One  day, 
on  seeing  the  chief  of  the  Academy  approaching,  he 
cried  out,  "  What  are  you  doing  here  among  us  who  are 
free?"4  After  the  death  of  Timon,  the  Pyrrhonean 
School  had  no  representative  till  the  time  of  Ptolemy 
of  Gyrene,5  and  Greek  Scepticism  was  represented  by 
the  Academy.  That  Pyrrho  had  a  strong  influence 
over  Arcesilaus,  the  founder  of  the  Middle  Academy, 

1  Hyp.  i.  232.         2  Adv.  Math.  I.  53.         3  Diog.  iv.  6,  33,  34. 
4  Diog.  ix.  12,  114.  5  Diog.  ix.  12,  115. 


DO       >^<£tu8  Empirics  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

is  evident1 ;  but  there  was  also  never  a  time  when  the 
Academy  entirely  broke  away  from  all  the  teachings  of 
Plato,  even  in  their  deepest  doubt.2  It  is  true  that 
Arcesilaus  removed,  nominally  as  well  as  in  spirit,  some 
of  the  dialogues  of  Plato  from  the  Academy,  but  only 
those  that  bore  a  dogmatic  character,  while  those  that 
presented  a  more  d»vide<l  mode  of  questioning, 

without  reaching  any  decided  result,  men  regarded  as 
authority  for  Scepticism. 

Sextus  docs  not  deny  that  Arce.silaus  was  almost  a 
Pyrrhonean,  but  he  claims  that  his  Pyrrhonism  was 
only  apparent,  and  not  real,  and  was  used  as  a  cloak  to 
hide  his  loyalty  to  the  teachings  of  Plato.3  As  Ariston 
said  of  him,4  "Plato  before,  Pyrrho  behind,  Diodorus  in 
the  middle."  Sextus  also  characterises  the  method  of 
Arcesilaus  as  dialectic,5  and  we  know  from  Cicero  that 
it  was  his  pride  to  pretend  to  return  to  the  dialectic  of 
Socrates. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Sextus,  in  his  refuta- 
tion of  the  position  that  the  Academy  is  the  same  as 
Pyrrhonism,  takes  up  the  entire  development  of  Aca- 
demic thought  from  the  time  of  Plato  till  that  of 
Antiochus,  and  does  not  limit  the  argument  to  Scep- 
ticism under  Arcesilaus.  The  claim  made  by  some 
that  the  two  schools  were  the  same,  is  stated  by  him,6 
and  the  word  'some'  probably  refers  to  members  of 
both  schools  at  different  periods  of  their  history.  Sextus 
recognises  three  Academies,  although  he  remarks  that 
some  make  even  a  further  division,  calling  that  of  Philo 

1  Diog.  iv.  6,  33.  4  Diog.  iv.  6,  33. 

2  Diog.  iv.  6,  32.  5  Hyp.  I.  234. 

3  Hyp.  i.  234.  6  Hyp.  I.  220. 


Critical  Examination  of  Pyrrhonism.         91 

and  Charmides,  the  fourth,  and  that  of  Antiochus  and 
his  followers,  the  fifth. 

That  many  in  the  Academy,  and  even  outside  of  it, 
regarded  Plato  as  a  Sceptic,  and  an  authority  for  sub- 
sequent Scepticism,  we  find  both  from  Sextus  and 
Diogenes.1  As  Lewes  justly  remarks,  one  could  well 
find  authority  for  Scepticism  in  the  works  of  Plato,  as 
indeed  the  Academicians  did,  but  not  when  the  sum 
total  of  his  teachings  was  considered.  The  spirit  of 
Plato's  teachings  was  dogmatic,  as  Sextus  most  de- 
cidedly recognises,  and  as  Aenesidemus  and  Menodotus2 
recognised  before  him.3  Sextus  himself  shows  us  that 
Plato's  idealism  and  ethical  teachings  can  have  nothing 
in  common  with  Scepticism,  for  if  he  accepts  the 
desirability  of  the  virtuous  life,  and  the  existence  of 
Providence,  he  dogmatises;  and  if  he  even  regards 
them  as  probable,  he  gives  preference  to  one  set  of 
ideas  over  another,  and  departs  from  the  sceptical 
character.  Sextus  characterises  the  sceptical  side  of 
Plato's  writings  as  mental  gymnastics,4  which  do  not 
authorise  his  being  called  a  Sceptic,  and  affirms  that 
Plato  is  not  a  Sceptic,  since  he  prefers  some  unknown 
things  to  others  in  trustworthiness.  The  ethical  differ- 
ence underlying  the  teachings  of  the  Academy  and 
Pyrrhonism,  Sextus  was  very  quick  to  see,  and  although 
it  is  very  probable  that  the  part  of  the  Hypotyposes 
which  defines  the  difference  between  the  Academy  and 
Pyrrhonism  may  be  largely  quoted  from  the  introduc- 
tion to  Aenesidemus'  works,  yefc  Sextus  certainly  gives 
these  statements  the  strong  stamp  of  his  approval.  He 

1  Hyp.  i.  221 ;  Diog.  ix.  11,  72.  3  Hyp.  i.  222. 

2  Bekker's  edition  of  Hyp.  i.  222.  4  Hyp.  i.  223. 


!):!       >SV./-///..s  EmpirlcuH  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

coi  idem  us  the  Academy  because  of  the  theory  that  good 
and  evil  exist,  or  if  this  cannot  be  decidedlv  proved, yet 
that  it  is  more  probable  that  what  is  railed  good  < 
than  the  contrary.1 

The  whole  Academic  teaching  of  probabilities  con- 
tradicted the  standpoint  of  the  Sceptics — that  our  ideas 
are  equal  as  regards  trustworthiness  and  untrustworthi- 
ness,2  for  the  Academicians  declared  that  some  ideas 
are  probable  and  some  improbable,  and  they  make  a 
difference  even  in  those  ideas  that  they  call  probable. 

Sextus  claims  that  there  are  three  fundamental 
grounds  of  difference  between  Pyrrhonism  and  the 
Academy.  The  first  is  the  doctrine  of  probability 
which  the  Academicians  accept  in  regard  to  the  supe- 
rior trust  worth  in-  me  ideas  over  others.8  The 
second  is  the  different  way  in  which  the  two  schools 
follow  their  teachers.  The  Pyrrhoneans  follow  without 
striving  or  strong  effort,  or  even  strong  inclination,  as  a 
child  follows  his  teacher,  while  the  Academicians  follow 
with  sympathy  and  assent,  as  Carneades  and  Clito- 
machus  affirm.4  The  third  difference  is  in  the  aim,  for 
the  Academicians  follow  what  is  probable  in  life.  The 
Sceptics  follow  nothing,  but  live  according  to  laws, 
customs,  and  natural  feelings  undogmatu -ally.5 

The  difference  between  the  later  teaching  of  the 
Academy  and  Pyrrhonism  is  evident,  and  Sextus  treats 
of  it  briefly,  as  not  requiring  discussion,6  as  Philo  taught 
that  the  nature  of  facts  is  incomprehensible,  and  Antio- 
chus  transferred  the  Stoa  to  the  Academy.  It  is  therefore 

1  Hyp.  i.  226.  *  Hyp.  i.  230. 

2  Hyp.  i.  227.  5  Hyp.  i.  231. 

3  Hyp.  i.  229.  •  Hyp.  i.  235. 


Critical  Examination  of  Pyrrhonism.         93 

evident,  from  the  comparison  which  we  have  made, 
that  we  do  not  find  in  the  Academy,  with  which  Scep- 
ticism after  the  death  of  Timon  was  so  long  united,  the 
exact  continuance  of  Pyrrhonism.  The  philosophical 
enmity  of  the  two  contemporaries,  Timon  and  Arcesilaus, 
the  Academician  who  had  most  in  common  with  Pyr- 
rhonism, is  an  expression  of  the  fundamental  incom- 
patibility between  the  two  schools. 

During  all  the  chequered  history  of  the  Academy 
the  dormant  idealism  was  there,  underlying  the  outward 
development.  Although  during  the  time  of  Arcesilaus 
and  Carneades  the  difference  was  so  slight  as  to  seem 
a  mere  matter  of  form  of  expression,  yet  the  different 
foundations  on  which  the  two  schools  stood  was  always 
recognisable.  On  the  one  hand  there  was  the  germ  of 
idealism  which  was  destined  to  awake  to  a  new  life, 
and  on  the  other,  the  attempt  at  absolute  negation 
which  was  to  result  in  the  final  extinction  of  Pyrrho- 
nism. We  find  in  both,  it  is  true,  especially  in  the 
time  of  Arcesilaus,  the  aim  of  eVo^.1  Both  placed 
great  weight  on  IcroaOeveia^  or  the  equal  value  of 
opposing  arguments.2  The  foundation  of  the  GTro^rj 
was,  however,  different  in  the  two  cases.  Arcesilaus 
founded  his  on  dialectic,  while  Pyrrho's  was  empirical. 

The  Pyrrhonean  believed  that  ideas  give  us  no 
knowledge  of  the  outer  world ;  the  Academic  Sceptic 
believed  that  we  cannot  distinguish  between  true  and 
false  ideas,  so  such  knowledge  is  impossible.  The 
Pyrrhonean  denied  that  truth  could  exist  in  ideas 
because  of  their  contradictory  nature,  and  consequently 

1  Hyp.  i.  232.        2  Diog.  ix.  73;  Hyp.  n.  130;  in,  65. 


91       Sextus  Empiricus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 


the  existence  of  all  truth,  fjirj&ev  elvat,  rfj  aXr^Bela  eVl 
TrdvTcav^sThe    Academic    Sceptic    granted    that    the 
_truth    was   possibly  contained   in    ideas,  but   affirn 
_that  it  could  never  be  known  to  us.     The  Pyrrhonean§__ 
prided  themselves  on  still  being  seekers    for  although^ 
ordinary  ideas  are  too  contradictory  knowle 

of  the  outer  world,  they  did  not  deny  that  >ueh  know- 
ledge might   be   possible,  but   simply  susp«-nd«-d    the 
j  i  \  dgment  regarding  it.     To  the  Pyrrhonean  the  re- 
correspond  <-<l  to  tin-  method.     All  ideas  thus  tar  known 
revealed  nothing  of  the  truth,  therefore  he  still 
Tii-    A(  i  i(  mician  tried  logically  to  prove  that  the  truth 
is  impossible  to  find.     It   is  the  relation  of  the  dialec- 
tician   to    the    empiricist,    and    the    two    varieties    of 

•  •xplained  by  their  difference  in  ori;_ 
'  In  Pyrrhonism  there  was  no  con>ti  uctive  element.     In 
the    Academic    Scepsis    such    an    element   was    found 
throughout  all   its  hi.Mory  in   tin-  theory  of  Probability. 
Arcesilaus  himself  laid  great  stress  upon  this  doctrine, 
ich  Sextus  caret  ull\  !y  inconsist- 

ent with  Pyrrhonism.     Arcesilaus  plainly  teaches  that, 
having  suspended  one's  judgment   in  regard  to  m;r 
of  knowledge,  one  should  control  his  choices,  his  refu 
and  his  actions  by  the  probable.3 

After  Antiochus  introduced    Eclecticism    into   the 
Academy,  Pyrrhonism   was  the  only  representative  of 
(Jreek    Scepticism,  and   it  flourished  for  over  two  cen- 
turies after  our  era,  and  then  also  disappeared,  no  more 
;lar  philosophical  school. 

1  Diog.  ix.  11,  61.  -Hyp.  1.229. 

-  Ma,  , 


Critical  Examination  of  Pyrrhonism.         95 

Having  considered  at  length  the  essence  of  Pyrrho- 
nism as  presented  by  Sextus  Empiricus,  it  now  remains 
to  briefly  note  the  characteristics  that  formed  its  strength 
and  weakness,  and   the  causes  of  its  final   downfall. 
Herbart  says  that  every  philosopher  is  a  Sceptic  in  the 
beginning,  bat  every  Sceptic  remains  always  in  the 
beginning.     This  remark  may  well  be  applied  to  Pyr- 
rhonism.    We  find  in  its  teachings  many  fundamental 
philosophical  truths  which  might  have  formed  the  be- 
ginning of  great  philosophical  progress,  but  wh^ch^were 
never  developed  to  any  positive  results.     The  teachings 
of  Pyrrhonism  were  some  of  them  well  fitted  to  prepare 
the  way  to  idealism.    The  great  idea  of  the  relativity  of 
Vorstellungen  is  made  very  prominent  by  the  ten  Tropes 
of  eVo^r/.      Aenesidemus,  in  his  eight  Tropes  against 
aetiology,  shows  the  absurdity  of  the  doctrine  of  causality 
when  upheld  on  materialistic  grounds.    That  was  to  him 
final,  errel  OVK  ecrrai  ainov.     He  could  not  divine  that 
although  the  result  which  he  presented  was  logical,  it 
only  led  to  a  higher  truth.     It  was  reserved  for  the 
greatest  of  modern  philosophers  to  reveal  to  the  world 
that  causality  is  a  condition,  and  a  necessary  condition, 
of  thought.     When  Aenesidemus  proved  by  his  seventh 
Trope  that  causality  is  subjective,  he  regarded  it  as  fatal 
to  the  doctrine ;  yet  this  conclusion  was  a  marked  step 
in  advance  in  critical  philosophy,  although  Aesesidemus- 
could  not  himself  see  it  in  all  its  bearings.     The  great 
difference  between  Aenesidemus  and  Kant  is  the  differ- 
ence between  the  materialist  and  the  believer  in  sub- 
jective reality.     Both  agreed  in  the  unknown  nature  of 
the  Ding  an  sich,  but  this  was  to  the  Pyrrhonist  the  end 
of  all  his  philosophy ;  to  Kant,  however,  the  beginning. 


!H>       Sextus  Empiricus  and  Greek  Scepticism. 

Pyrrhonism  has  rendered,  notwithstandii  .  ats 

of  fatal  weakness,  marked  service  to  the  world  in  science, 
philosophy,  ethics,  and  religion.      It  quickened  scientific 
thought  by  emphasising  empirical   methods  of  invc 
%gation,  and    1>\  all   results  i'ound'-d   without 

sufficient  data  upon  false  hypotheses.      If,  instea 
denying  the  possibility  of  all  sciei  of  the 

.want  of  a  criterion    of  the  truth   of  phenomena,  the" 
Fyrrhonists   had    comprehended    the   possibility   of  a 
science  of  phenomena,  they  mi^ht  have  l.-d   the  world"" 
in  scientific  progress.1 
jn   th«  IS  to   thought   that   t: 

y  j)n  dogmatic  beliefs  occasioned.  Pyrrhonism  brought 
together  all  the  must  prominent  theories  of  the  old 
schools  of  philosophy  to  test  tin 

their  contradictious,  and  this  very  process  of  critici-m 
often  d< •uioii.xti -ated  the  power  oTthe  truth  which  they 
stained. 

Sextus  Empiricus  was  often  charged  by  the  Church 
Fathers  with  corrupting  religious  belief,  and  yet  the 
st  service  which  Pyrrhonism  has  rendered  the 
world  was  in  religious  and  ethical  lines.  This  sen 
did  not,  naturally,  consist  in  destroying  belief  in  al. 
lute  truth,  as  the  Sceptic  professed  to  do,  but  in  preparing 
the  way  to  find  it.  The  bold  attacks  of  Scepticism  on 
all  truth  led  men  to  investigate  ethical  and  religious 
teachings,  to  examine  the  grounds  of  their  belief,  and 
to  put  in  practical  use  the  right  of  reason  and  free 
discussion. 

Scepticism  was  the  antecedent  of  freedom  of  con- 
science and  rational  criticism,2  and  the  absolute  right  of 

1  Compare  Lewes  Op.  cit.  p.  463.        2  Compare  Cbaignet  Op.  cit.  p.  460. 


— 


Critical  Examination  of  Pyrrhonism.         97 

scientific  thought.  The  Sceptics,  however,  reaped  none 
of  the  benefits  of  their  own  system.  They  remained,  as 
it  were,  always  on  the  threshold  of  possible  progress. 
With  the  keys  to  great  discoveries  in  their  hands,  the 
doors  of  philosophical  and  scientific  advancement  were 
for  ever  closed  to  them  by  the  limitations  of  their  own 
system.  The  inherent  weakness  of  Pyrrhonism  lay  in  its  .  ; 
psychological  inconsistency  and  in  its  negative  character. 
I  think  that  weTmay  safely  say  that  Pyrrhonism  was  the 
most  consistent  system  of  Scepticism  ever  offered  to  the 
world,  and  yet  it  proves  most  decidedly  that  complete 
Scepticism  is  psychologically  impossible.  A  man  may 
give  up  his  belief  in  one  set  of  ideas,  and,  if  they  are 
ideas  that  are  popularly  accepted,  he  will  be  called  a 
Sceptic,  as  was  the  case  with  Hume.  He  must,  however, 
replace  these  ideas  by  others  equally  positive,  and  then 
he  is  no  longer  a  Sceptic,  but  a  Dogmatic,  for  he  believes 
in  something. 

We  have  shown  that  the  greatest  thinkers  of  Pyrrho- 
nism, Pyrrho,  Aenesidemus,  and  Agrippa,  were  not 
examples  of  absolute  Scepticism,  and  although  Sextus 
Empiricus  realised  what  consistency  demanded  in  this 
respect,  and  affirmed  on  almost  every  page  that  he  was 
asserting  nothing,  yet  there  is  not  a  paragraph  of  his 
books  in  which  he  does  not,  after  all,  dogmatise  on  some 
subject.  Complete  Scepticism  is  contrary  to  the  funda- 
mental laws  of  language,  as  all  use  of  verbs  involves 
some  affirmation.  The  Pyrrhonists  realised  this,  and 
therefore  some  of  them  wrote  nothing,  like  Pyrrho, 
their  leader,  and  others  advocated  afyacria1  as  one  of 
the  doctrines  of  their  system. 

1  Hyp.  i.  192. 


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